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Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Genesis of the Nationalist Anti- 
Communist Movement in Northeastern Afghanistan, 1969-1979. 
Peter B. DeNeufville King's College, London University 
Between 1969 and December 1979 a nationalist, ethnically- 
Persian or Tajik opposition movement developed in Afghanistan in 
response to the increasing Soviet penetration of the country 
which had begun in 1955. The movement, emanating from the 
Panjsher Valley in northeastern Afghanistan and later known as 
the Northern Alliance, would demonstrate itself, after April 
1980, to be the biggest threat to the Soviet occupation of the 
country. 
While there are a number of studies dealing with the 
entire Soviet-Afghan war, little work has been done to document 
the progression of any single guerrilla front. This study seeks 
to fill this lacuna by exploring the origins of the foremost 
resistance movement and to remove some of the pervasive 
obscurity surrounding Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet War. 
The underlying thesis presented here is that, despite 
common perceptions about the centrality of Pashtuns in Afghan 
society, it was the Tajiks, a highly influential though 
little-understood minority group, and other allied Persian- 
speaking-nationalists, who caused the greatest military damage 
to the Communist regime in Afghanistan in 1978-1979, thereby 
contributing to the Soviet decision to intervene in December 
1979. This study, by moving beyond the historically Pashtun- 
biased, English-language colonial literature on the country, 
is thus also applicable to an understanding of the full 
spectrum of Afghan history. 
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Note on Transliteration 
Persian is a member of the Indo-Iranian language 
family and contains various consonant and vowel phonemes 
foreign to the English ear. For example, the "gh" sound 
in the word "Ghaus" also contains a subtle liquid "r" 
directly after the glottal "h, " creating a sound 
combination nonexistent in English. The "ü" is 
transliterated for four different vowel sounds: "ou" as in 
"Massoud, " "o" as is "koh, " "u" as in "Nuristan, " and "oo" 
as in "Majrooh. " The complexity of these phonetics is 
often intimidating for English readers. The letters "v" 
and "w" are the same letter in the Arabic alphabet, 
pronounced "waw" or "vav, " posing yet another complexity. 
Though Afghans, such as my friend, The Hon. Ravan Farhadi, 
prefer to pronounce the letter as "vav" (the common 
Iranian pronunciation), in cases such as Mohammad Anwar`s 
name I have used the "waw" pattern (traditional in 
Afghanistan). 
I have attempted to follow classical transliteration 
for Persian place names, while at the same time trying to 
present them in a way which English-speaking readers will 
find phonetically recognizable. Whenever possible, I have 
used common spellings for place names such as Nuristan. 
In the case of well-known figures I have relied on 
spellings used by The New York Times, and for earlier 
periods those included in Louis Dupree's Afghanistan. I 
V 
hope that scholars of Persian languages will be tolerant 
of these inconsistencies, recognizing my attempt at 
accessibility for a broad audience. 
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This work grew out of a desire to understand how it was 
that the Soviet military, with its sophisticated armour 
and air power, came to be defeated by an Afghan ethnic 
minority widely assumed, even in its own poor country, to 
be insignificant. ' The events of September 11,2001 
(hereafter, 9/11) have brought into clearer focus the 
need to understand this question, as they have 
highlighted the West's ongoing misunderstanding of it. 2 
In order to answer this question one must go beyond 
geopolitics and examine the social history of men and 
women who, following Afghanistan's first Communist-led 
1 Writing in 1809, Mountstuart Elphinstone, recounting what was told 
to him, wrote that in the period ever since the Arab invasion of 
Afghanistan in the first Islamic century, the Pashtuns "have 
reduced the Tajiks to a state of entire dependency except in one or 
two strong counties, " Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of 
Caubul (Karachi: Oxford University Press, reprinted 1972), p. 406. 
Contrast this statement with the description of the upland Tajiks 
or Kohistanis he relates just three pages later in the same study: 
"In their personal character, they are bold, violent, and unruly; 
and so much given to war that they reckon it is a disgrace for a 
man to die in his bed; They are excellent infantry, particularly 
among the hills, " p. 409. While undoubtedly both accounts were 
related to Elphinstone with similar conviction, the first, though 
in some ways perhaps technically accurate, bears far less 
consistency with the events of the last two centuries, including 
especially the 1980s, than does the second. Why the inconsistency? 
Olivier Roy asks a similar question about the obscurity of the 
Tajiks in his 1985 study, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pointing out that "For the 
majority of Afghan and western historians, " the January 1929 
seizure of power by the Tajik leader Habibullah Kalakani 
"represents a bizarre episode, an interruption in the course of 
traditional politics, " p. 66. Rather than providing a cogent 
answer to this question, however, Roy continues directly with a 
complex thesis - perhaps intended in part to befuddle Soviet 
analysts - making the esoteric point that Habibullah and the Tajiks 
in this inexplicable aberration, "benefited not from the moral 
support of the ulama in the north, but from their actively backing 
his cause in their preaching, particularly in the Naqshbandi 
areas, " pp. 66-67. 
2 For the best post-9/11/01 study on Afghanistan see Steve Coll, 
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin 
Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001 (New York: 
The Penguin Press, 2004). Thomas Kean, chairman of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as 
the 9/11 Commission), said in an exchange with Samuel Berger during 
a commission hearing that Coll's book "confirms a lot of what we're 
finding out in this investigation. I'd recommend it. " 
1 
coup in July 1973, eventually chose to fight. 3 As such 
this dissertation is a history from below of how upland 
farmers, artisans and labourers banded together with 
distinguished military officers and foreign-trained 
doctors and engineers, often enduring snow, high 
mountains and other hardships in pursuit of the nation's 
freedom from Soviet dominance. The ultimate defeat of 
the Soviets in northeastern Afghanistan resulted from the 
efforts of an entire cadre of men, driven by history, 
local geography, education and culture. 4 
Few Westerners appreciate the significance of the 
Panjsher Valley resistance movement and its role in the 
events leading to the Soviet decision to invade and 
occupy Afghanistan. One who does is the French political 
3 The first Communist coup, which took place on 17 July 1973, was 
accomplished, according to British diplomat Martin Ewans, "by a few 
hundred troops, led by a handful of officers. " Ewans adds that 
"Daoud seems to have relied on Karmal and the [Communists] who in 
the early 1970s had begun to recruit supporters from among the 
officers corps, " Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (Surrey, 
England: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 130. Louis Dupree points out that 
Daoud, in his first tenure as Prime Minister, 1953-1963, had 
"crushed opposition as it rose, and made no pretense of returning 
to the days of the `liberal parliament"' when he returned to power 
in 1973, Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 499. Thus his open alliance 
after 1973 with the Communists, combined with his chauvinistic 
Pashtun sentiments made him and his Communist allies a natural 
opponent of the nationalist opposition movement that eventually 
sparked the Panjsher Rebellion. 
4 For the central role of Persinate culture in Afghan history see 
Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of 
Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946 (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1969) and Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in 
Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Mohammad 
Khan (1826-1863) (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). The 
significance of the geography of the Panjsher, central to the 
success of the anti-Soviet Tajik movement, and the general 
importance of routes in Central Asian history, including in the 
1980s, is the topic of Mahnaz Z. Ispahani's Roads and Rivals 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989). The important 
role of education in Ahmad Shah Massoud's family and Panjsheri 
culture in general is covered in Chapter 6 of Coll, Ghost Wars. 
The cohesive mercantile and non-tribal nature of Tajik society, and 
Jamiat-i-Islami in particular, is the subject of Chapter 4 of Roy, 
Islam and Resistance in Afqhanistan. 
2 
scientist Olivier Roy, whose work Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan, published in 1985 immediately after the 
height of the Soviet War, accurately credits the role 
played by the Persian-speaking Afghans. 5 
A number of secondary works and academic studies 
address communism, Islamism and the Soviet War in 
Afghanistan. 6 In particular, some literature has 
addressed the general phenomenon of the Panjsher 
resistance and the role played by Ahmad Shah Massoud 
following the December 1979 intervention.? In contrast, 
there is no English literature on the development of the 
Panjsher front prior to the Soviet intervention. 8 This 
thesis will attempt to fill that gap in the scholarship 
5 To highlight the contrast he saw between the Persian nationalists 
and the radical Pashtuns, Roy describes the philosophy adopted by 
the leader of the latter group as being "homogenous and disciplined, 
which was not far removed from that of Lenin, " Islam and Resistan.: e 
in Afghanistan, p. 78, while he describes the former as "a dominant 
party which has renounced its quintessential [fundamentalist] 
character to absorb people who are not ideologically committed from 
the very beginning, " p. 120. While the Panjsheris comprised the 
largest Persian front, they were but one of dozens of such Farsi- 
speaking groups. See George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War (New York: 
Grove Press, 2003) for a discussion of the British M16's success in 
recognizing the importance of the Panjsher Valley front before 
other Western intelligence agencies. 
6 For a classical study of the development of communism in 
Afghanistan see Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: 
Parcham and Khalq (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 
1983). Roy's Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan is perhaps the 
best study on the role of Islam, though a recent work by David 
Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), has contributed to 
an understanding of the war's origins, in particular the key role 
played by traditional leaders - something that Roy, again perhaps 
for ideological or tactical reasons, suppresses. Mark Urban's War 
in Afghanistan (London: Macmillan, 1988) is perhaps the best 
overview of the war's development from a military standpoint. For a 
more detailed discussion see "Sources" section of introduction. 
See Hafiz Mansur, Diary of Jihad (Kabul: Jamiat Islami Political 
Office, 1991), translated and edited by Ferozan and deNeufville, 
1994; Sandy Gall, Behind Russian Lines: An Afghan Journal (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The 
Soviet War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); and Roy, Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan. 
8 As is mentioned later in the introduction, Mansur's work Diary of 
Jihad is the only book covering the 1979 rebellion. 
3 
by examining the growth of what became the most 
significant anti-Communist front of the Soviet-Afghan War. 
The years 1980-1983, immediately following the 1979 
uprising highlighted in this thesis, have been 
acknowledged as the most important in the effort to 
defeat the Communist, and in particular the Soviet, 
forces in Afghanistan. 9 Notwithstanding the shrill tone 
of Pakistani-based opposition leaders in the late 1980s - 
or the steady increase in U. S. aid to Afghan rebels after 
1984 - for the war in the northeast the early 1980s were 
by far the most pivotal time. 1° The accounts presented 
here are those of individuals who were inside Afghanist, mn 
during this period, far removed from the public relations 
campaigns being waged by Pakistan's Inter-Service 
Intelligence, the American Central Intelligence Agency 
9 With the Fortieth Army's losses on the main highway mounting and 
their key airbase at Bagram threatened by attack, the Soviei. s in 
January 1983 signed a ceasefire protocol. As Urban writes, "The 
pattern of operations by the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in 
Afghanistan had, since 1980, been dictated by the need to secure 
certain key roads - in particular, Highway 2 (i. e. the Salang 
Highway) from the Soviet border across the Salang pass to Kabul. 
The aim of preventing attacks on this road had triggered six 
offensives against the Panjsher, and now it prompted a remarkable 
cease-fire, " Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 118. Although the 
ceasefire lasted just several months into 1984, it gave Massoud 
time to unify Tajik resistance forces across northeastern 
Afghanistan. Also see Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan in 1982: Still No 
Solution, " Asian Survey vol. 23, no. 2 (1983), pp. 133-142. 
10In August 1983, Clarence Long, chairman of the American House of 
Representatives Appropriations Sub-committee on Government 
Operations, visited Pakistan at the behest of Representative 
Charles Wilson and initiated the dramatic increases in aid that 
would result in the Afghan war becoming known as "Charlie Wilson's 
War. " See Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, pp. 174-193, for a detailed 
account of Long's visit to Pakistan. Following the trip, Wilson 
secured a $40 million appropriation secretly earmarked for anti- 
aircraft cannons for the Afghan resistance. According to Crile, the 
amount was $10 million more than the entire U. S. contributi; r; to 
the covert Afghan program in 1982, Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 
216. 
4 
and others beyond Afghanistan's borders. " More 
specifically, the halt in hostilities by the occupying 
forces within 36 months of their arrival indicates that 
the fighting in the Northeast was far more important than 
was previously acknowledged by various Pakistani-based 
and, of course, Soviet sources. 12 
The 1979 Rebellion 
In May 1979, a 27-year old anti-Communist militant leader 
named Ahmad Shah, who for security reasons had adopted 
the nom de guerre Massoud, returned from five years of 
exile in Pakistan to his native Panjsher Valley, with 
twenty-five fighters. 13 There, in the territory that 
intersects the USSR's main supply route through the 
Salang Pass to Kabul and the many overland crossings from 
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, the militants 
aligned themselves with the region's traditional leaders, 
or khans, and began plotting an uprising. 14 In little 
11For a detailed discussion of the ISI's efforts to promote the 
radical Pashtun-Afghan groups at the expense of the single Tajik 
front, see Coll, Ghost Wars. 
12 See, for example, Mohammad Yousaf, Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The 
Defeat of a Superpower (Havertown, Pennsylvania: Casemate, 2001) 
and Boris Gromov, Limited Contingent (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1993). 
13 Mansur in Diary of Jihad recounts a list of the key figures of this 
group and the munitions they carried, pp. 3-4. He explains how 
"The Mujahiddin entered the Panjsher Valley two groups in the half 
of Jawza month. The first group went directly to Safid Chihr .. )ildi 
established their headquarters there, and the second group settled 
in the Dahane Rewat vicinity. The groups, relying on their 
experience from the 29th of Saratan uprising against Daoud, did not 
conduct any military actions until the Asad month of the same year, 
but they convened gatherings there to direct the awareness of the 
people toward Jihad, " p. 5. 
14Noelle writes of Kohistan, the region adjoining Kabul to the north: 
"Its overwhelmingly Tajik population had successfully evaded 
government control until the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
While some parts of Kohistan were held as a jagir by indiviz1(iils 
5 
over a month the Panjsher was in rebellion and the Salang 
highway had been severed, leaving the tottering Communist 
government briefly cut off from its Soviet patron. 15 A 
confidential U. S. government cable shortly thereafter 
concluded that the resulting reorganization of the 
"embattled" Afghan regime's cabinet was "inadequate to 
pacify the growing domestic opposition. " 16 
The 1979 Panjsher Rebellion was quite similar in its 
development to earlier rebellions in 1978-79 in Nuristan 
and Herat, which were also led by nationalists and 
Persian speakers, and which are dealt with in this study. 
The long-term significance of the Panjsher uprising, 
favored by the royal court, the remaining districts yielded no 
revenue to speak of, " State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century 
Afghanistan, p. 30. It was the descendents of these Tajik lcllder_s 
who in August 1839 briefly seized the capital in advance of the 
arrival of British forces, escorting the former Shah, Shuja, back 
to Kabul, p. 31. They were again to hold the capital for Tu)-! of 
1929 and also 1993-1996, until the Taliban seizure of Kabul. SE, _, 
R. D. McChesney, Kabul Under Siege: Fayz Muhammad's Account of_ the 
1929 Uprising (Princeton, New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publisher,,, 
1999) and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and 
Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 
15 Gust Avrakotos, the CIA official who became responsible for the 
entire covert funding program for the Afghan resistance, later 
acknowledged that "Geographically, [the Panjsher] was the ke, y, " 
Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 197. Ispahani writes, "The 
significant events that led to the Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan - the legacy of the Great Game, the making of the 
Durand Line, and the Afghani-Pakistani quarrel over the future 
`state' of Pakhtunistan - were all caught up in the web of Central 
and South Asian routes, " Ispahani, Roads and Rivals, p. 84. 
Television journalist Sandy Gall, in his book about a harrowing 
reporting trip to Afghanistan in 1982, writes that "The Salang 
Tunnel was a vitally important supply route and knowing this, the 
Russians guarded it well, patrolling the area with helicopter 
gunships, " Gall, Behind Russian Lines: An Afghan Journal, p. 124. 
16 Bruce J. Amstutz, confidential cable, U. S. Embassy, Kabul, to U. S. 
State Department, 30 July 1979, from National Security Archive 
collection, "Afghanistan: The Making of U. S. Policy, 1973-1990. " A 
cable in September mentioned the success of the guerrilla strategy 
of cutting the Salang Highway, "indicating a growing military 
sophistication on the part of the anti-regime forces which probably 
surpassed the skill normally associated with mountain villagers, " 
Bruce J. Amstutz, confidential cable, U. S. Embassy, Kabul, t- U. S. 
State Department, 6 September 1979, No. 06697, Section 02 of 03 
0612072, from National Security Archive collection, "Afghanistan: 
The Making of U. S. Policy, 1973-1990. " 
6 
however, was dramatically different. The Nuristani 
rebellion, which occurred in Kunar Province on the border 
of Pakistan and helped inspire the Panjsher rising, was 
an embarrassment for the Communists but was not in itself 
a strategic threat to the Kabul regime. 17 The same holds 
true for revolts in early 1979 in Herat, Nangahar and 
Paktia Provinces. 18 In contrast, the Panjsher Rebellion 
quickly came to pose a serious security threat to the 
Communist regime that, as will be shown in this study, 
both influenced the June 1979 decision of the Soviet 
Central Committee's to address the crisis and led to a 
shakeup in the Afghan Defence Ministry, furthering the 
schism between Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin and 
President Nur Taraki and directly contributing to the 
17 Edwards writes that "A widow who had refused to leave Ningalam when 
the other residents fled was burned alive in her house with her 
child" and that Wakil, a principal figure in the Kunar uprising, 
"was among those who had heard the story of the burning of Ningalam 
and the killing of the woman and her child, and he told me that the 
incident hardened his resolve to leave Kabul and return to Pech, 
which he did the following winter, " Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 128. 
In other words, this key leader of the Kunar rebellion became 
involved not because of any overarching strategic reasons, but 
because he believed that there were humanitarian reasons for 
resistance. Richard Strand writes that the Nuristanis "were the 
first citizens of Afghanistan to successfully revolt against the 
Communist overthrow of their government in 1978. Their success 
inspired others throughout the country to rise up and bleed the 
Soviet Union to death through thirteen years of war, " Nuristan: 
Hidden Land of the Hindu-Kush, interviews of Anwar by Richard 
Strand and Peter deNeufville, Sedora. net, 1997-2003, p. 2. Earlier 
in their history, Strand writes, the Nuristanis had resisted Islam 
as it spread eastward, but in 1895-96 they were conquered by the 
Afghan armies of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and were forced to convert 
to Islam. Also see Schuyler Jones, Men of Influence in Nuristan 
(London: Seminar Press, 1974), pp. 2-20. Certainly the events in 
the peripheral region of Nuristan had a profound impact on the 
leaders of the Panjsher Rebellion. 
'8A cable on September 6 from the U. S. embassy in Afghanistan to the 
State Department noted that "Paktia and the south to continue to 
simmer, " implying their insignificance to the security of the 
capital and thus the non-strategic nature of the areas for the 
Soviets. Bruce J. Amstutz, confidential cable, U. S. Embassy, Kabul, 
to U. S. State Department, 6 September 1979, No. 06697, from 
National Security Archive collection, "Afghanistan: The Making of 
U. S. Policy, 1973-1990. " 
7 
Soviet decision in early December 1979 to intervene. 
19 
The battles in the Panjsher were to intensify 
following the Red Army's arrival in the country. 
Eventually, the Soviet failure to stem the insurgency 
would tip the balance of power in Afghanistan's critical 
northeast quadrant away from the Communists and their 
Soviet backers. "By the time he repelled his sixth 
Soviet offensive, in 1982, Massoud had made a name for 
himself nationwide, " Steve Coll writes in Ghost Wars. 
"He was the `Lion of the Panjsher. ' The word Panjsher 
itself had become a rallying cry across Afghanistan and 
abroad, a symbol of hope for the anticommunist 
resistance. "20 For these reasons, the 1979 Panjsher 
Rebellion, and the development of the nationalist-Islamic 
movement that led to it, in many regards marked the 
genesis of the Soviet Fortieth Army's defeat. Although a 
2001 Wall Street Journal article may have been hyperbolic 
in calling Massoud "The Afghan who won the Cold War, " his 
role in the history of the Soviet-Afghan war was clearly 
key. Amusingly, a senior CIA official, Gust Avrakotos, 
would later take credit for making "it possible for 
Massoud to recognize his greatness; " the claim is 
somewhat absurd, considering that the Tajik leader had 
fought his two most important battles, both in 1982, 
19A cabinet shake-up, reported the day after the announcement of his 
new appointment (as minister of defence), was described as being 
"on Amin's initiative, " Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, 
P. 87. 
20 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 117. 
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several months before Avrakotos' assignment to head the 
Directorate of Operations Afghan desk. 21 
By the time of the 1988 signing of the Geneva 
Accords, providing for the USSR's withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, the Tajik organization's authority stretched 
across much of seven provinces and was a significant 
presence in five others. 22 Later, following the Islamic 
Revolution of April 1992, it was this same group of men 
who installed their political party's leader, Professor 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, as president of Afghanistan, and 
remained in power for almost four and a half years until 
the September 1996 Taliban takeover of Kabul. 23 
Key Figures 
The leaders of the Panjsher front, a mix of students from 
Kabul's top educational institutions and rural 
traditional leaders of the Panjsher, were the elite of a 
little-understood Persian ethnic group, broadly known as 
21 Robert Kaplan eulogized Massoud in an article entitled "The Afghan 
Who Won the Cold War, " Wall Street Journal, September 19,2001. 
Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 195. The Soviets' fifth and sixth 
offensives in the Panjsher took place prior to Avrakotos' joining 
the Afghan program in mid-1983, Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, p. 154. 
22By 1986 Jamiat controlled the majority of Parwan, Kapisa, Kunduz, 
Badakhshan and Takhar Provinces in the east, and the western 
provinces of Herat and Farah. The organization also had a 
significant presence in sections of Baglan, Kunar, and Laghman 
Provinces in the east, and Nimroz and Helmand Provinces in the west 
and south. For more on the Geneva Accords see Diego Cordovez and 
Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet 
Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
Z3For a description of the Taliban takeover of Kabul see Coll, Ghost 
Wars, pp. 332-333. Ewans, Afghanistan, Chapter 18, "Enter the 
Taliban, " offers a broader view of the event. 
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Tajiks. 24 This faction had played a critical, though 
little-known, role in Afghanistan's development over the 
previous two-and-a-quarter centuries, as is described in 
the first half of Chapter 1.25 By 1979, following twenty- 
four years of intense Pashtun nationalism driven by the 
personal ambitions of the left-leaning Prince Daoud, 
these men were determined to restore Afghanistan to the 
more Persian-centric position it had known since the 17'76 
transfer of the capital to Kabul. 26 
Ironically, as much as any other factor, it had been 
the hostility of American diplomats towards Afghanistan 
following World War II that had led to the Soviet entry 
into the country in 1955.27 The history of how this 
relatively unknown faction came to play a dominant role 
in the modern Afghan state, and how short-sighted U. S. 
diplomacy was to lead directly to the events of the l')80s, 
are also examined here. 
24ln his classic 1809 study of the country, Mountstuart Elphinstone 
described the Tajiks as a people "to excite a degree of curiosity, 
which my information is ill calculated to remove. The Tajiks are 
not united into one body, like most other nations, or confined to 
one country, but are scattered unconnected through a great pr of 
[Central] Asia, " Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 
p. 403. 
25 This is the focus of Chapter 1. Noelle's State and Tribe in 
Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan and R. D. McChesney's Kabul Under 
Siege further discuss this period. 
26 For examples of the Pashtun chauvinism demonstrated by the Khalq 
regime see Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism. 
27 In Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, Arnold Fletcher writes: "It 
was to an Afghanistan angry with the United States, dissatisfied 
with its own economic progress, and alarmed over the situation. east 
of the Durand Line, that Nikita Khrushchev came in November 1256, 
arriving in Kabul on the last lap of his celebrated tour, " p. 269. 
See also Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs iot-ho 
Mid-20th Century: Relations With the USSR, Germany, and Briti ri 
(Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1974) and. Leon B. 
Poullada and Leila D. J. Poullada, The Kingdom of Afghanist. =ri 'n i 
the United States: 1828-1973 (Omaha, Nebraska: The Centre for 
Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and 
Dageforde Publishing, 1995). 
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The town of Bazarak, at the centre of the Panjsher 
Valley, became the focal point of much of the drama of 
late 1979 and the early 1980s. Home to some 500 families, 
it is the second-largest town in the lower Panjsher and 
the fourth largest in the entire valley. It is bisected 
by the Panjsher River, the banks of which are dotted with 
overhanging mulberry trees. Most of the houses are of 
adobe construction, though since the war the wealthier 
men in the town have built houses and a new mosque from 
stones quarried in the adjoining side valleys. The town 
is made up of three principal areas, each with its own 
predominant clans. They are known as: Bazarak (including 
the Parande Valley which runs north to the Andarab 
Valley), Manjahor (on the far side of the river which 
runs south to the Tagab Valley), and Jangalak (on an arid 
knoll overlooking a prominent flood plain just north of 
the town) . 
28 
From this last place, a young man named Dost 
Mohammad, the son of a prominent courtier of Amir 
Habibullah, began a military career and married, as his 
second wife, the learned daughter of a lawyer from the 
neighbouring Panjsheri town of Rukha. Together the 
couple had four children, the oldest of whom, Ahmad Shah, 
proved from a very young age to possess remarkable 
28This author spent significant time in Parande and Jangalak in June 
1994-July 1996. The flood plain, known as Maidon-i-Shahi, or Field 
of the Kings, is where earlier rulers of the country came to watch 
annual buzkashi matches. See Whitney G. Azoy, Buzkashi: Game and 
Power in Afghanistan (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1982). 
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rhetorical and organizational gifts. 29 As a teenager, 
Ahmad Shah, with encouragement from Dost Mohammad, took a 
keen interest in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, sitting with 
his father late into the evening listening to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation's reports of the battles. Later, 
as an engineering student at the Soviet-run Polytechnic, 
Ahmad Shah joined the anti-Soviet Islamic movement, which 
was formally established at Kabul University in 1969. He 
was to become one of the most popular, best connected, 
and, following Prince Daoud's coup in 1973, longest 
surviving of the early leaders of the nationalist wing of 
that organization. In 1974 Ahmad Shah, still in his 
early twenties, and several dozen militants fled to 
Pakistan. It was with this experience that the former 
university activist and member of the traditional Tajik 
bureaucratic elite, Ahmad Shah, employing the code name 
Massoud, returned to the Panjsher with 25 men in May 1979 
with the intention of overthrowing the second Communist 
29 By age 11 Massoud was organizing war games among the boys in his 
neighborhood and he later tutored classmates in math, Coll, Ghost 
Wars, pp. 107-109. Also see Gall, Behind Russian Lines, and this 
author's interview with Ahmad Zia, February 1992. Roy discusses the 
sequence of leadership of the Islamic Youth - "The four 
[successive] leaders of the youth movement, Abdurraman Niyazi, 
Engineer Habiburrahman, Mawlawi Habiburrahman and Gulbuddine 
Hekmatyar (the only survivor after 1975)" - and notes that "the 
radical students, especially the Pashtun, were pro-Hekmatyar, " Roy, 
Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, pp. 73,77. Edwards writes 
that "'Beginning in the early 1970s, the halcyon atmosphere of the 
first period of political activity evaporated and was replaced by a 
situation that was a great deal more tense and fractured. " The 
first reason for this change was certainly the unexpected death, 
reportedly from leukemia, in 1970 of Abdur Rahim Niazi, the 
charismatic leader of the Muslim Youth. While a number of other 
students were as actively committed to the movement as Niazi, "none 
commanded the respect that he enjoyed, " Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 
207. 
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government, which had come to power in April 1978.30 
The Obscurity of the Tajiks 
Little research has been done on Afghanistan's Persian- 
speaking partisans largely because prior to 9/11, few 
researchers were trained in the Persian language, willing 
to endure the significant hardships needed to record the 
story, and in particular, suspicious of the traditional 
colonial analyses of the Afghan nation. Those British 
works, primarily written from within the safety of 
India's (now Pakistan's) North-West Frontier Province, 
viewed Afghanistan through the prism of the Ghilzai 
Pashtun, who populated that region. 31 In such an 
environment it was easy to conclude that Afghanistan was 
a Pashtun state, and therefore, whatever the non-Pashtun 
Afghans did was of little significance. 32 Even in 1995, 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the 
30 See Mansur, Diary of Jihad, pp. 5-7. 
31Books such as Olaf Caroe's The Pathans (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1958) and William Kerr Fraser-Tytler's Afghanistan: A Study of 
Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), which primarily focused on the Pathan, or 
Pashtun, tribes, have for decades been offered by specialists as 
"the leading works on Afghanistan. " More recent analysts such as 
Howard Hart, CIA station chief in Islamabad during the first three 
years of the Soviet occupation, lapped up Pakistani myths about 
Afghanistan. Hart told an interviewer that "The Afghans are hardly 
a people, much less a nation, " Crile, Charlie Wilson's War, pp. 
224-225. It is a seemingly odd statement in reference to a people 
that has remained nationally connected within a single state for 
over 250 years. 
32 For the importance of non-Pashtuns in the inception of the 
resistance, see Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, pp. 54- 
83; also Edwards, Before Taliban, especially pp. 95-166 and pp. 
225-278. Edwards also highlights the role of Persian-oriented 
individuals such as Faizani, Samiullah Safi and Abdur Rahim Niazi 
in the development of the nationalist movement. Dupree gruffly 
writes that "Habibullah (called Bacha Saqqao, "Son of a Water- 
carrier'), a non-literate Tajik who controlled Kohistan, entered 
Kabul, deposed Amanullah, and ruled Afghanistan for nine bloody 
months, " Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 452. 
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accomplishments of Massoud's resistance movement had 
started to become increasingly appreciated, a senior 
United Nations official, holding forth from a well- 
fortified Afghan Prgramme office within Pakistan, was 
still able to disparage the Panjsher as "an insignificant 
gorge. "33 
In the twenty-five years that have passed since the 
1979 Panjsher Rebellion, the challenge, as William Royce, 
the distinguished U. S. government expert on Afghanistan, 
has pointed out, is "to understand what was different 
about the water in the Panjsher. "34 To truly accomplish 
this task it is necessary to transcend what historian 
John Gaddis describes as "the principle of diminishing 
relevance, tf 35 or the deleterious tendency to ignore the 
distant past, and go back to the beginning of modern 
Afghan history. 
Afghanistan's 1747 so-called "confederation, " rather 
than being a domestic event, was the result of the 
fracture of Shah Nadir Kuli Khan's Persian empire along 
Sunni-Shiite lines following his assassination. 36 Two key 
nineteenth-century Afghan Amirs, Dost Mohammad (1826- 
33 Interview with the author, July 1995. This United Nations official 
from East Africa was indignant that the people from "one gorge, " as 
he repeated, had come to rule an entire state. 
34 Author interview with Royce 29 January 2003. 
35Or in his words, "the greater the time that separates a cause from 
a consequence, the less relevant we presume that cause to be, " John 
Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 96, emphasis added. As Gaddis points out there, 
the lag time between cause and effect can be dramatic: "The 
Japanese government could hardly have decided to attack the United 
States if the Japanese islands had never surfaced. " 
36 See Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2002), p. 227, and Noelle, State and Tribe in 
Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan. 
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1839; 1843-1863) and his grandson, Abdur Rahman (1880- 
1901), were half Qizilbash-Persian and on three 
successive occasions came to power with the support of 
the country's Persian minority living north of Kabul in 
the Shamali or Northern Plain and Panjsher Valley. 37 The 
dynasty remained in power until January 14,1929, when 
the last member of that ruling house attempted to arrest 
a key Tajik leader, Habibullah Kalakani, who at the time 
held sway in the Shamali Plain and Panjsher Valley. 38 
Kalakani deposed the Amir and, though he remained in 
power for only nine months, the event, much like the 
anti-Soviet resistance of the early 1980s, demonstrated 
the central role in the Afghan state of the secularly- 
organized, mobile, and learned Tajik minority. Because 
of the central relationship of this group, the Tajiks, 
the Qizilbash, non-Pashtun Persian speakers in both the 
east and west of the country, and Persianized Pashtuns, I 
have referred to the group collectively as "Persians, " 
and have referred to a collective "Persianate-Afghan" 
national culture. 39 
37 For a discussion of the conquest of Turkistan and the role of the 
Northern Army, see Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century 
Afghanistan, pp. 60-122. 
38 McChesney in Kabul Under Siege provides an account of the nine- 
month Tajik government under Habibullah Kalakani, January-November 
1929. An earlier Afghan shah, Mahmoud was similarly deposed. 
39While numerous ethnic labels are used to describe Persian-speaking 
or Farsiban Afghans, this thesis employs the terms Persian, and 
Persianate. The purpose is to identify a common denominator for 
the numerous sub-groups that contributed to the national movement 
documented in this work. These include Panjsheri Tajiks, such as 
Massoud's cadre; Shamali Tajiks; Quizilbash; individuals such as 
Rabbani, who, at least in contemporary Dari, is often called a 
Badakhshi (in contrast to the Tajiks of Takhar); western non- 
Pashtuns like Ismail Khan, who are known as Farsiaban, never Tajik; 
15 
To an entire generation of Soviet fighting men, 
Afghanistan's Panjsher Valley and its Tajik inhabitants 
became synonymous with death and the defiance of the 
Afghan people in the face of Communism and the USSR's 
intervention in their country. 4° The guerrillas' strategy 
was to cut off the supply routes connecting Kabul with 
the USSR, particularly the Salang Highway, the main 
north-south artery through the Hindu Kush mountains. 41 
Methodically, Ahmad Shah Massoud divided the valley 
into military districts, assigning commands to his most 
daring and talented leaders. From these defensive units, 
fighters were selected for elite mobile groups known as 
"mutaharek. i42 Between April 1980 and September 1982, the 
USSR launched six progressively more sophisticated 
offensive operations into the strategic valley, in an 
attempt to secure the Salang. The last of these six 
attacks, in September 1982, was witnessed by a British 
television network correspondent and his four-man crew. 
Their reporting on that battle, including two full-length 
and the urban Durrani such as Zahir Shah and Hamid Karzai, who are 
culturally and linguistically Persian, despite their Pashtun 
lineage. 
90 The 1983 French documentary film A Valley Against an Empire - shot 
and directed by Christophe de Ponfilly, about Massoud and the 
Mujahedin resistance - was indicative of this almost mystical 
perception that developed in the 1980s. 
91The two major passes through these mountains are Shibar and Salang. 
As Dupree writes, "No motorable road went through the Hindu Kush 
until the reign of King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-33), when the 
Afghans completed a long-time dream by building a road which 
traveled circuitously via Shibar Pass through the Hindu Kush, " 
Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 10. Urban points out that ten days before 
the Soviet intervention, soldiers from the 103rd Guards were 
deployed from Bagram to protect the Salang Pass, Urban, War in 
Afghanistan, p. 44. 
42 Roy translates this as "mobile or a mobile group, " Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 225. 
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books, confirmed what over a dozen independent reporters 
and European intelligence services already suspected: the 
Soviets could not stem the strategically-located Panjsher 
opposition. 43 
Starting with two dozen men in May 1979, by 1984 
Massoud commanded a standing army of several thousand, 
with hundreds of thousands of active supporters across 
five key provinces of northeastern Afghanistan. 44 The 
expanded organization's activities - controlling the 
intersection between the Soviets' strategic north-south 
corridor from Central Asia to Kabul and the guerrillas' 
east-west supply routes from Pakistan, which were 
burgeoning as a result of the efforts of a young, east- 
Texas congressman, Charlie Wilson - soon sealed the fate 
of the Soviet occupation of the country. 45 Despite two 
major offensive operations into the Panjsher Valley in 
1984, by 1985 Soviet negotiators had begun hammering out 
the terms of a treaty, known as the Geneva Accords, which 
93 ITN anchorman Sandy Gall travelled to the Panjsher in the summer of 
1982 with cameraman Charles Morgan, television news editor Nigel 
Ryan, sound engineer Tom Murphy, and Jean-Jose Puig, a Frenchman 
who had spent time with the Mujahedin the previous summer. Gall 
wrote about the experience in Behind Russian Lines: An Afghan 
Journal. "Our plan, " he nonchalantly wrote, "was to walk in from 
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which would take us, 
we estimated, a week or ten days. We would make contact with a 
guerrilla leader called Masud, who had been described to me as the 
Afghan equivalent of the young Tito, spend three to four weeks 
filming him and his fighters, and then walk back out. I estimated 
we should be back in London by the end of September, " p. 13. Ryan 
recounted the trip in A Hitch or Two in Afghanistan (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983). 
44 See note 21 for the northeast provinces controlled by Jamiat by the 
mid-1980s. Chapter 7 of Urban's War in Afghanistan includes 
excellent accounts of Panjsher 7, which began April 17,1984, and 
continued through the summer; Panjsher 8, which began in September 
of that year; and the growing sophistication of the Northern 
Alliance. 
45 See Crile, Charlie Wilson's War. 
17 
was signed on April 14,1988.46 The Tajik resistance 
group, which later became the backbone of the 
organization known as the Northern Alliance, would go on 
to challenge the Taliban-al-Qaeda militia during the late 
1990s, aided by the Russian Army which had come to 
respect its moderate and nationalist aims. 47 
Just why the accomplishments of the Persian Front 
largely escaped many, if not most, of the Western 
officials assigned to analyze the various resistance 
factions is a complex phenomenon to explain. In part, 
the manipulation of the Afghan resistance groups by 
Pakistan's ISI since the mid-1970s, and corresponding 
efforts by that organization to mislead its Western 
counterparts about the true intentions of the various 
groups, had a dramatic impact. 48 Years later American 
policy-makers would emphatically defend the successive 
decisions, dating to the Carter Administration, to back 
the ISI's radical Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 49 Additionally, as 
46 In July 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of 8,000 
troops, which took place in October of that year, Ewans, 
Afghanistan: A New History, pp. 167-168. Also see Cordovez and 
Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet 
Withdrawal. 
47By 1999, Russia and Iran had become major supporters of the 
Northern Alliance. See Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 462-63. 
48 The extent to which such efforts were successful in influencing 
certain American foreign policy bureaucrats can be seen in the 
impassioned attacks by such individual on the multinational post- 
9/11 support for the Nationalist Karzai government. See Anonymous 
(later disclosed to be Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris: Why the 
West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, D. C.: Brassey's, Inc., 
2004), p. 33-58. 
49The precedent would give way to at least tacit and quite possiLle 
material U. S. support for another Pakistani surrogate force in the 
mid-1990s, the Taliban. See Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan and the 
Taliban, " in William Maley (ed. ), Fundamentalism Reborn? 
Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 
1998), pp. 72-90. 
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was mentioned earlier, the plethora of British colonial 
studies written from the eastern side of the Durand line 
and coloured by the perspective of those largely Pashtun 
communities has greatly stilted the West's understanding 
of Afghanistan. As late as the fall of 2001, a 
distinguished American diplomat with years of service in 
the region could declare that "Afghanistan is 
ungovernable and therefore what it needs is not a 
government but an umbrella holder. "50 
Indeed, many Western officials and journalists 
apparently came to believe the assertions of many 
Pakistani generals and senior civilian officials that 
they legitimately possessed an almost neo-colonial 
security interest in the country. 51 The cumulative effect 
of this was to greatly obscure the accomplishments of the 
Tajik resistance forces. 
As Chapter 2 points out, Pakistan's primary 
objective appears to have been, and continues to be, to 
keep a weak state on its western border. To accomplish 
solnterview with former U. S. ambassador to Pakistan, November 2002. 
The speaker, then head of a major think tank, had earlier stated, 
with only slight amusement, that Kipling's Kim, the tale of an 
Irish orphan who travels for many years to locations on the eastern 
side of the Durand Line with a mystic wanderer, is a "starting 
place for understanding Afghanistan. " The statement about the 
umbrella holder, apparently, meant that any stronger form of 
government in Kabul would not be in Pakistan's interest -a 
condition that American diplomats for decades have seized on to 
alienate successive pro-western Afghan governments. 
51Associated Press correspondent Kathy Gannon filed a television 
story in October 2001, announcing that she was reporting from 
Afghanistan, before pointing out in her closing that she was in 
Islamabad, Pakistan! Certain observers were not surprised when Ms. 
Gannon, the longtime Islamabad correspondent for AP, subtitled her 
2005 book 18 Years Inside Afghanistan. See Gannon, I is for 
Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror: 18 Years Inside Afghanistan 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2005). 
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this the ISI has, since the 1970s, consistently thwarted 
the efforts of leading Afghan nationalists such as 
Massoud. In 1988 and 1999, respectively, Bahauddin 
Majrooh and Abdul Ahad Karzai, both Afghan nationalist 
leaders of the highest calibre, are believed to have been 
assassinated by Pakistani intelligence. Other prominent 
figures such as former President Sibghatullah Mujadidi 
and former Shah Mohammad Zahir have endured decades of 
Pakistani subversion and plots against their relatives 
and only sporadic and symbolic assistance from Pakistan 
throughout the decade of the Holy War. 52 
Structure 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. The first 
covers the period from 1732-1967. It begins with the 1732 
alliance between the ambitious, and Sunni, Nadir Kuli 
Khan, future Shah of Iran, and the Abdali branch of the 
Pashtun Tribe, and documents the major role that the 
Persian state - and later, individuals of Persian origin 
- played in the formation and growth of the Afghan nation. 
It concludes with an examination of the Afghan 
government's futile attempts between 1944 and 1954 to 
form a loose alliance with the U. S., and the 
corresponding failures of U. S. diplomacy, which led to 
the Soviet entry into the country in 1955 under the guise 
52 See, for example, Coll's Ghost Wars. 
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of economic aid. 
The second and third chapters describe the origins 
of the Panjsher revolt, showing how, following the 1973 
fall of the Shah, the nationalist wing of the Afghan 
Islamic movement, bringing together military officers, 
public servants, disaffected citizens, and urban 
university students, became a dominant force in the 
country and split from the Pashtun-radical wing. 
The fourth and fifth chapters chronicle Massoud's 
return to Afghanistan after years of planning in the 
spring of 1979, and the outbreak of the Panjsher revolt. 
The sixth and seventh analyse how, after a number of 
initial setbacks, the revolt gradually developed into a 
full-fledged guerrilla war, owing to Massoud's political 
and strategic visions as well as his leadership skills 
and the renewed support of a number of the Panjsher's 
traditional leaders. This, in turn, played a role in 
driving the Soviets to decide, on December 12,1979, to 
send troops to Afghanistan to prop up the Communist 
regime. 
Sources 
This study is based primarily on author interviews with 
some 75 Afghan participants, including Ahmad Shah Massoud 
and the dozen or so senior Panjsheri commanders who were 
still alive in the mid-1990s. Four were killed and one 
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was seriously wounded in the period following their 
interviews. Commander Massoud himself was assassinated 
on September 9,2001, by al-Qaeda operatives who visited 
his base in Takhar Province posing as reporters. In 
addition, use has been made of the U. S. National Security 
Archive and the archives of the New York Times and other 
periodicals. 
To date, only one book has been published 
specifically dealing with the 1979 Panjsher Rebellion: 
Abdul Hafiz Mansur's Diary of Jihad. 53 This 120-page book 
is a unique source, written by one of the brightest and 
most enterprising young Panjsheris involved in the anti. - 
Communist opposition (he subsequently rose to head the 
government's Baktir News Agency and in 2004 stood as a 
presidential candidate). Mansur remained in the valley 
during the rebellion and drew mostly on his first-hand 
experiences, as well as selected interviews and documents. 
While his own estimates seem quite accurate, second-hand 
accounts are presented without assessment or comment and 
generally weaken the work. Thus, for example, since 
Mansur was in Rukha during most, or all, of 1979, the 
book contains good information about that area but less 
useful data about fighting in other villages. Some 
Panjsheris have complained that Mansur focused on Rukha 
because he wanted to glorify his own village. It is also 
53Abdul Hafiz Mansur, Diary of Jihad (Kabul: Jamiat Islami Political 
Office, 1991), translated and edited by Professor Sabour Ferozan 
and this author. 
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likely, however, that he had trouble obtaining reliable 
information about fighting in other places and thus, for 
the most part, focused on what he had personal knowledge 
of. His descriptions are slightly idealistic, but 
nevertheless contain quite valuable information on the 
1979 Panjsher Rebellion. 
Mark Urban's War in Afghanistan remains the primary 
Western military history on the Afghan war. 54 It is based 
mainly on secondary sources and makes only brief mention 
of the 1979 rebellion. It does, however, contain 
excellent information about the later Soviet Panjsher 
incursions as well as the strategic effect of the Jamiat 
attacks along the Salang. Olivier Roy's Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, as was previously mentioned, 
is by far the most sophisticated intellectual history of 
the anti-Soviet opposition of the 1980s and is based on 
his own field research. 55 Although the book contains an 
excellent chapter on the uprisings of 1978-79, 
interestingly it makes no direct references to the 1979 
Panjsher Rebellion. Similarly, David Edwards' Before the 
Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad has added 
significantly to the understanding of the antecedents of 
the Islamic movement and the 1978-1979 rebellion, 
54 Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
55Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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particularly in Kunar Province. 56 Edwards' earlier work, 
Heroes of the Age similarly provides a basis for 
understanding the roles of traditionalism and mysticism 
in Afghan political life - both key topics in his later 
works. 57 Radek Sikorski's Dust of the Saints: A Journe 
to Herat in Time of War, completed during the years of 
the Soviet occupation, contains valuable first-hand 
accounts of the 1979 Herat rebellion. 58 
Edward Girardet's Afghanistan: The Soviet War 
illuminates the Panjsher 5 Soviet operation in 1982 and 
both ITN news reader Sandy Gall's Behind Russian Lines 
and his producer Nigel Ryan's A Hitch or Two in 
Afghanistan cover Panjsher 6, which both men witnessed 
during that same year. 59 
Anthony Arnold's Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: 
Parcham and Khalq and his 1985 study Afghanistan: The 
Soviet Invasion in Perspective and Henry Bradsher's 
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention are excellent 
studies on the Soviet encroachment and ultimate 
intervention in Afghanistan. 60 Raja Anwar's The Tragedy 
56 David Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). 
57David Edwards, Heroes of the Age (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1996). 
58Radek Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of 
War (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1990). 
59Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1985). Sandy Gall, Behind Russian Lines (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1983). Nigel Ryan, A Hitch or Two in 
Afghanistan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983). 
60Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and 
Khalq (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). 
Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective (Stanford, 
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of Afghanistan: A First-Hand Account has also contributed 
to an understanding of the 1978-79 period in Afghan 
politics. 61 
More recently Mahnaz Z. Ispahani's Roads and Rivals, 
The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia 
has added significantly to the West's understanding of 
the strategic importance of routes in Asian politics and 
the underlying reasons for the Soviet intervention, as 
well as the ultimate failure of the occupation. 62 
Two recent popular books, George Crile's Charlie 
Wilson's War and Steve Coll's Ghost Wars: The Secret 
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001, have added 
significantly to the literature describing, respectively, 
how the Congressionally-approved CIA covert funding 
programme developed during the 1980s, and what, through 
gross mismanagement, its unintended effects were. 63 
For the background chapter, William Kerr Fraser- 
Tytler's Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments 
in Central and Southern Asia, Olaf Caroe's The Pathans, 
550 B. C. - A. D. 1957, Louis Dupree's Afghanistan, 
Mountstuart Elphinstone's An Account of the Kingdom of 
Communism and Soviet Intervention (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
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York: Verso, 1988). 
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Caubal, and in particular Vartan Gregorian's The 
Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and 
Modernization, 1880-1946 all have added to an 
understanding of the general historical underpinnings of 
the country. 64 Willem Vogelsang's recent book, The 
Afghans, paints a clear picture of the country's 
development in the eighteenth century. 65 
Christine Noelle's State and Tribe in Nineteenth- 
Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan 
1826-1863) and Robert McChesney's Kabul Under Siege: 
Fayz Muhammad's Account of the 1929 Uprising have done 
much to illuminate the role of the conquest of lesser 
Turkestan (1845-1863) and the nine-month reign of 
Habibullah Kalakani, together two of the most important 
recent developments in the Persian integration of the 
Kabul city-state. 66 
Cornelius Van Engert's long-classified 1924 analysis, 
A Report on Afghanistan, Leon and Leila Poullada's The 
64 William Kerr Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political 
Developments in Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford 
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(Princeton, New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999). See also 
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Kingdom of Afghanistan and the United States: 1828-1973, 
Arnold Fletcher's Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, and 
Dupree's book provide a clear picture of the development 
of U. S. -Afghan relations through the 1960s. 67 George C. 
McGhee, who at the time served as U. S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Near East, adds a self-serving 
account of the American bureaucracy's treatment of the 
Afghan government during the Truman Administration in 
Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy. 68 
Documents published by the National Security Archive 
in two collections - Afghanistan: The Making of U. S. 
Policy, 1973-1990, and The September 11th Sourcebooks, 
Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War - and 
by the Cold War International History Project were 
extremely helpful - as was the New York Times - for 
illuminating the specific progression of events, 
particularly in 1978-1979.69 
Conclusion 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan posed a challenge 
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to the Kabul city-state like no other in its two-century 
history. It would be another twenty-one years before the 
nationalist Hamid Karzai, an educated and Persianized 
Pashtun with a deep understanding of his nation's past, 
would arrive in the Afghan capital on a CIA flight to 
assume power. As President-designate Karzai, accompanied 
only by four or five aides, disembarked the aircraft, he 
was greeted by General Fahim, the acting leader of the 
Northern Alliance and Afghanistan's new defence minister. 
"Where are your men? " the startled Fahim asked upon 
realizing the plane was almost empty. 
Marshaling his self-confidence, Karzai, who had been 
chosen as Afghanistan's leader just three weeks earlier 
at a peace conference in Bonn, Germany, masterfully 
orchestrated by diplomats from the U. S., Germany, the 
United Nations and the neighbouring states, turned to the 
ethnically-Persian defence chief and replied with a 
smile: "General: you are my men. " 
This thesis provides a new understanding of the 
development and intellectual underpinnings of the 1979 
Panjsher Rebellion fundamental to understanding modern 
Afghan political history. That event, and the front it 
spawned, were the direct precursors of the Shura Nazar, 
or Northern Council, the organization which Commander 
Massoud organized across Northeastern Afghanistan during 
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the 1983 ceasefire. Much like the Panjsher Front in the 
years 1979-1982, it would be responsible for three years 
of concentrated attacks on the Red Army, leading to the 
1986 decision to withdraw. Later, these same forces 
would serve as the political and military foundation of 
the Rabbani Government, which was established in the 
vacuum left by the collapse of the Najibullah Govern.? n,, nt 
in March 1992 and the further turmoil created by the 
Pakistani and U. N. -brokered "peace settlement" in early 
1992, involving the selection of Gul Baddin Hekmatyar as 
Prime Minister. After the Taliban militia's takeover of 
Kabul in September 1996, another Pakistani-driven event, 
Massoud's forces formed the core of the Northern Alliance, 
the group which prevented the Taliban from gaining full 
control of the country and subsequently provided a 
beachhead for U. S. forces after 9/11. That the 1979 
Panjsher Rebellion had such a pivotal impact on later 
events makes it, and its antecedents, a critical area of 
study that, as was mentioned in the previous section on 
the existing literature, has heretofore been greatly 
overlooked by scholars. 
The years 1994 through 1996, in between the 
turbulence that followed the fall of Najibullah and the 
rise of the Taliban, offered a unique opportunity to 
study that event in detail. Though future historians 
will of course bring valuable analysis to this subje_: t, 
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the deaths of senior participants during and after the 
period when this research was conducted, and the 
cognitive deterioration of certain surviving participants, 
will pose formidable obstacles to such work. 
This thesis will also, for the first time, examine 
the largely organic development of the Northern Alliance 
and, by extension, the largely missed opportunity for 
directing the U. S. aid programme toward that politically 
moderate and nationalist group. Indeed, it was only in 
the wake of September 11,2001, that the Northern 
Alliance finally received the unqualified backing of the 
U. S. government . 
70 
Finally, the magnitude of the political 
repercussions emanating from the Panjsher Rebellion 
requires a re-examination of the entire history of 
Afghanistan. While earlier studies have factually, and 
often in tremendous detail, recorded the major events 
since 1747, it is the underlying hypothesis of this work 
that the western, and particularly English-language 
interpretations of those accounts have consistently often 
been, like a compass set with slightly improper 
declination, just-in-error. It is thus the objective of 
70In a November 2001 meeting with Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was then 
the Afghan president, U. S. Presidential Envoy James Dobbins said 
"that the United States now recognized the mistake it had mal- in 
abandoning Afghanistan following the Soviet Union's withdrawal j_n 
1989. The attacks of 9/11 had demonstrated the consequences of such 
neglect, " James Dobbins, To Build a Nation (unpublished manuscript; 
initial chapters reviewed by P. deNeufville). It is believed `o be 
the first official American acknowledgement of the governmeat'. 3 
misguided support first for a Hekmatyar Gulbuddin-led government in 
1992 and later for the Taliban militia. 
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this thesis to correct that phenomenon as it prevents an 
accurate understanding of the two hundred and sixty-year 
history of the Persian-centric state. 
Consider, for example, the eminent late twentieth- 
century American scholar on Afghanistan, Louis Dupree, 
who writes that the Tajik takeover in 1929, "came from an 
unexpected direction - the north. ff 71 Following Dupree's 
argument, one might assume that the southerly arrival 
routes on the capital of both of the country's most 
prominent nineteenth century monarchs, Dost Mohammad and 
Abdur Rahman, were similarly "unpredictable. " In the 
case of the former Amir, his approach to the capital on 
two occasions, in 1826 and 1840, were in fact both from 
his place of exile in the north. 72 The cumulative effect 
of Dupree's work and that of other scholars of 
Afghanistan dating all the way back to Mounstuart 
Elphinstone's 1809 Account of the Kingdom of Caubal, has 
been to create a distorted reality, one in which the 1979 
Panjsher Rebellion does not quite fit. 
Yet, the events in the Panjsher Valley in 1979, 
following a series of nationalist occurrences throughout 
the 1970s and a long chain of Persian-centric events 
71Italics added, Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 452. 
72Dost Mohammad's attempted return in 1839 during the First Anglo- 
Afghan war was short-lived and he spent the balance of the war 
living in India before making a third return with the aid of the 
British Government in 1841. While north and Persian are not 
completely synonymous in an Afghan context, it is useful to point 
out that the 1775 transfer of the capital north from Kandahar to 
Kabul alienated Timur, the shah who oversaw that move, from the 
Pashtuns, who considered him more "pro-Persian than pro-Afghan, " 
Dupree, Afghanistan p. 340. 
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dating back to the eighteenth century, did occur as is 
documented here using primary sources for the first 
time. 73 
The idea that the 1979 Panjsher Rebellion helped 
precipitate the December 1979 Soviet intervention appears, 
itself, to be a discovery. Nowhere in the existing 
research is this reality examined, though in the 
aftermath of the war an increasing number of writers did 
acknowledge that Massoud's movement played a significant 
role in the defeat of the USSR's Fortieth Army - most of 
them, such as Crile, attributing it to Massoud's 
charisma. 74 Similarly, the strategic location of the 
Panjsher Valley, the particular geography that gave rise 
to the front, has been little discussed by scholars and 
the one contemporary academic study devoted to the topic 
of routes in Central Asia, by Mahnaz Ispahani, mentions 
the Panjsher resistance only in passing. 75 And yet, as 
this thesis illustrates, it was this factor, as well as 
the secular and pragmatic nature of Afghan-Persian 
73 Though Mansur's Diary of Jihad provides a brief account of the 1979 
Panjsher Rebellion, particularly in the town of Rukha, it does not 
mention the nationalist or Persian antecedents of the event, nor, 
understandably, does it look at the results of the event. 
74Crile, for example, describes Massoud as "This one guerrilla leader, 
so great that he belonged in the historical company of Tito, Ho Chi 
Minh, Mao Tse-tung, and Che Guevara, " while mentioning nothing 
about the mercantilist culture from which he sprung, Charlie 
Wilson's War, pp. 194-195. 
75 See Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the 
Borderlands of Asia. 
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culture, a factor in fact long pre-dating the country's 
formation, that enabled the rebel leaders to attract a 
broad following, which in turn gave rise to the success 
of their very nationally-oriented movement. 
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Chapter 1, A Persian Nation Thrust into the Soviets' 
Arms: The Birth of Afghanistan and the American Entry 
Into the Great Game, 1732-1967. 
Siege of Herat 
The capture of the oasis city of Herat by Persian forces 
led by Nadir Kuli Khan on February 16,1732, could well be 
described as the beginning of modern Afghanistan. ' Then a 
brigand in the service of Shah Tahmasp I, Kuli Khan had 
won fame several years earlier for expelling the Ghilzai 
Pashtun2 from southern Persia, where they had invaded 
eighteen years earlier. After the fall of Herat, a number 
of surrendering Abdali Pashtuns, who had defended the 
city, were invited to join Kuli Khan's army. The Abdalis' 
efforts over the next three years to help their new 
commander secure his southern flank, particularly in 
Dagistan, culminated in Kuli Khan's ascent to the throne 
of Persia in 1736.3 
The former camel trader, now known as Shah Nadir Kuli 
Khan, then turned his attention to Kandahar. He 
1 Herat, located in western Afghanistan, southeast of Meshad, is 
known for its blue mosques and minarets. The date of surrender is 
cited in Ganda Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern 
Afghanistan (London: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p. 13. 
2 The eastern branch of that Pashtun tribe. 
3 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (Surrey, England: Curzon 
Press, 2001), pp. 20-26; Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans (Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), pp. 225-26; Louis 
Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1973), p. 330. Upon becoming the Persian ruler, as Hamid 
Algar points out, Nadir "declared the ceremonial vilification of 
Abu Bakr and Umar, as well as other Companions of the Prophet, and 
rejection of the legitimacy of the first three Caliphs. Purged of 
these excrescences, Shi'ism was henceforth to be known as the 
Ja'fari mazhab, both to efface the connotations of sectarianism the 
word Shi'i inevitably carried, and to facilitate the absorption of 
the reformed school into the main body of Islam as a fifth Sunni 
mazhab. " Hamid Algar: "Religious Forces in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, " The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7 
(Cambridge, England: Cabridge University Press). 
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calculated that if he could capture the Afghan city and 
liberate two Abdali princes, Zulfiqar and Ahmad, held 
there, it would earn him the unwavering support of the 
Abdalis. The reason for this, in a little-appreciated 
nuance of history, was that Shah Nadir, an Afshar Turk, 
had converted to become espoused Hannifi-Sunni practices 
similar to those practiced by the Abdalis and unlike most 
of his Shiite subjects. 4 And this alliance, the new Persian 
monarch recognized, would allow him to exploit a 
traditional weakness in the foreign policy of his 
principal foes. 
The Moguls, who ruled much of what is modern Pakistan 
and western India in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, had historically contained the Ghilzai Pashtun 
with punitive force and bribery, resulting in little 
cultural or educational advancement on the part of these 
tribes. The Persians, however, adopted what Vartan 
Gregorian describes as "a more successful method of coping 
with the [western Abdali] tribes: they channeled their 
4 Throughout his career Nadir Shah actively sought to reduce 
sectarian strife among the people he ruled over. The effect of 
this was alienate him from those committed to Twelver Shi'i dogma 
and the Shi'i ulama who sought his patronage. "Nadir's motives in 
promoting a revision of Shi'ism may safely be presumed to have been 
political; there is no evidence of personal piety in his life, " 
Hamid Alger points out, and he adds that Nadir's religious 
practices may, in part, have been driven by the fact that "the 
majority of his soldiery was recuited from the Sunni borderijaJA, ý of 
Iran, and it was necessary to accommodate their religious 
susceptibilities by the suppression of the more objectionable 
features of Shi'ism. " Hamid Algar, "Religious Forces in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, " The Cambridge History of Cran, 
vol. 7 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, p. 709). 
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military forces into the Persian armies. i5 This policy had 
served the Persians well since the founding of the Mogul 
Empire in 1525, although by the early eighteenth century 
the efforts of the Shi'a Safavid rulers of Persia to 
incorporate Hanafi-Sunni Pashtuns into their ranks had 
ground to a halt. As a Sunni sympathizer, Nadir Kuli Khan 
was able not only to reestablish this practice, but also 
to take it to unprecedented levels. Between the fall of 
Herat in 1732 and the capture of Kandahar in 1738, 
thousands of Abdali fighters flocked to the Persian Shah's 
banner, as the liberation of Zulfiqar and Ahmad Khan, the 
two most prominent young Abdalis, became a battle cry of 
the allied Persian and Afghan forces. 
Following the conquest of Kandahar and the liberation 
of Zulfiqar and Ahmad Khan Sadozai, the Persians wrested 
Kabul from the Moguls before defeating the main body of 
the eastern army outside Delhi in 1739. During this time, 
eight Pashtun cavalry units came to occupy a central 
position, which Olaf Caroe identifies as "the spearhead of 
the [Persian] army. i6 Among these officers, Ahmad Khan is 
said to have risen to the leadership of three to four 
thousand "seasoned" Abdali cavalrymen and, by the age of 
twenty-three, the young chieftain was already serving as 
commander of the Shah's bodyguard. 
5 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of 
Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946 (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1969), p. 44. 
6 Olaf Caroe points out that Pashtun distrust of Hindu officers in 
the Mogul army also contributed to this factor, The Pathans, 550 
B. C. - A. D. 1957 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1958), p. 224. 
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Shah Nadir's reliance on the Abdalis during the 
conquest of Central Asia in 1740-41 came at the cost of 
his further estrangement from the Qizilbash, as the Shiite 
Persian officers' corps was known. 7 The pro-Sunni Shah, as 
Vogelsang writes in his contemporary study, was "never 
really accepted by his predominantly Shiite Iranian 
subjects. "8 On the night of June 19,1747, while his army 
camped near Ashkhabad, Shah Nadir was assassinated by 
senior Qizilbash officers, who sought to reassert Shiite 
leadership over the Persian army. 9 
The Shah's murder shattered the alliance that had 
bonded the Abdalis to the Persian Empire for seventeen 
years. Ahmad Khan and kinsmen quickly secured treasures 
that included the famous Koh-i-Nor Diamond, 1° and then sent 
their four thousand Abdali horsemen toward Kandahar. The 
fortune and the experience they had gained serving in the 
Persian army would in turn enable them to begin building 
Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century 
Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1826-1863) 
(Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997), p. 25. 
8 Vogelsang, The Afghans, p. 227. In his work, published in 2002, 
Vogelsang makes the first reference I have seen to Kuli Khan's 
Sunnism, though, since the Shah was an Afshar Turk, it is quite 
obvious. The author also points here to possible dementia that 
clouded the end of the Sunni Shah's life, including the blinding of 
his son, though it is difficult to calculate the strains on the 
Hannifi Sunni monarch of a Shiite nation; this was an 
unprecedented position, unless one includes the Ghilzai rulers of 
southern Persia (1721-1729). Also see Cornelius Van Engert, A 
Report on Afghanistan, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, Department of State Division of Publications, Series C, No. 
53, Afghanistan, No. 1), p. 11, who mentions Nadir's Sunnism. 
9 For a general history of Nadir Shah's reign, see L. Lockhart, Nadir 
Shah: A Critical Study Based Mainly Upon Contemporary Sources 
(London: Luzac & Co., 1938). 
10Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani, p. 22; Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 332; 
Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p. 46. 
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their own state, as southwestern Asia was partitioned 
overnight along Shiite-Sunni lines. 
Shortly following Ahmad Khan's return to Afghanistan 
and his coronation as Shah in 1747, he won the allegiance 
of certain Qizilbash officers, eager to preserve their 
lucrative commands. With these defections the fledgling 
government came to control of the cities of Kabul, 
Peshawar, Lahore, and Quetta. The new monarch, now known 
as Ahmad Shah, quickly reorganized his forces and within 
months of his coronation had launched the first of eight 
campaigns into the sub-continent, eventually establishing 
nominal control over a kingdom that stretched from the 
Persian city of Meshed west to Shrinagar in Kashmir and 
from the northern city of Faizabad south to the Arabian 
Sea. 
Most significantly, Ahmad Shah's reign succeeded in 
preserving the Persian-Abdali alliance, restored by Nadir 
Shah, while reversing the groups' historical roles, as the 
Pashtuns came to lead the alliance. Moreover, through the 
recruitment of the Qizilbash and through his own education 
received while serving at the highest levels in the 
Persian Army, Ahmad Shah laid the groundwork for a state 
led by the Abdalis (or Durranis, as his dynasty became 
known) but strongly rooted in the culture of the western- 
bordering state of Persia. It was this synthesis that was 
to provide the foundation for the country's growth in the 
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nineteenth century and soon spurred the transfer of the 
capital from Kandahar to Kabul. 
A Persian Capital 
After Ahmad Shah's death on October 23,1772, his son 
Timur was crowned the second Shah of Afghanistan. Born in 
Persia, the new monarch had served in the Punjab and spoke 
little Pashtun. In 1776, he moved his court to the alpine 
city of Kabul, " where, despite his continued support of 
the council in Kandahar, "he sought to create a military 
counterpoise to the Durranis by expanding his Qizilbash 
force to 12,000 men. "12 Though the rising strength of the 
Sikhs13 in the east was largely to undermine the Afghan 
efforts to preserve Shah Nadir's expansive empire, the 
nation's decisive cultural and linguistic shift from 
Pashtun to Persian was to be lasting. By the time of his 
death in 1793, while much of the empire Timur had 
inherited was gone, the most significant changes had been 
brought about by the promotion of the Qizilbash to a 
principal role in the kingdom and the transfer of the 
capital to Kabul. 14 
11The location where southeastern- and southwestern-running 
watersheds converge on a plateau extending north to the Hindu Kush. 
12Noelle, p. 231. Also see Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of 
the Kingdom of Caubul (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 
300-301. Dupree says that the Pashtun in Kandahar "considered him 
more pro-Persian than pro-Afghan, " p. 340. 
13 An eastern tribe that succeeded the Moguls in South Asia in the 
late eighteenth century and rose to power under the leadership of 
Ranjit Singh (1780-1839). 
14Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, pp. 12- 
13; Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 639; Mohan Lal, Life of the Amir Dost 
Mohammad Khan of Kabul (Karachi: Oxford University Press, reprint 
1978), pp. 43-44. 
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Despite the short and unsuccessful reigns of Timur's 
sons - Zaman Shah (1791-1800), Shah Mahmud (1800-1803, 
1809-1818), and Shah Shuja (1803-1809,1839-1842) - 
against a backdrop of gross overpropagation15 and continued 
Durrani infighting, the Persian character of the infant 
Afghan state continued. 16 But the person who would 
contribute most to the evolution of Afghanistan's distinct 
national identity was a young chieftain of mixed Barakzai- 
Qizilbash lineage by the name of Dost Mohammad, who in 
1813 became governor of the critical Tajik province of 
Kohistan, which at the time included both the Shamali 
Plain and the adjacent and ethnically similar Panjsher 
Valley. 
Dost Mohammad Khan 
While Nadir Kuli Khan's 1732 capture of Herat and 
subsequent alliance with the Abdali were the direct 
predecessors of Afghanistan's confederation, it was Dost 
Mohammad's arrival in Kohistan (today known just by its 
geographical name, Shamali) that led to the country's 
consolidation. As Arnold Fletcher put it, a "lifetime of 
15Timur is said to have had three hundred wives and concubines. 
16 Paradoxically, Gregorian points out that Timur's most 
counterproductive strategy may have been his "numerous martial 
alliances undertaken to strengthen the position of the monarchy 
among the Afghan tribes, " as twenty-three or more sons went on to 
compete for the throne after his death, p. 50; also see William 
Kerr Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments 
in Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 
second ed., 1953), pp. 67-68. Caroe puts the number at twenty-six, 
The Pathans, p. 267. 
40 
effort directed toward unifying and pacifying his country" 
was initiated by this gubernatorial appointment. '7 
The Tajiks were a well-established population who had 
migrated to Western Central Asia from Persia during the 
Middle Ages. 18 That they would eventually unite with the 
more recent eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Persian 
emigres, the Qizilbash, seems natural. In fact, Dost 
Mohammad expended the better part of nine years convincing 
the secularly oriented Tajik highlanders that he could be 
their voice in Kabul. Finally, in 1826, amid ongoing 
anarchy, he launched his campaign to succeed the 
floundering Sadozai, whose ruling era had been brought to 
an effective close by Shah Mahmud's ill-conceived blinding 
and execution of his Vizar, Fath Khan Barakzai in 1818.19 
Much like Timur Shah's transfer of the capital to Kabul in 
1775, Dost Mohammad' s seizure of power in 1826, 
17 Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 124. 
18There is some speculation that this population intermarried 1, )ith 
foreign outposts left along key throughfares, notably the P, i; jsher 
Valley, by various armies such as Monguls and the Greeks. Haroain 
Mir interview, 11 December 2004. DNA testing will shed light on 
the apparent ethnic anomalies or lack of homogeneity in places like 
the Upper Panjsher where the practice of inter-clan marriage 
continues to this day. Interestingly, the second of al Ahmad 
Khan's grandsons to come to the throne, Shah Mahmud, was deposed in 
1805 after intervening on the side of the Qizilbash in sectarian 
clashes in Kabul. Mahmud's actions, though having a negative 
effect on his career, would, in the words of a later chronicler, 
"safeguard the regime's honor, and prevent it from being 
irretrievably besmirched. " Faiz Mohammad Siraj al-tawarikh, volume 
one, p. 87. In other words, the protection of this key Persian 
population in Kabul at this key juncture was, in Faiz Mohammed's 
estimation, to have an indelible imprint on the development of the 
Afghan national character. 
19 The execution of a Barakzai Khan by a Sadozai monarch - the second 
in a generation (Fatih Khan's father, Paindar Khan, was killed in 
1799 by Shah Zaman) - acutely focused the Barakzai on vengeance 
against the Sadozai, Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, pp. 68-69. 
Writing nine years before Fath Khan's death, the later infamous 
British envoy, Mountstuart Elphinstone, described the Barakzai clan 
as -spirited and war-like, " adding that "they are a much more 
conspicuous figure than any other tribe among the Afghans, " 
Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, pp. 391-426. 
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facilitated by joint attacks of Tajik, Qizilbash, and 
Persianized Abdali forces, can be seen as a fundamentally 
Persianate event. 
Despite Dost Mohammad's successes during his first 
twelve years in power, on October 1,1838, Lord Auckland, 
the Governor General, issued his fateful Simla Manifesto, 
calling for the restoration of the Sadozais, who the 
British official naively believed, because of the family's 
particular lineage, could more effectively govern the 
emerging Persian-centric state. The British invasion of 
Afghanistan that followed this demand would trigger a new 
east-west struggle that became known as the "Great Game. /20 
MacNaughten's Arrival in Kabul 
In August 1839, ten months after Auckland's demand, a 
twenty-thousand-strong British force known as the Army of 
the Indus marched into Kabul. The British assumed power 
from a Shamali and Panjsheri force which, as testament to 
those groups' growing national significance, had occupied 
the capital in Shah Shuja's favour after Dost Mohammad's 
departure. 21 Taking an ominously nonchalant approach to 
the operation, one British regiment travelled with a pack 
of foxhounds, another with two camels bearing only 
20Arthur Conolly coined the term in a letter to a friend. See P-ter 
Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central A--, ja 
(New York: Kodansha International, 1994), p. 123. 
21Keen to prevent the Pashtun tribes' entry into a city where their 
influence and economic interests had steadily been growing over the 
previous thirteen years, this is believed to have been the Tajiks' 
first independent action on the national stage. 
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cigars. 22 Within days, Dost Mohammad had quit the country, 
exiting through the Tajik zones and eventually taking 
refuge across the Oxus River with the Amir of Bukhara. 
Nine months later, in August 1841, despite subsequent 
uprisings by both of Afghanistan's two other major ethnic 
groups, the Ghilzai and the Durrani, the British 
commander, General William MacNaughten, issued his 
infamous report that the country "was perfectly quiet from 
Dan to Beersheba. /,, 23 One of the few British officers who 
appear to have grasped the fluidity of the situation was a 
Kashmiri named Mohan Lal. A Muslim fluent in Persian, Lal 
had made strong contacts with the local population and 
knew of the rising resentment over the foreign presence . ''4 
On the night of November 1,1841, three British 
officers, including the chief political officer, Colonel 
Alexander Burnes, were hacked to death by a mob. Instead 
of mobilizing the forty-five hundred British troops at his 
command, General MacNaughten hesitated, denying pleas by 
Lal and other officers for immediate action. For seven 
weeks, he allowed the situation to deteriorate until on 
December 23, again defying the advice of his senior 
political officer, MacNaughten decamped for "secret talks" 
with Dost Mohammad's son, Akbar Khan. Later that same 
22Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, p. 45; Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 
379. 
23Sir John Kaye, History of War in Afghanistan (London, 1851), vol. 1, 
p. 603, quoted in Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, p. 48. 
29 See Lal, Life of the Amir Dost Mohammad Khan of Kabul, pp. 391-400. 
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day, the beheaded corpse of William MacNaughten was found 
hanging from a pole in the bazaar. 25 
On January 6,1842, sixteen thousand British and 
Indian personnel set out for Jalalabad, "fully 
[expecting], " according to one member of the party, Lady 
Sale, "to have to fight [their] way out. /f26 
Defeat of a Superpower 
Eighty years later, in the 1920s, representatives of the 
British Legation in Afghanistan were invited to meet two 
elderly ladies then living outside Kabul. Upon hearing 
their story, the diplomats realized that the European- 
looking women were none other than survivors of the 
carnage of 1841. In addition to the intrepid Dr. Brydon, 
who had arrived alone at Jalalabad on a mortally wounded 
pony in the second week of January 1841, they were three 
of only about one hundred British to survive the foolish 
evacuation following MacNaughten's death. The women had 
been rescued as babies from the convoy and raised by local 
families. 27 In all, some fourteen thousand British and 
Indian personnel were massacred in attacks. 
25Dupree cites an East Indian Company secret report of 19 February 
1842, questioning the role of Akbar Khan in the British envoy's 
death, but, as likely as anything, this was intended to deflect 
criticism from Dost Mohammad. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 387; 
Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, p. 108, quoting Captain 
Laurence's report. 
26 Lady Florentia Sale, A Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, 
1841-2,1969 edition, p. 95. 
27 Towards the end of their lives, these women chose to reveal their 
remarkable fate to their countrymen. The event appears to have 
been recently declassified. Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, p. 
50, recounts the story of the elderly ladies. Dupree in 1964 
discovered a signed copy of Dr. Brydon's report of 19 January 1842, 
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A month-long punitive action by Queen Victoria's 
forces in Kabul and Shamali claimed hundreds of Afghan 
lives, many innocent, as various warlords took the 
opportunity to strengthen their control of the principal 
cities of Kandahar, Herat, and Tashqurghan. In late 1842, 
Dost Mohammad returned to a country that, far from Lord 
Auckland's vision of a strong anti-Russian bulwark to 
protect India, was neither unified nor particularly 
enthusiastic about an alliance with the British. 28 
Conquest of Turkistan 
In 1845, Amir Dost Mohammad launched his operation to 
conquer the semi-autonomous states on the north slope of 
the Hindu Kush, historically known as Turkistan. With his 
path to the south and west blocked by some of his Barakzai 
kinsmen, the Amir's focus on the culturally northern 
territories, with the support of his maternal Qizilbash 
and allied Tajik supporters, was an obvious course. 
Although this area had been formally incorporated into the 
Sadozai Empire in 1751, by the 1840s it had been reduced 
to "almost a dozen petty principalities, " as Noelle 
in General Sales Brigand's book in the India Office Library, which 
mentions, among other details, how he and some forty other mounted 
officers on the night of 12 January 1842 had been forced to abandon 
their troops struggling on foot through snow and enemy fire, Dupree, 
Afghanistan, pp. 389-93. 
2e The most lasting impact of Lord Auckland's decision to invade the 
country may have been to foster a world-power-like confidence among 
the Afghans. Paradoxically, during the later twentieth century 
this would serve British and Western interests as Afghans 
repeatedly cited the 1841 and 1880 victories as precursors of the 
(eventual) Soviet defeat in their country, thus accelerating the 
end of the cold War. 
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described it. 29 Afghan and foreign historians, though 
acknowledging the results of this phase of the nation's 
history - that is, the transformation from confederated 
kingdom into modern state - have sought to perpetuate the 
erroneous notion that it was a Pashtun phenomenon. On the 
contrary, the half-Qizilbash leader, Dost Mohammad, 
undertook the struggle for "Lesser Turkistani30 (1845-1863) 
specifically because he could not rely upon the Durrani 
Council. The political significance, and Persian 
influence, of these campaigns have recently been discussed 
in works by Robert McChesney and Christine Noelle. 31 
In September 1855, Amir Dost Mohammad launched his 
long-awaited conquest of the southern zones. Eight years 
later, on May 27,1863, Dost Mohammad died, two weeks 
after capturing Herat. Though the Amir is often cited as 
the leader responsible for the initial integration of the 
modern Afghan state, his consolidation of the Tajik 
northeast, which would have a fundamental bearing on the 
events of the 1980s, remains a little-appreciated 
accomplishment. Having twice displaced the Sadozais - the 
second time overcoming the upheaval of the first Anglo- 
Afghan War - Dost Mohammad's success in bringing order to 
the country must be attributed to the effectiveness of his 
29Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, p. 121. 
30The Afghan portion of the region on the southern banks of the Amu 
Darya River is known by this name. 
31R. D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia. Four Hundred Years in the 
History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991). Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth- 
Century Afghanistan. 
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Durrani-Qizilbash-Tajik coalition. Not only did Dost 
Mohammad strengthen the Qizilbash's role in the governing 
alliance, but through his ties to Shamali and the Panjsher 
and the conquest of lesser Turkistan, he also 
accommodated, and relied upon, the Tajiks' entry into the 
nation's governing coalition. 32 
The Iron Amir 
On July 22,1880, following twenty-five years of 
instability punctuated by Russo-Anglo rivalries and a 
second British invasion, a stout, young grandson of Dost 
Mohammad, Abdur Rahman, marched from Samarkand via the 
principal Shamali town of Charikar to Kabul, where he was 
formally recognized as Amir by General Donald Stewart, the 
acting Head of State and departing commander of British 
forces in Afghanistan. Twenty days later, the last of 
Stewart's troops departed, ending the ill-fated second 
Anglo-Afghan war. With his court in Kabul temporarily 
housed in tents and mud huts, Abdur Rahman's first 
objective was to fend off his cousin Ayub Khan's competing 
claim to the throne. Ayub, who already held Herat, had 
seized Kandahar after the British withdrawal. The new 
Amir soon induced the defection of some of Ayub's troops 
in Kandahar, seizing that city in October 1881 as his 
Tajik Northern Army simultaneously captured Herat. The 
32Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, p. 87. 
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capture of the two cities heralded the Barakzai-Qizilbash- 
Tajik's third generation of national leadership. 
While Amir Dost Mohammad had built a Qizilbash-Tajik 
national army to secure the periphery of the crumbling 
Saddazoi kingdom, Abdur Rahman constructed the actual 
system of administration that would transform the still 
loosely confederated nation into a state. He accomplished 
this by appointing (and frequently rotating) provincial 
and regional governors to collect taxes and monitor 
security threats. Many of these appointees were Kabuli 
Qizilbash and Tajik veterans of the Amir's Northern Army. 
The introduction of this new and powerful class of 
bureaucrats made the Persian language the defining 
character of the emerging Kabul city-state and 
significantly strengthened the standing of the Persians 
within Afghanistan. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Kohistanis, 
Panjsheris, Tashqurghanis, and other Tajiks and Pashtuns 
slowly migrated to the capital, Kabul. Intermarriage 
between these groups and the urban Qizilbash, and 
resulting adoption of Sunni-Islamic practices, and 
government service all contributed to the rising 
phenomenon of a Persian-Afghan culture. Tellingly, 
throughout a series of revolts by the nation's major 
ethnic groups following Ayub Khan's defeat - Ghilzai 
(1886), Uzbeks (1888), and Hazaras (1891-93) - only the 
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Tajiks remained loyal to Abdur Rahman, although by the 
time he died only a small percentage of them had actually 
migrated to the capital. 
Abdur Rahman's reign also saw increasing border 
tensions among the Great Powers and the absorption of the 
Pashtuns into the Indian Empire, thus further diluting 
that group's influence within the developing Afghan state. 
In 1887, the King of Denmark mediated and resolved a 
dispute between the Afghans and the Russians over the 
northern boundary of the country, by recognizing the Amu 
Darya River as the frontier. The Wakhan corridor, 
stretching to the frontier with China and permanently 
separating India and Russia, was ceded to Afghanistan in 
1895. And, finally, the eastern border of the country was 
demarcated in detailed negotiations with British diplomat 
Sir Mortimer Durand in 1897, permanently separating the 
eastern-most Pashtun tribes from Afghanistan. 33 
Though Abdur Rahman is recognized as one of the most 
important leaders in Afghanistan's history, his agreement 
with the British on the so-called "Durand line" and the 
formal separation of the Pashtun tribes may have done 
almost as much to seal the fate of his dynasty as did the 
missteps of his successors, particularly in maintaining 
their relations with the Tajiks. 
33 Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, p. 166. 
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When Abdur Rahman died in 1898, his eldest son, 
Habibullah, assumed the throne. The fourth Barakzai- 
Qizilbash34 soon became embroiled in a dispute with the new 
and ambitious viceroy, Lord Curzon, who suspended the 
subsidies extended to the country after the Second Anglo- 
Afghan War. Despite this, throughout World War I, British 
suzerainty was maintained. Following the Amir's 
mysterious murder while on a hunting trip in Laghman in 
February 1919,35 Habibullah was succeeded by his son 
Amanullah, a leader of the so-called "war party" that 
lobbied to support the Central Powers during World War I. 
Upon assuming the throne, Amanullah declared Afghanistan's 
independence from Britain and, with encouragement from the 
new Soviet government, incited Pashtuns on both sides of 
the Durand line to rise up. The British responded by 
launching the brief air campaign that has become known as 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War. 36 Though the armistice 
extracted conditions from the Afghans that terminated all 
subsidies and permanently recognized the eastern border of 
the country, the British agreed to restore Afghanistan's 
34 Though he was perhaps only twenty-five percent Quizilbash, 
culturally he was thoroughly Persianized and he spoke little 
Pashtun. See Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan. 
35Ewans writes that the most likely regicide was Amanullah, 
Afghanistan: A New History, p. 86. 
36 The air campaign in which the RAF operating one Handly Page V-1500 
out of Peshawar quickly brought the new Amir's government to 
submission following the successful targeting of the Arg Palace, a 
Kabul armaments factory and, symbolically, the tomb of Amir Abdur 
Rahman. More antiquated British planes dropped hundreds of bombs 
on the eastern city of Jalalabad. On one day alone, the RAF 
delivered over three thousand pounds of ordinance to the winter 
capital, leading Amanullah to appeal to the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford 
on 24 May 1919. 
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right to conduct its own foreign relations. 37 Amanullah's 
dialogue with Soviet Russia continued, though over the 
next eight years he would develop an increasingly pro- 
Western stance. 38 
In July 1928, after suppressing a rebellion of the 
Mengal and Jaji tribes with British-supplied aircraft, 
Amir Amanullah returned, overland, at the wheel of a Rolls 
Royce, from his maiden overseas tour, which had included 
stops in numerous European and Middle-Eastern capital 
cities. The Amir proceeded to announce, at a hastily 
convened national council, that Afghan men should cut 
their beards and dress in Western clothes, and that women 
should be educated and cease wearing Islamic head-covers. 
Shockingly, he then went on to rhetorically ask, "Is it 
not shameful that the women of Europe are more laborious 
and more active than the men of Afghanistan? "39 For a 
traditional Islamic society such as Afghanistan's, the 
effect of the Amir's pejorative comments was cataclysmic. 
The negative domestic response was first felt in an 
uprising that soon developed in the eastern city of 
Jalalabad. Even when his emissaries returned from that 
city with exorbitant demands, the Amir appears to have had 
little appreciation of the danger he faced. Most likely, 
37 Agreement was subject to six months probation; over the strong 
objections of Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, Chelmsford 
restored Afghanistan's sovereignty. 
"See Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919- 
1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973). 
39 Quoted in Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, p. 169. 
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he believed that regardless of the worsening political 
situation in the east, he could rely on the Barakzai- 
Qizilbash dynasty's traditional Tajik allies in the 
northeast. In the midst of the deteriorating situation he 
attempted to arrest a popular Tajik militia leader named 
Habibullah Kalakani. 40 This proved to be a fatal error of 
judgement. 41 
On December 14,1928, two thousand Tajik fighters 
assembled at the Murad Beg Fort, on the outskirts of 
Kabul, and proclaimed Kalakani the new Amir of 
Afghanistan. 42 Having demolished the hundred-year alliance 
with the Tajiks that had enabled his forefathers to pit 
various Pashtun tribes against each other, Amanullah was 
now forced to turn for aid to a shadowy Ahmadzai-Ghilzai 
chief, Ghausuddin Khan. 43 After collecting money and arms 
in Kabul, Ghausuddin did raise an army, but instead of 
returning to help Amanullah, proceeded to seize the city 
of Ghazni, where he, too, was proclaimed Amir. This 
90Habibullah Kalakani (the suffix "i" denotes "of [the town of] 
Kalaquan") has historically been known as Bachah-i Saqqao, or "son 
of the water carrier" (his father's profession), the pejorative 
name having been kept alive by anti-Tajik Afghan chroniclers and 
their uncritical English-speaking counterparts. 
41Roy points out that "there can be no doubt that the uprisings of 
the Basmachi against the Soviet regime had repercussions in the 
Shamali and Panjsher, where Mawl"awi Abdul Hayy, an alim and a 
former student at Deoband, joined Enver Pashah in 1920, " Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanian, p. 66. Whether these sentiments were 
fully appreciated by Amanullah, they were insufficient warning to 
his ultimate blunder in the key region adjacent to the capital. 
42 Fearing that to enter the capital without a designated "Amir" would 
be a violation of the Shariat, the rebels were careful to hold the 
ceremony and offer Friday prayers before passing the village of 
Dih-i-Kupak at approximately 3.00 p. m., R. D. McChesney, Kabul Under 
Siege: Fayz Muhammad's Account of the 1929 Uprising (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999), p. 37. 
93 Dubiously, that individual's father had led a revolt against the 
late Amir Habibullah. 
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development "seriously affected the morale of the few 
troops remaining to defend Kabul" from the Tajiks. 44 
Government forces in Jalalabad, Laghman, Dakka, and Kahi 
soon began to desert en masse. On January 14,1929, three 
days after a second betrayal by Ghilzai tribesmen at 
Jagdalak, Amir Amanullah quit the capital. 
The Tajik Amir 
On January 16,1929, Kalakani negotiated the surrender of 
the Arg Palace with the assistance of the British 
Minister, Sir Francis Humphrys. 45 The Tajiks' jubilation 
at seizing the traditional seat of government was 
heightened by the discovery that they were taking 
possession of a well-stocked national treasury. 46 On April 
19, four thousand freshly paid Suleiman Khel-Ghilzai, 
allied with Kalakani, attacked and defeated the former 
amir's remaining army in Ghazni. 
Following this defeat of Amanullah, Nadir Khan 
Moussabin, the former Afghan Chief of Staff and hero of 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War, became the central figure in 
the growing anti-Tajik opposition movement. 
44 Poullada writes that Amanullah by this point seems to have been 
increasingly led by Turkish advisors who failed to grasp the 
central importance of Tajiks in the stability of the capital, 
Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, p. 175. 
95 Quite probably MujadidiMujaddidi, a key nationalist religious 
leader who opposed Amanullah, or Kalakani himself, had realized 
that by staging their siege from Bagh-i-Bala adjacent to the 
British legation, they would be able to draw the British into 
negotiations on their behalf. In fact, the British Legation was 
heavily damaged by Amanullah's artillerymen. 
46When the looting ended, McChesney says, Habibullah "began to move 
what was left in the treasury north to [Kohistan], " Kabul Under 
Siege, p. 50. 
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In the summer of 1929, Nadir Khan petitioned the 
British, who were keenly interested in ending the chaos in 
the neighbouring state, for the support of the Pashtun 
tribes, particularly the Mahsud and the Wazir living on 
the British side of the Durand line. He warned them that 
if such assistance was not forthcoming, he would quit the 
fight. 47 
Persuaded, in September the Indian government 
instructed its tribal agents to permit individual Pashtun 
fighters, or groups, to enter Afghanistan. Little 
encouragement seemed necessary: large numbers of Mahsud 
and Wazir soon joined Nadir's force, thus provoking the 
Afghan tribes into action. Though his brother Hashim 
Moussabin was unsuccessful in overcoming the atypically 
allied Tajik and Ghilzai forces east of Kabul late in the 
summer, a couple of weeks later, on September 27, the 
forces of his other brother, Shah Wali, seized Charasiah, 
the southern approach to the capital. 48 
By the second week of October 1929, the Arg Palace 
was under siege for the second time in a year. Amir 
Habibullah Kalakani fled the capital on the night of 
October 12. Pursued by Nadir's forces, he surrendered 
four days later on the promise of safe conduct. 
47 The correspondence between Nadir Khan and the government of India 
is in the India Office Library, London LPS/10/1232,1928, p. 50. 
Britain's fear of ongoing turmoil in Afghanistan if Habibullah was 
successful in his drive for legitimacy was linked to a realization 
of both the Tajiks' historic role and the close ties that the group 
enjoyed with Soviet Central Asia. 
48Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, p. 193. 
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Kalakani's previous experience of Pashtun duplicity was 
promptly repeated: upon returning to Kabul, he found 
himself imprisoned in the Arg Palace. In a last 
photograph after his capture, which would later become an 
enduring political symbol to Tajik Afghans, the leader 
looked fatigued, his turban slightly askew as he stood 
upright and stared fixedly into the camera, his arms - 
possibly already trussed - tucked under a tightly wrapped 
dark shawl. 
On the morning of November 1,1929, Habibullah 
Kalakani and ten of his supporters and relatives were led 
to gallows erected outside the palace. In the second of 
three violent deaths to befall Afghan monarchs in a 
fourteen-year span, 49 the Persian outlaw-turned-monarch was 
hanged. 
Assassination of Nadir Shah 
With no money in the treasury to compensate the tribes for 
bringing him to power, Nadir spent his first weeks on the 
throne watching his subjects loot the capital and 
surrounding bazaars. Andre Viollis, the only foreign 
correspondent to witness the mayhem following the Tajiks' 
overthrow, wrote that "the [Pashtun] tribesmen considered 
4 9They were Amir Habibullah Barakzai (1919), Amir Habibullah Kalakani 
(1929), and Shah Nadir Moussabin (1933). 
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Kabul an enemy capital. 1150 Despite this, the new monarch 
quickly moved to mend relations with the Tajiks, 
appointing the sons of prominent leaders to serve in his 
own bodyguard . 
51 To strengthen his rule, Nadir assumed the 
title of "Shah, " not in use since Dost Mohammad succeeded 
Shah Shuja for the second time in 1842. 
Once marauding tribesmen had been ejected from the 
capital, Nadir's double challenge was to restore the 
domestic order that had been disrupted by Amanullah's 
political follies and the subsequent Tajik takeover, while 
advancing his own aspirations for the country's 
modernization. The new Shah soon affirmed Kalakani's 
strict enforcement of sharia and restored purdah 
regulations52 that he had enacted, while successfully 
implementing a constitution that largely resembled the one 
proposed by the toppled Amanullah. 53 
Following a second revolt by the Shamali-Tajiks in 
1930, which was aggressively suppressed by the execution 
of scores of individuals, and a brief Soviet incursion 
into the Kunduz area of Afghanistan later that year, the 
new government initiated construction of a road through 
the Hindu Kush to activate their authourity in the 
50Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, p. 196. It was a 
phenomenon that would be repeated in September 1996 as the Taliban 
militia spilled into the Persian-speaking city. 
510ne such appointment was given to Dost Mohammad Khan, the son of 
Amir Habibullah's former household treasurer Yahya Khan and the 
father of Ahmad Shah Massoud. See interview with Dost Mohammad 
Khan, February 1992. 
52 Religious codes governing dress and public behavior of women. 
53 For constitutional details, see Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, 
p. 101. 
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northern provinces, which had been so important to the 
previous ruling house. 54 All these ambitious plans were 
abruptly stopped on November 8,1933, when the shah was 
assassinated by Abdul Khaliq, the protege of one of 
Nadir's political rivals, and succeeded on the throne by 
his son, the frail nineteen-year-old Prince Zahir. ss 
Wallace Murray 
Throughout the late 1920s and the 1930s, the U. S. 
Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, Wallace Murray, 
had waged a vigorous campaign against nearly all U. S. 
efforts to increase ties with Kabul, claiming that 
Afghanistan "was the most fanatical, hostile country on 
earth. 1156 Murray was so motivated that on at least one 
occasion he seems to have enlisted the FBI in intimidating 
a U. S. businessman who wished to establish trade relations 
there. In early 1928, he thwarted a planned visit by Amir 
54 The Soviet force invaded in pursuit of partisan leaderIbrahim Beg, 
who was soon driven back across the Oxus and captured, Ewans, 
Afghanistan: A New History, p. 102; also see Hopkirk, Setting the 
East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia (London: John 
Murray, 1984). In response to this action and the Soviets' 
increasing ambitions towards India, the British in 1931 extended a 
subsidy of 175,000 pounds and a gift of 10,000 rifles to Nadir Shah 
to help the new government. The British were also alarmed by 
Soviet support for Abdul Ghaffur Khan (grandfather of Wali Khan) 
and the ""red shirt movement" (Khudai Khidmatgars), which dominated 
the North-West Frontier Province in 1930. Also see Roseanne Klass 
(ed. ), The Great Game Revisited-(New York: Freedom House, 1987). 
55 Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in 
Central and Southern Asia, p. 241; Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway 
of Conquest, p. 234. In the opinion of Louis Dupree, the succesion 
had far-reaching implications for Afghanistan's future: "Logically 
and in keeping with the pattern of Afghan illegitimate succession, 
Shah Mahmud should have seized power, proclaimed himself king, 
incarcerated his nephew, Mohammad Zahir, and perhaps fought with 
his brothers for the throne. What actually happened changed the 
character of the modern Afghan monarchy, and set Afghanistan on the 
evolutionary political path it still follows, " Afghanistan, p. 476. 
56Murray to Wells, 8 April 1940, United States National Archives 
(hereafter USNA) 124.90h/49. 
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Amanullah, who sought to establish these relations, by 
claiming that "the United States has already recognized 
Afghanistan, " while in a subsequent case five and a half 
years later, he denied a diplomatic visa to Shah Mahmoud, 
then the Afghan Minister of War, arguing that "We do not 
recognize Afghanistan. "57 Not until Joseph Grew, the 
venerable U. S. diplomat and Ambassador to Japan, 
complained on October 26,1933, about the ambiguity of th 
U. S. position towards Afghanistan was Murray forced to 
capitulate over recognition. 58 
The Arrival of Minister Engert 
Cornelius Van H. Engert's arrival in Kabul as Minister in 
July 1942 was something of a homecoming. Twenty years 
earlier, as a young Foreign Service officer stationed in 
Iran, he had been the first U. S. diplomat to visit Kabul. 
Two years after his return to Washington he had published 
a 225-page, classified study recommending formal American 
recognition of the country. 59 Engert's posting previous to 
57Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, pp. 48,50; USNA 1930- 
39 files, box 4085,890h. 602 including Department memo, 24 July 
1928; DOS telegram to USE, Rome No. 6,20 January 1928, USNA 
890h. 00/1 political affairs; and Berlin dispatch 1546,24 August 
1933, and London telegram 388,11 February 1933. 
58Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, pp. 50-53. "Grew's 
prestige was such, as to not admit of an equivocal reply, " Poullada 
writes. "The pressures [from within the State Department] for 
establishment of diplomatic relations finally coincided with the 
election of an internationally-minded President, Franklin Roosevelt, 
and almost at once American policy began to shift in favour of 
recognition. " On 22 January 1935, William Hornibrook, the U. S. 
Minister in Tehran, was co-accredited to Kabul, though it was not 
until Engert's arrival in 1942 that the U. S. had a resident envoy 
in Kabul. 
S9Although the report explicitly recommended U. S. diplomatic 
recognition, it was, more importantly, the first U. S. historical 
survey of the country and remains one of the most cogent. 
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his return to Kabul had been as Consul General in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, from 1933-35, where he had witnessed the 
overthrow of Haile Selassie's government by Fascist Italy, 
as well as the completely ineffective efforts of the 
international community to resist it. On presenting his 
credentials to Zahir Shah on July 25,1942, he seemed 
determined to prevent a similar. event from occurring at 
his new posting. 
With little choice but to hope that the results of 
the Allied war effort would soon speak for themselves, the 
Minister busied himself in a virtual "one-man rescue" of 
the landlocked Afghan economy as he lobbied Allied 
authorities to provide fixed shipping allocations for 
critical exports and imports. 60 These efforts often pitted 
the interests of the Afghans against those of British 
India, which preferred to see the neighbouring state 
stagnate. Many of these conflicts were ascribed to the 
zeal of "young wartime bureaucrats in the Government of 
India" who worked in the relevant inter-Allied agencies. 
Owing to the strategic nature of his mission - to ensure 
the overland supply routes to the USSR in the event of the 
Nazis' recapture of Iran - and his strong support in the 
U. S. War Department, Engert and his team eventually 
overcame British objections and obtained fixed shipping 
Cornelius Van H. Engert, A Report on Afghanistan, Department of 
State Division of Publications, Series C, No. 53, Afghanistan, No. 
1 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1924). 
60Leon B. Poullada and Leila D. J. Poullada, The Kingdom of 
Afghanistan and the United States: 1828-1973 (Omaha, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska, 1995), pp. 74-76. 
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quotas for the Afghans. 61 By the end of the Second World 
War, "Afghan officials from the Prime Minister on down" 
had come to appreciate "the persistence and courage of 
Engert, `the stubborn little Dutchman, "' as they referred 
to him. 62 Even before the end of World War II, Engert had 
come to personify an American government that the Afghans 
saw as a uniquely disinterested participant in their long- 
troubled foreign affairs. 63 
For most of the war, Assistant Secretary Murray, 
whose extreme fear of the Central Asian state, much like 
his later counterparts, likely stemmed in part from the 
potential of a posting or even a visit, was forced to 
muzzle himself. Only in late 1944, as Nazi forces 
retreated across Eastern Europe, did Murray begin 
regaining the initiative, successfully blocking the 
Afghans' first request for post-war U. S. aid. It would be 
the first key step toward driving a wedge between the U. S. 
and its de facto ally, Afghanistan. 64 
61Ewans points out that the effect of the Engert shipping quotas was 
that following the war, the country was "'financially buoyant, as 
she had been able to spend little during the war years, while Mill 
selling abroad her karakul and agricultural produce, " Afghar_! _. A New History, p. 105. 
63Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, p. 77. 
63 See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the 
Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2003) and Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, p. 77. 
64 Afghanistan formally remained non-aligned throughout the war, 
though through Engert's efforts it most likely would have provided 
the Allies with Central Asian supply routes had they become 
necessary. Ewans points out that following the Afghans' wart`: ine 
cooperation with the U. K., they ""reminded the Indian government of 
their interest [in the self-determination of the Pashtuns], it 
received the blunt reply that the Durand Line was an internati: -nal 
frontier and that what happened on the Indian side was none of 
their business, " Afghanistan: A New History, p. 106. 
60 
On October 16,1945, Ambassador Engert, on the eve of 
leaving the country, cabled Washington to lobby in support 
of an additional Afghan request to purchase basic military 
supplies from the U. S. Engert's appeal cited both 
Britain's recent extension of ten-year credits as an 
attempt to retain their monopoly and the fact that most of 
the materials the Afghans sought were non-combat 
equipment. 65 The State Department responded to Engert on 
November 9,1945, with familiar ambiguity: "The sale of 
military surplus on credit requires a special application 
to the Surplus Property Administration for exemption to 
Section 15(a) of the Surplus Property Act. " The cable 
added that "at this time it has not been determined what 
countries can be granted such exceptions. "66 With the war 
over and the need for Allied supply routes through Central 
Asia gone, Engert was powerless to defy Murray and other 
State Department bureaucrats who were anxious never to see 
the frontier state themselves. In addition to missing an 
opportunity to avert the Soviets' initial entry into the 
country eight years later, the Truman Administration's 
decision, albeit by mid-level functionaries, of alienating 
65Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, p. 131. Engert had 
also written to the State Department in July that "'recent Afghan 
experiences with tribal dissidents had resulted in a decision to 
form a small, effective force consisting of mountain brigades for 
operations in the tribal areas, backed by a well-trained 
gendarmerie for internal security and border patrol, " Poullada, 
Afghanistan and the United States, p. 130, citing Secret Dispatch 
No. 793,23 July 1945. USNA 890H. 24/7-23-45. 
66Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, p. 131. In 1946, the 
State Department for the fourth time rejected the Afghan request. 
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a pro-U. S. but non-aligned state, was to help create a 
broad and damaging precedent for U. S. interests. 67 
Prime Minister Mahmoud's Visit to Washington 
In mid-1948, the new Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmoud, 
paid a visit to U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall in 
Washington. Personable and intelligent, Mahmoud, who had 
succeeded his older brother Hashim two years earlier, was 
regarded as "having a reputation for tolerance" and being 
very pro-American. 68 Given the now four official 
rejections for aid by the Afghans' unofficial wartime 
Allies, two of which had preceded the Engert appeal, 
Mahmoud's government had also placed an arms order in June 
1947 with the SKODA firm in the still western state of 
Czechoslovakia. 69 Though U. S. military aid clearly 
remained the Afghan government's top international 
priority, the Afghans were eager not to appear overly 
dependent on American largesse. Sitting down with 
Marshall, the Afghan Premier presented the case for the 
67 Despite this strategic decision, certain commercial benefits did 
accrue from the World War II alliance. Dupree points out that the 
Morrison Knutson Co., an American firm, did negotiate, beginning in 
late 1945, to take over a development project in the Helmand Valley, 
adjacent to Kandahar, from German and Japanese teams that had been 
expelled in October 1941 at the behest of the Allies, Afghanistan, 
pp. 480-483. As much as anything else, it was this relationship 
which became representative of post-war U. S. -Afghan relations. 
"From the beginning, " Dupree writes, "misunderstandings arose 
concerning areas of responsibility and capabilities of the two 
parties, " p. 483. 
68 Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, p. 242. 
69USNA 890H. 24/3-25-46, cited in Poullada, Afghanistan and the United 
States, p. 132 and note 11. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia 
did not occur until April 1948, thrusting Czechoslovakia into the 
Soviet sphere. 
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U. S. providing his government with modest military 
support. 
"Who's the enemy? " the Secretary of State curtly 
interrupted him. The erudite Prime minister calmly 
replied that he felt his nation could be threatened by the 
USSR, much as Eastern Europe was. Upon hearing this, 
Marshall burst into "derisive laughter" at the prospect of 
the Afghans resisting a potential Soviet invasion long 
enough for the Allies to intervene. 70 Marshall proceeded 
to challenge Mahmoud's assertion that, in the absence of 
U. S. aid, his government would be forced to turn to the 
USSR for support. The pro-U. S. Prime Minister was then, 
in turn, forced into the humiliating position of having to 
be subtly threatening in his response. 
"Islam forbids eating pork, " Mahmoud addressed the 
former war leader. "But if the situation is desperate and 
survival is at stake, it is permissible to eat. "7l 
In November 1949, a little over a year after 
Mahmoud's unsuccessful visit to Washington, it was 
announced over the radio that the Prime Minister's nephew, 
70 There could have been no misunderstanding by Marshall of the 
Afghan's sincerity. The State Department memorandum regarding the 
previous visit with Prince Naim quotes the envoy as 
saying, "Properly armed and convinced of U. S. backing the Afghans 
would stand in the Hindu Kush and hold the Soviets back to give the 
United States and its allies time to defend the Middle East and 
South Asia, " USNA 890H. 20/11-19-48, from Poullada, Afghanistan and 
the United States, p. 142. Also, an identical strategy was being 
employed by NATO in Syria and Iran, countries that were wealthier 
but historically less successful at repelling foreign advances; the 
Secretary's condescending reaction was a clear indication to the 
Prime Minister of the U. S. view of his country's importance, not 
the futility of the proposed policy. 
71Armin Meyer letter to Leon Poullada 8 June 1986, quoted in Poullada, 
Afghanistan and the United States, p. 133. The metaphor, a 
diplomatically phrased warning, may have also been Mahmoud's frank 
appraisal of his own political longevity. 
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Prince Mohammad Daoud, would be the new Minister of Tribal 
Affairs. Almost at once, presumably with the new 
minister's encouragement, a "Government of Pashtunistan" 
was formed in the eastern Ghilzal Provinces under Haji 
Mirza Ali Khan, a former Nazi agent already believed by 
that time to be working with the Soviets. Historian 
Anthony Arnold has argued that it was only in mid-1950 
that "the USSR finally appeared to recognize the 
opportunity that Afghanistan's short-sighted Pashtunistan 
policy was affording them. , j, 72 In light of Daoud's and 
Mirza Ali's later Soviet liaisons, it is entirely possible 
that at this point, in late 1949, Moscow was already 
playing an active role in the developing border conflict. 73 
Courting Assistant Secretary McGhee 
By 1951, Prince Daoud, who was deeply offended by U. S. 
policymakers' successive rebuffs of his uncle and their 
increasing Pakistani-based regional policy, was named 
Minister of Defence. In light of Daoud's exploitation of 
the Pashtunistan issue to fuel his rise to power, and his 
later Soviet leaning, it may seem ironic that he made U. S. 
aid his top goal throughout 1950 and 1951. Always 
72 Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective 
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), p. 30. 
73 See Klass (ed. ), The Great Game Revisited, and Henry Bradsher, 
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). In addition to establishing a five- 
hundred-student school in Kabul to educate and politically 
inculcate children from the disputed territories, there were 
reports that the Afghans were organizing guerilla training, 
presumably for cross-border operations, James Spain, The Pathan 
Borderland (The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1963), p. 241, quoted in 
Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, p. 100. 
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mercurial, Daoud was undoubtedly influenced by Prime 
Minister Mahmoud's pro-Western views and by those of his 
brother, Prince Naim, who was then serving as ambassador 
to the U. S. At a meeting in early 1951, Naim again warned 
U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 
George McGhee that if even symbolic aid were not 
forthcoming, his government might have to approach the 
USSR. McGhee later recalled his response: 
Sensing that [Naim] was bluffing from the obvious 
futility of the Afghan government's relying on Russian 
military aid, I picked up the phone and asked my 
secretary to get me the number of the Russian embassy. 
I wrote it on a piece of paper and handed it to Prince 
7 Naim, whereupon we both laughed. 4 
The Istanbul Protocol 
Unbeknownst to Naim, two months before this disappointing 
encounter, the Assistant Secretary had attended a key 
regional conference of American ambassadors in Istanbul. 
According to McGhee's memoirs, that event, coming more 
than three years after George Kennan had formulated the 
U. S. 's "containment doctrine, " established that: 
In the case of states bordering on the USSR we should 
continue large-scale military aid and, where necessary, 
economic aid and encourage strong popular resistance to 
Communist aims. 75 
Despite this clear mandate, McGhee, writing years later, 
claimed that "there was never any doubt that our policy, 
74 George C. McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in 
Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 304. McGhee took 
pride in the dramatic miscalculation even twenty-eight years after 
the Soviet entry into the country in 1955. 
75McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, pp. 269-270. 
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during my tenure as Assistant Secretary, was against 
military aid to Afghanistan. " 76 
The State Department's widening duplicity on the 
Afghan aid issue and deepening alliance with Pakistan 
manifested itself again in March 1951 at talks between 
McGhee and Minister Daoud in Kabul. "None of the previous 
Afghan requests [for nominal U. S. aid] had been official, " 
McGhee announced to his stunned hosts. The insult was 
hastily compounded by a disingenuous solicitation: If the 
Afghans wished aid, "a formal list should be presented to 
the embassy with a list of specific requirements. "77 
McGhee, of course, had little more interest than 
Murray had had in the 1930s in increasing U. S. -Afghan 
ties, and on December 8,1951, the U. S. Ambassador in 
Kabul, George Merrell, delivered a response to the 
"official" request so laden with conditions, including 
full United Nations disclosure of even small arms 
transfers and effective Pakistani approval, that Prime 
Minister Mahmoud declared it a "political refusal. "78 The 
pro-American Afghan Prime Minister's career was 
effectively at an end. 
76McGhee letter to Leon Poullada, 29 August 1985, quoted in Poullada, 
Afghanistan and the United States, p. 144. Poullada wryly inquired 
regarding the Istanbul meeting: "Is it possible that Assistant 
Secretary of State McGhee and all those professional diplomats 
experienced in Middle East geography did not realize that 
Afghanistan had a common border with the USSR? " Afghanistan and the 
United States, p. 145. 
77USNA 890h. 20/17 December 1951. 
78 This was to be the last significant act of Mahmoud's once-promising 
career, the final six months of which were spent in a state of 
depression and infirmity. For a discussion of Mahmoud's tenure as 
prime minister, see Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 494-498. 
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Daoud's Rise 
By May 1953, it was clear to the Afghans that the benign 
neglect of the Truman Administration was being replaced by 
the outright hostility of the newly elected Eisenhower 
Administration. For the Afghans, who had had their 
diplomatic efforts repeatedly spurned over the previous 
decade, this was a very discouraging development. In 
stark contrast to Engert's collaborative stance during 
World War II, Dulles's new envoy in Kabul, Angus Ward, 
adopted an adversarial tone towards the Afghan 
government. 79 
In August 1953, Mahmoud resigned in frustration over 
the failure to establish relations with the U. S. and the 
following month, Daoud became Prime Minister. 80 The month 
after that, his brother, Prince Naim, was back meeting at 
the U. S. State Department in Washington. This time, to 
avoid any miscommunication, he had arranged to meet 
personally with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. 
After no less than a dozen rebuffs by the U. S. government 
over the previous ten years, both brothers may have felt 
that, culturally and militarily, it was important for 
79Poullada states that "The Pakistanis wanted to topple Daoud" and 
"Ambassador Ward and the CIA station chief in Kabul were in fivour 
of cooperating, " Afghanistan and the United States, pp. 104-105. 
Such sentiments, particularly in light of U. S. covert operations in 
Iran during this period, were likely not unknown to the Afghans. 
Regarding the U. S. -supported coup against the nationalist Iranian 
prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, see Kinzer, All the Shah's Men. 
eoSee Sultan Ghas interview, 22 November 2005. 
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their country to be linked to one of the two emerging 
postwar superpowers. 
In this last appeal, paradoxically, Naim appears not 
to have restated the possibility of Soviet aid, as he and 
Mahmoud previously had, taking instead a purely pro- 
American view. This tactic led the internationally 
inexperienced Dulles to comment after the meeting that "if 
the Afghans were already so anti-Russian, it wasn't 
necessary to worry about them. " 81 In fact, Dulles, perhaps 
egged on by Murray's like-minded successor McGhee, was 
intent on isolating the Afghans and, to insure that 
outcome, took the unusual step of copying the Pakistani 
Ambassador to Washington on his negative reply to Naim, 
sent December 28,1954.82 The Afghans' response to this 
double affront - albeit in the context of a Cold War of 
which they had no clear understanding - was neither long 
in coming nor, in light of repeated warnings, 
unpredictable. 
Daoud's Announcement 
Afghanistan's acceptance of a US$100 million Soviet loan 
in January 1955, preceding Moscow's penetration of Egypt 
by a full eight months, appears to have caught U. S. 
61 See Poullada's interview with Helen Nicholl, a Foreign Service 
officer in the State Department's Office of South Asian Affairs, 
December 1957, from Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, 
Note 11, p. 149. 
82 Dulles wrote: "After careful consideration, extending military aid 
to Afghanistan would create problems not offset by the strength it 
would generate. Instead of asking for arms, Afghanistan should 
settle the Pushtunistan dispute with Pakistan, " quoted in Poullada, 
Afghanistan and the United States, p. 149. 
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officialdom by surprise. 83 The situation rapidly 
deteriorated after the Pakistani Government announced on 
March 27 the consolidation of all the provinces of West 
Pakistan into one administrative unit, in an effort to 
limit the power of the Pashtun tribes. Three days later, 
Afghan mobs sacked Pakistani diplomatic posts in 
Afghanistan. The northwestern corner of South Asia was 
descending into turmoil. 
After nine years of hostile U. S. diplomacy, Daoud had 
called John Foster Dulles' bluff. The degree to which the 
U. S. was caught off guard by this action can be measured 
by the speed with which Washington responded. In early 
1956, the obstinate Ambassador Angus Ward was formally 
recalled, and by 1957 the U. S. started training Afghan 
officers in the U. S. At that point, however, a National 
Security Council report correctly observed that 
"Afghanistan has incurred so huge a burden of debt to the 
Communist bloc as to threaten its future independence. "84 
In August 1961, relations between the Afghan and Pakistani 
governments again erupted into active conflict. 
For the Soviets, Afghanistan's economic penetration 
and isolation could not have been better; for ordinary 
Afghans, the situation brought the worst economic crisis 
83 See Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 508. 
84 Declassified Documents Reference System, Fiche No. 44B (NSC 5617). 
Quoted in Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, p. 152. 
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since 1942.85 The pro-USSR stance of the regime of Prime 
Minister Daoud and his brother and their longtime 
opposition to a democratic constitution increasingly came 
to be seen by the Shah and others as symptoms of the same 
ailment. 
Subversion of the Constitution 
On March 9,1963, Kabul Radio announced that Zahir Shah 
had accepted Prime Minister Daoud's resignation, though it 
was quite clear he had been fired. The broadcast on that 
day went on to say that Mohammad Yousef, the pro-Western 
Minister of Mines and Industry, had been asked to form a 
new government. It is interesting that Yousuf was a 
Qizilbash who called himself a Tajik. Three weeks later, 
the Shah announced the formation of a committee to be 
chaired by Shamsuddin Majrooh, the Minister of Justice, to 
forge a new constitution. 
On October 1,1964, Zahir Shah, as President of the 
Constitutional Convention, signed into law a new governing 
document that provided for a bicameral Parliament. Though 
short of a fully representative government, for a country 
which nine years earlier had felt forced to embrace the 
USSR, it nonetheless represented a dramatic victory for 
85 Airlifts of fresh fruit to the USSR increased from 7,250 tons in 
1961-62 to 11,000 tons in 1962-63; however, payment for that 
produce decreased from US$1.46M to US$1.43M, respectively, DuF ce, 
Afghanistan, pp. 545,552. See also Fletcher, Afghanistan: 
of Conquest, pp. 275-276. 
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democracy and the rule-of-law. 
be short-lived. 
Sadly, these gains were to 
Just one year into Afghanistan's democracy, Dr. 
Yousef appeared in the lower house on October 14,1965, to 
formally present the interim government's report to the 
Shah. The session quickly heated up as Babrak Karmal, the 
leader of the Communist faction, verbally attacked the 
Prime Minister and his cabinet, accusing them of graft. 86 
By this point, the lower house had split into five 
factions: four democratic and one Communist. Eleven days 
later, on October 25, Karmal's faction, having gained the 
initiative, mobilized an all-day demonstration near 
Yousuf's house in Kabul, which most likely took place with 
KGB planning and guidance. 87 
In the late afternoon, in an event that has never 
been conclusively explained, an Afghan military unit armed 
with Soviet rifles opened fire on the crowd of 
demonstrators, killing three students and wounding many 
others. 88 This unprovoked attack, occurring outside the 
prime minister's house, rocked the mountaintop capital 
perhaps like no other event since the death of Nadir Shah. 
On October 29,1965, Mohammad Yousef resigned, citing "ill 
health. i89 Although the Shah quickly appointed Mohammad 
86 Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 590-597. 
87 See Klass (ed. ), The Great Game Revisited, p. 52. 
88P. Reardon, "Modernization and Reform: The Contemporary Endeavors, " 
in George Grassmuck, Ludwig Adamec and Frances Irwin (eds. ), 
Afghanistan: Some New Approaches, 1969, pp. 149-203, cited in 
Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 592. 
89Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 595. 
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Hashim Maiwandwal, the former Afghan Ambassador to Great 
Britain, Pakistan, and the U. S., as the new Prime 
Minister, significant damage had already been done to 
Afghanistan's fragile democracy. 90 
The 1967 War 
On the morning of June 5,1967, two hundred Israeli 
aircraft staged a pre-emptive attack on eleven airbases 
across Egypt: the Six-Day War had begun. In the early 
hours of the conflict, the defiant statements of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and other Arab leaders dominated the 
airwaves. One listener to these reports was a fourteen- 
year-old named Ahmad Shah, the son of one of the most 
prominent Panjsheris, an army colonel named Dost Mohammad. 
He stayed up late with his father on the six nights of the 
war listening to BBC accounts of the battles. From a 
young age, Ahmad Shah had shown a keen interest in the 
military, often putting on Dost Mohammad's army hat - many 
sizes too big - and parading around the family's house. 
But it was the Arab-Israeli war that gave him his first 
opportunity to explore the subject in a concrete way. At 
school for a number of days during and after the war, when 
teachers would leave the classroom for recess, Ahmad 
Shah's classmates would remain seated as he began a 
90Anthony Arnold states that "the PDPA had crossed over from 
legitimate (if only quasi-legal) political activity within a 
democratic framework to calls for violence against the established 
order and disruption of the democratic process, " Afghanistan's Two- 
Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Stanford, California: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1983), p. 33. 
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blackboard presentation on the previous day's 
developments. 91 
Perhaps even more noteworthy than Ahmad Shah's 
introduction to military operations was his exposure to 
the ideas of Islamic nationalism. Suddenly he was no 
longer limited by being a Tajik or even an Afghan: he was 
a member of an Islamic community, and the exploits of 
Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces fighting several 
thousand miles away were deeds that he felt reflected on 
him. Even when the success of the Israeli air campaign 
had been grasped, young Ahmad Shah, though saddened, was 
not dispirited. He had found a broader context in which 
to express his political identity as a minority Afghan 
Persian. In the anti-nationalistic climate that had been 
created by the escalating Soviet subversion in the late 
1960s in Kabul, the idea that an Islamic state could 
effectively challenge developed countries such as Israel 
gave the young Afghan hope vis-ä-vis the challenges his 
own country faced. 
91lnterview with Ahmad Zia, February 1992. 
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Chapter 2, Origins of a Nationalist Resistance Movement: 
Reaction to Soviet Encroachment, July 1973-March 1978. 
The Muslim Youth 
For the four years following the 1967 War, Ahmad Shah 
continued his studies at the French-run Lycee Istiglal in 
Kabul where, in addition to receiving a western education, 
he became involved in the Muslim Youth Movement, an 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, formally organized at 
Kabul University in the spring of 1969. Created in 
reaction to the foreign-supported socialist movements of 
Babrak Karmal and others, this new movement, led by a law 
student by the name of Abdur Rahim Niazi, seems at its 
inception to have "offered a bulwark against what appeared 
in the concentrated atmosphere of the university to be a 
tidal wave of [anti-nationalist] atheistic behavior. "1 
Spurred both by the Communist subversion of Afghanistan's 
constitutional movement in 1965 and "the petty annoyances 
of the leftist students, " Niazi's organization stepped up 
their outreach to various national groups in the last year 
of the decade, precipitating a schism with several radical 
Pashtun members, in particular, a soon-to-be-infamous one, 
named Gulbuddin. 
By the time Ahmad Shah enrolled in the Kabul 
Polytechnic in the fall of 1972, Abdur Rahim Niazi had 
been dead for over two years. Although his death was 
1 David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 203. 
74 
publicly attributed to leukemia, a few supporters wondered 
if Gulbuddin, who over the course of the war was 
responsible for the killing of scores of nationalist 
leaders, had murdered him. 2 Following Niazi's death, 
another Polytechnic student, engineer Abdur Rahman, 
assumed leadership of the nationalist faction of the 
"Igani" youth movement, as it became known. The bright 
and outgoing Abdur Rahman appears to have quickly adopted 
Ahmad Shah as one of his principal deputies. In this way, 
Ahmad Shah, who had been encouraged by his father to 
pursue a course in civil engineering, found himself, just 
months out of college, at the very centre of a rapidly 
emerging nationalist movement. 3 
From 1972 to 1973, both of the then separate wings 
of the Afghan Communist party, Khalq and Parcham, enjoyed 
tremendous freedom under the government of Nur Ahmad 
Etemadi. 4 Though all opposition organizations were banned 
from conducting public rallies after a suspicious 
massacre had taken place in front of Prime Minister 
Yousuf's house in 1965, few if any Communist Party 
members remained incarcerated. However, the Khalq 
faction appears to have continued to actively recruit 
junior and mid-level officers from within the military. 
2 Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 5. 
3 Ahmad Wali interview, June 1992. 
4 M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan 
Response, 1979-1982 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995), p. 11; Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 649,692. 
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This practice was largely facilitated by the training of 
Afghan military personnel by the Soviet Red Army 
following the countries' 1955 agreement. Henry Bradsher 
considers the primary cause of the underlying weakness in 
Afghanistan to have been the "failure to develop in the 
late 1950s some system to meet the possible dangers of a 
Soviet military relationship. It was a problem that 
continued [after Daoud's 1963 resignation] by the leaders 
who succeeded him. "5 Even after forty years on the throne, 
Zahir Shah appears to have had little appreciation for 
the effect that eighteen years of Soviet penetration was 
increasingly having on the Afghan military. 6 
The Military Coup 
On June 25,1973, the Shah left Afghanistan for Italy, 
where he was scheduled to undergo eye treatment and then a 
round of mud baths in the town of Ischia. In his absence, 
power was to be held by his cousin, General Abdul Wali, 
commander of the army's Central Corps. The previous year 
the Shah had finally appointed a Prime Minister, Mohammad 
Musa Shafiq, who, it appeared, would actively challenge 
Prince Daoud, whose Communist supporters remained 
5 Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, p. 27. 
6 Scores of complaints and allegations by nationalist Afghan officers 
like Dost Mohammad about the Communists' recruitment within the 
armed forces did little to stem the trend, Dost Mohammad Khan 
interview, February 1992. 
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Politically active. 7 Bidding farewell, the monarch 
announced that he would return from his vacation to Italy 
by the end of July. In fact, his return would take some 
twenty-nine years, as events in the long-tranquil kingdom 
were about to rapidly spiral out of control. 
In the predawn hours of July 17,1973, a small group 
of Communist military officers, supported by several 
hundred pro-leftist troops, stormed the Shah's palace. 
After a brief engagement in which eight guards were 
killed, the palace was captured.. Simultaneous operations 
succeeded in capturing the state radio station, the 
international airport, and other strategic points in the 
capital. The rebels secured the arrest of General Wali 
and other members of the government. 
That morning, an announcement was made over Kabul 
Radio that Afghanistan had become a republic. Minutes 
later, Prince Daoud went on the radio and, speaking in 
Pashtu, a language not understood by more than half of the 
country's citizens, charged that the monarchy had become a 
despotic regime and accused his cousin the Shah of 
undermining the country's interests. The following day it 
was announced that the now-Soviet-allied Prince Daoud had 
been "named" President and Prime Minister of the Republic 
Kakar, Afhanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 
1979-1982, p. 11. Also see Dupree, Afghanistan, Appendix G, p. 693, 
in reference to the government that took power July 26,1971. 
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of Afghanistan. It would be the first of four Communist- 
led coups to rock the country in the 1970s. 8 
For Ahmad Shah and the other Muslim Youth leaders, 
even more disturbing than the fact that Daoud had seized 
power was the method by which he had done it: his coup had 
been led by a handful of mid-level military officers, 
known to have links to the two Communist factions. 9 
Within days Habib-ur Rahman and Ahmad Shah had 
dropped out of the Polytechnic and gone underground to 
dedicate themselves full-time to the overthrow of the 
Daoud government. 10 In this enterprise, the student 
leaders appear to have had the encouragement of one 
extraordinary patron: the prominent Sufi cleric Maulana 
Muhammad `Ataullah Faizani. Described by David Edwards as 
"one of the most interesting and enigmatic figures in 
contemporary Afghan history, "" Faizani's leadership, in 
the late 1960s, of the opposition to increasing Communist 
covert activities appears to have been a significant 
catalyst for the nationalistically-oriented movement in 
its critical early days. As one participant, Mohammad 
Ayoub, described the early days of the movement, "The main 
8 The subsequent ones took place in April 1978, October 1979, and 
December 1979. 
9 Key individuals included Abdul Qadir, Aslam Watanjar, Pacha Gul, 
Faiz Mohammad, and Abdul Mustaghni. See Bradsher, Afghan Communism 
and Soviet Intervention, p. 56. 
loThough by the 1980s Jamiat Islami would turn against Zahir Shah, 
whom they correctly blamed for the country's woes, the movement's 
militant phase was specifically catalyzed by the monarch's 
overthrow, Ahmad Zia interview, January 1992. Also Ahmad Shah 
Massoud interview, 6 June 1994. 
"Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 229. 
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target of all the activity was to prevent Communist groups 
from spreading all over Afghanistan and taking power in 
Afghanistan": 
We were not doing activity to bring an Islamic 
government. At that time, there was no idea that we 
will throw out this kingdom and bring in Islamic 
Government as an era. There was no ideology like this, 
there was no idea of this at that time. Because we 
knew that, Afghanistan's people, everybody is Muslim. 
It was just a nationalist movement and a reaction 
against the Communists. 12 
Beyond Faizani's critical leadership of the early anti- 
Communist movement, in many ways he would become 
emblematic of the wellspring of individuals that would 
organize the first sophisticated acts of opposition to the 
Taraki government after its 1978 takeover. Whether he set 
the movement on a nationalist course by design, or was 
merely reacting to the country's cultural and demographic 
tendencies, Faizani was one of the first and most 
prominent of a group of educated, moderate, Persian- 
speaking, and traditionally-minded nationalists to step 
forward and resist the Soviet penetration of their 
country. 
13 
Little has been written about this well-traveled and 
progressive dissident. 14 After studying in Kabul, Faizani 
12Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, pp. 1,3. 
13 Though Faizani's activism had initially focused on social 
inequities in Afghanistan, he appears to have shifted quickly to an 
anti-Communist focus after July 1973. 
14Edwards describes Faizani's work as having a "hagiographic" girility, 
based primarily on the accounts of two of the Maulana's disciples, 
Before Taliban, p. 326, note 5. Despite this qualification, the 
breadth of Faizani's activities are confirmed by Engineer Es-Haq, 
Ahmad Shah Massoud and, to a limited extent, Olivier Roy, who has 
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began his career, at the age of 23, as a teacher in Herat. 
For several years thereafter, he traveled the Islamic 
world. At some point, in the tradition of his ancestors, 
a family of venerated clerics by the name of Miajan, 
Faizani is said to have spent three years of 
"purification" living in a cave. If true, the experience 
seems, as much as anything, to have convinced him of the 
inefficiency of traditional Sufi preparation. Eager to 
perpetuate the spiritual-political role played by his 
ancestors, Faizani recognized that Afghan mysticism hall to 
change if it were to compete with modern ideologies. As 
Edwards concludes, 
Faizani was a man of the modern age as well. Educated 
and knowledgeable about science and technology, he 
differed from many traditional scholars and Sufis in 
wanting to integrate the spiritual and secular forms of 
knowledge. In a time of general decline for Sufism, 
when most of the established saintly families had lost 
their influence and clerics either ignored science or 
claimed it was an infidel trick, Faizani espoused a 
mythical theology that embraced science and technology 
as ways of understanding and appreciating God's 
creation. 15 
After returning to Afghanistan, Faizani settled in Mazar- 
i-Sharif, where he soon delivered a sermon denouncing the 
corruption of the ulama and the landed elite. It was to 
become his first political controversy and landed him in 
jail. After his release he moved to Baglan Province where 
acknowledged the important role played by Faizani but has also 
raised doubt about his significance. Roy writes that Faizani "was 
popularly supposed to have begun to establish a network in the 
army, " implying that this suggestion is exaggerated, Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 72. 
-'-"Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 229. 
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he established a Sufi centre near the town of Pul-i- 
Khumri, which for centuries had been the seat of the 
Ismaili order in Afghanistan. While it is not known what 
previous contact Faizani may have had with the Shiite 
Ismailis during his travels, the idea of a "progressive" 
Afghan Sufi nationalist operating with the support of the 
young, westernized, politically moderate, Agha Khan, who 
was based in Geneva, is remarkable. 16 
After several arrests, Faizani, like earlier Sufi 
nationalists, developed a significant following among 
teachers, students, and "mid-level military officers, , 17 
and eventually settled in Kabul. Faizani is also thought 
to have been the person who encouraged Abdur Rahim Niazi 
to enroll in Kabul University and formally organize the 
Muslim Youth Movement there. 18 
It is also known that engineer Habib-ur Rahman, who 
succeeded Niazi, was a Faizani supporter and was a 
frequent visitor to the library in Pul-i-Khishti that 
Faizani established after his release from the jail where 
he had been incarcerated following his instigation of the 
1969 Pul-i-Khishti demonstration. Rahman, a nationalist 
who resented Daoud's push for Pashtun separatism, 
16 The Agha Khan is the leader of the Ismaili sect. Karim Agha Khan 
(Agha Khan IV) succeeded his grandfather, Mohammed Shah (Agha Khan 
III), in 1957 following his graduation from Harvard University. He 
later played a role in the founding of the New York-based Paris 
Review with his college roommate John Train. Train, a New York 
investment banker, would later organize and lead the Afghanistan 
Relief Committee during the Soviet War of the 1980s. 
17 Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 228. 
'8lbid., p. 231. 
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identified with Faizani's inclusive approach towards 
politics. 19 In addition to being drawn to the fascinating, 
high-level political and military figures who frequented 
Faizani's library, the movement's young members would have 
also been attracted to Faizani's mainstream approach 
towards Sufi training. 
The age of jet travel, the mystic claimed, enabled 
traditional Sufi spiritual preparation, or "zikr, " to be 
greatly accelerated, so that with even a moderate 
commitment modern Sufis could benefit from the same type 
of zikr "powers" exercised by earlier adherents, without 
spending years of contemplation in caves. Politically 
sophisticated, Faizani recognized that Communism posed a 
powerful challenge to the Afghan nation; his approach was 
to streamline dramatically the process for entrance into 
his order and thus deputize the largest following 
possible. This was, as Edwards writes, "threatening to 
the traditional clerics not only because of his synthetic 
approach to spirituality and science but also because of 
his ecumenical openness to people of many backgrounds. "20 
In other words, by widely commissioning Sufi practitioners 
and uniting unaffiliated segments of society, such as 
students, Shiite minorities and others, with influential 
19"Why we do not ask for the independence of Panjdeh, " Habib-ur 
Rahman asked, referring to a former Afghan northwestern territory 
annexed by the Bolsheviks, in a speech critical of Daoud, "the same 
as we ask for the independence of Pashtunistan? " Speeches of Habib- 
ur Rahman (Tehran, Iran: Jamiat Islami Cultural Committee). 
20Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 230. 
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government officials, Faizani developed a power base that 
quickly outstripped that of more conventional theologians. 
Daoud's Communist-backed coup offered him the chance to 
integrate this loose dissident-nationalist following 
(known by the early 1970s as Hezb-i-Tauhid) in an attempt 
to overthrow the new government. 
Massoud recalled that his first contact after Daoud's 
assumption of power was with his brother-in-law, Mohammad 
Ghaus, and said that planning for the first coup "started 
under the leadership of Habib-ur Rahman. "21 It seems 
highly unlikely, however, that career military officers 
would entrust their lives to previously untested student 
leaders, making Massoud's recollection implausible. It is 
more probable that the three parties, all with strong 
links to the military, that had coalesced around Faizani 
to form Hezb-i-Tauhid, provided the critical support for 
the first coup attempt, and that only because of the youth 
leaders' later roles were they able to claim credit for 
"organizing" the event. The coup was scheduled to take 
place in September 1973, just four months after Daoud's 
takeover. 
Despite secrecy and detailed planning, particularly 
within nationalist elements of the Air Force, the 
government uncovered the operation at an early stage. 
22 
Faizani, his leading supporter in the army General Mir 
21Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 1. 
22 Ibid, p. 1. 
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Ahmad Shah Rizwani, and others, including a number of 
aligned Shia leaders, were arrested. 23 Most vexing for 
Ahmad Shah was the arrest of Habib-ur Rahman, who had 
recruited him to the Muslim Youth Movement at the 
Polytechnic and since that time had made him his key 
lieutenant. The arrests left Ahmad Shah, though barely 
through his first two years of college, as one of the top 
leaders of the Muslim Youth organization, which, through 
Faizani's efforts, was now directly linked to the 
military. Most likely it was at this point that Massoud's 
relationship, by marriage, to a respected Air Force pilot 
became key in integrating the anti-Communist officers into 
the youth movement. 
Though Faizani's precise fate remains unknown, and 
his activism lasted only four months into Daoud's regime, 
his part in unifying the nationalist opposition and his 
possible links to the Geneva-based Agha Khan remain 
fascinating areas of study. 24 Olivier Roy suggests that 
Faizani's links to the military may have been exaggerated, 
yet he acknowledges the important role of the Pul-i- 
Khishti library; Roy's skepticism possibly resulted from 
his later contact with Peshawar-based leaders eager to 
23 According to Ayoub, in addition to Faizani seventeen men from the 
army and air force and several students were arrested, Ayoub 
interview, 12 December 2004, p. 10. 
24 It is known that Faizani was still alive in 1979. Ambassador Ravan 
Farhadi, who was detained in Pul-i-Charkhi prison for some twenty 
months beginning in 1979, says that he met him two or three times, 
Farhadi interview, 8 December 2004. Based on this account, it 
seems probable that Faizani was executed after the Soviet invasion. 
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garner credit for themselves for the movement's origins-25 
Certainly Edwards' account of the nationalist leader whom 
he calls the "last Sufi" is consistent with the 
traditional-nationalist and culturally-Persian leadership 
of the resistance during the succeeding six years. 26 Only 
after the Soviet intervention would anti-nationalist 
Pashtuns, more interested in bolstering their own group's 
position and significantly supported by outside powers, 
seize the initiative, thus diminishing the nationalist 
characteristics of the resistance that were present at its 
creation. 
The Rise of Ahmad Shah 
Already in hiding at the time of the first of the coup 
attempts, Ahmad Shah continued to make occasional visits 
to his family's home, but only at night and with extreme 
caution, as some of his relatives held jobs in the 
government and were under pressure to reveal his 
whereabouts. 27 
Ahmad Shah's family appears to have maintained a 
somewhat close link to its native Panjsher Valley. Dost 
Mohammad, long absent from his village of Jangalak, began 
25 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 72. 
26 Though none of the four men highlighted in the remainder of this 
chapter - Mohammad Anwar Amin, Samiullah Safi Wakil, Burhanuddin 
Rabbani and Ismail Khan - were ever necessarily members of Hezb-i- 
Tauhid, or specifically practitioners of mysticism, all, like 
Faizani, were Persian-speaking nationalists with strong traditional 
beliefs. 
27Wali Massoud interview, September 1992. 
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playing a more active role there after his retirement from 
the military in 1972.28 The family often travelled to the 
Panjsher on weekends, and stayed for longer periods during 
the summer when Ahmad Shah's younger brothers and sisters 
were not in school. 29 
As the expected hour of Ahmad Shah's arrival 
approached, two of his brothers, Ahmad Zia and Ahmad Wali, 
stood ready to open the gate to avoid his spending any 
unnecessary time on the street. Suddenly, a suspicious- 
looking car drove slowly past the house, circled the block 
once, and parked in an alley some fifty metres away. The 
men in the car appeared to be members of President Daoud's 
security service. After some discussion, the youngest 
brother, Ahmad Wali, was dispatched to the nearest bakery. 
The sight of a teenager buying bread around mealtime was 
hardly unusual in Kabul. Hesitating momentarily as he 
left the bakery, Wali scanned the street and, after seeing 
no sign of his brother, returned home. 30 
For the next several hours the family waited 
anxiously, taking turns at the window. Finally, one of 
them watched the suspicious car start and the security 
men, in typical Soviet form, drive off at high speed. 
family barely had a chance to recover when there came a 
28Wali Massoud interview, September 1992; Dost Mohammad Khan 
interview, February 1993. 
29Ahmad Zia interview, February 1993. 
30Ahmad Wali interview, June 1995. 
The 
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low knock at the gate. Wali opened it to find a grinning 
Ahmad Shah standing in the darkness. 31 
This story is interesting because it demonstrates 
several critical elements that would typify the early 
opposition movement: the intense political tension in 
Kabul following the 1973 Communist-backed coup; the tough 
survival instincts that the militants had acquired - in 
the case of Ahmad Shah, only two years out of high school; 
and perhaps most significantly, the remarkable resolve of 
the militants' families in supporting activities that they 
believed were in the nation's interest and therefore 
worthy of significant risks and sacrifice. 
The August 1974 Coup Attempt 
On one of his clandestine visits home, Ahmad Shah 
announced that given Faizani's arrest and the Communists' 
strong position in the army, the Ikhwanis were initiating 
their own efforts to recruit trustworthy military 
officers. 32 Though still just over twenty years old, Ahmad 
Shah had volunteered as a leader of the new clandestine 
effort. If satisfied with his own assignment, he must 
have been discouraged to find that in place of Habib-ur 
Rahman, the second operation would be led by the 
increasingly radical youth leader Gulbuddin. Several 
31 Ibid. 
32 The Arabic Ikhwan means brotherhood. The Egyptian party "Ikhwan- 
Ul-Muslimin" has become known in the West as the Islamic 
Brotherhood. 
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years Ahmad Shah's senior, Gulbuddin seems to have 
dominated the planning of this second attempt -a fact 
that, in light of later events, raises suspicions about 
his role in the plot's disclosure. Ahmad Shah was 
responsible for making contacts with the military. He was 
selected "because of his family, of course, " Ayoub said 
years later. "The whole family were military officers.... 
If you don't have anybody from family, how you can contact 
them? /33 Ahmad Shah's brother-in-law, Jagran (Major) 
Mohammad Ghaus, became a key player, helping to recruit 
other air force and army officers to support the 
operation. 34 Even though he was nearly ten years older, 
Ghaus seems to have had much respect for his brother-in- 
law and to have been able to convince large numbers of 
military officers to support the effort, unaware of 
Gulbuddin's unreliability. There is no. evidence that 
Massoud's father, Dagerwal (Colonel) Dost Mohammad, played 
any role in, or even knew about, the planning for the 1974 
coup attempt, though the fact that he was a well-known 
individual certainly assisted their effort. 
Once again, however, the coup plan was discovered in 
its early stages, leading to the arrest of about three 
33 Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 14. 
34Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 1. "The next attempt 
for a coup was made. Of course, at this time Hekmatyar instead of 
Habib-ur-Rahman arranged the affairs. He was not responsible for 
the party organization. He was in charge of drafting and meeting 
army officers. " 
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hundred military officers. 35 The disclosure in part seems 
to have been made by an army officer who attended a 
meeting of the coup plotters and "taped all the meeting 
and took it to the government. "36 Daoud later promoted the 
officer, making him commander of the Mahtaw-Qala area. 37 
Among those arrested were Professor Abdul Sayyaf, one 
of the leading Islamic scholars in Kabul at the time, as 
well as Mohammad Ghaus, and his close friend Agha Gul, a 
lieutenant in the Kabul Gendarme. 38 Mohammad Ghaus was not 
heard from for a number of days and, following Habib-ur 
Rahman's disappearance the previous year, Ahmad Shah and 
his family must have assumed the worst. In Badakhshan 
Province, the militant leader, Dr. Omar, together with 
more than one hundred students, were also apprehended 
after the failed plan and many were summarily executed. 
"Hundreds of students moved to Badakhshan in the north and 
a number of them to the south, " Massoud recalled. "Many 
often were caught by the local people and handed over to 
the government. The person responsible for this in the 
north was Dr. Omar, one of the famous men. He was also 
arrested. 1,39 
After hiding for more than a week, Ahmad Shah was 
warned by another student leader, Jan Mohammad, to flee 
35Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 1. 
36Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 13. 
37 Ibid. 
38Agha Gul said that out of three hundred who were arrested, five 
were released: himself, Mohammad Ghaus, Sayyaf, Najmuddin and Dr. 
Sams from Laghman, Agha Gul interview, 15 June 1995. 
39Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 2. 
89 
the capital. 40 The two soon managed to reach the edge of 
town, and Ahmad Shah caught a ride with a truck headed 
down the Kabul Gorge towards the Pakistani border. 
Flight to Peshawar and the Formation of Hezb-i-Islami 
Upon reaching Peshawar, Ahmad Shah was reunited with his 
close friends Ayoub, Rahmanyar, and Jan Mohammad. 41 
Several days later Gulbuddin, who had adopted the code 
name "Hekmatyar, " arrived, as other student leaders 
trickled in. This group of exiles grew to more than twenty 
persons. 42 "A lot of our friends were captured, " Ayoub 
recalled. "And we left our fathers, mothers, relatives, 
our jobs, everything. Just we went to Pakistan alone. //43 
Although the militants did not immediately realize it, one 
of the most respected of the Persian activist-scholar 
theologians, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, had also 
secretly arrived in Peshawar, and later moved in with 
Gulbuddin. 44 
The capital of the North-West Frontier Province and 
culturally the seat of the Ghilzai-Pashtuns, Peshawar was 
very different from Kabul. It was a city in which the 
90 Ibid. 
91Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 2. It is not known 
when Jan Mohammad reached Pakistan, but Es-Haq said that when he 
arrived in Pakistan in 1975, Massoud, Jan Mohammad and others were 
there. Engineer Es-Haq interview, 5 October 1994, p. 1. 
42 Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 2. 
93 Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 19. 
44"There was one house that we were reaching there, and there was 
another house that was Ustad Rabbani and Habib Rahman - Mawlawi 
Habib Rahman - Gulbuddin and Mohmad Gul Pilot. " Ayoub interview, 
12 December 2004, pp. 18-19. 
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young Persian-speaking Afghans were clearly outsiders. 
"There was no rest, because at that time Peshawar was 
very, very hot, " Ayoub said. 
with this type of hot weather. 
"And we were not familiar 
[In our house] there were 
two rooms. There was no fan in the ceiling. We had only 
one small fan in one side, and when we plugged it into the 
electricity it was making noise: rrrrrrrrrr. i45 
Ahmad Shah, along with a number of Ikhwani members, 
joined Gulbuddin to form a new political party which they 
named "Hezb-i-Islami, " or the Party of Islam. Their exile 
and involvement in planning military operations apparently 
led the militants, still in their early twenties, to feel 
they had outgrown the "Muslim Youth" label by which they 
had been known in Kabul. Gulbuddin was recognized as the 
new party's chief, replacing Habib-ur Rahman, whom the 
militants learned had been executed after the first coup 
attempt. Rebuffed by Gulbuddin for his leading role in 
the failed second coup attempt, Ahmad Shah resigned 
himself to a junior position in the new organization. 46 
Significantly, while the two Communist factions in 
Kabul had adopted rigid organizational structures with 
hierarchical layers and lengthy titles, the Islamists 
eschewed formalities and chose a looser organization 
45Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 19. 
46Gulbuddin had been the overall leader of the previous coup attempt, 
but Ahmad Shah had done much of the planning with the military. 
Gulbuddin used the opportunity created by the failure of the coup 
attempt to push Ahmad Shah out of the way. 
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modeled on Afghanistan's traditional practice of decision- 
by-consensus, typified by the institution of the Shura, or 
local assembly. The root of this difference was clear: 
while the Communists identified with Soviet-type 
centralization, equating "foreign" with "good, " the 
Islamists were inspired mainly by historical Afghan 
personalities - men such as Mullah Hadda, Sultan Muhammad 
Khan and Mir Bacha Khan, who had fought for the 
independence of the Afghan nation. 47 The new "Hezb" 
members attempted to bridge rapidly diverging Pashtun 
radical and traditional nationalist positions, a divide 
that in many ways mirrored the anti-nationalist, pro- 
Pashtunistan stance Daoud had taken in the 1950s and the 
subsequent nationalist-oriented parliamentary period 
during the 1960s. Similar divisions also took place 
within the Communist party itself between the pragmatic, 
urban, Persian-speaking "Parcham" wing and the radical and 
divisive Pashtun "Khalq" faction. 
For Ahmad Shah and the more nationalistically-minded 
members of the group, lingering suspicions about 
Gulbuddin's radicalism in the early 1970s and his possible 
role in Niazi's death in 1970 were not abated by the new 
leader's first steps in Peshawar. It was soon learned 
that, without the consent of the other group members, he 
97 See Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, pp. 59-60, and 
Edwards, Heroes of the Age, pp. 1-32. 
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had contacted the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence, 
known as the ISI. 48 
More divisive than any other issue confronted by the 
Afghan opposition in the Daoud era, was cooperation with 
the ISI; it cut accross the emerging "nationalist" versus 
"radicalist" divide. By 1975 the radicals had come to 
favour Pan-Ghilzai politics, recognizing that such efforts 
weakened Afghanistan's traditional Durrani-Persian 
alliance on which Timur Shah, Dost Mohammad, Abdul Rahman 
and others had built their nation. The radicals' position 
fit perfectly with that of the ISI, whose opposition to 
the Daoud regime was also specifically intended to serve 
an anti-Afghan-nationalist agenda, which by the mid-1970s 
had become a top Pakistani strategic priority. 
F, ollowing three wars with India (1947-1948,1965 and 
1971), the Pakistanis had come to be paranoid about having 
a strong state on their Western flank. By the 1970s, the 
respective seventeenth- and eighteenth-century policies of 
Persia and the Moguls that Gregorian writes about had 
evolved, west of the Durand line, into a Persian-based 
Afghan state and, to the east, into a lawless culture 
characterized by continued cycles of subsidies and 
punitive strikes from the Punjab (since 1947 the state of 
Pakistan) . 
49 It is a dynamic that continues to this day. 
4 8Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, pp. 2-3. 
99 See Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of 
Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946, pp. 39-51. See also Anonymous 
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In addition to perpetuating an inherited policy towards 
Afghanistan, Pakistani President Ali Bhutto may have also 
perceived a tactical opportunity in using the opposition 
as a "tool for countering any new Pashtunistan pressure" 
from Daoud. 50 
But it was Pakistan's perceived strategic interests, 
well established by 1975, that were in fundamental 
opposition to the objectives of Falzani, Niazi and others 
who sought to restore Afghanistan's national, and Persian, 
culture, as they hoped to address the decadence of the 
ruling elite which they (and the leftists) blamed for the 
country's continuing underdevelopment twenty years after 
the initiation of significant international aid. 
These individuals sought to restore a strong Afghan 
national government by reintroducing traditional Islamic 
principles, which had been in ebb since the beginning of 
Soviet penetration in 1955. Gulbuddin's willingness to 
ally himself with the ISI and, in part because of shared 
Pashtun ethnicity, to subordinate Afghan interests to 
Bhutto's generals, was similar to the bribes his ancestors 
had accepted from the Moguls to attempt to block systemic 
(Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War 
on Terror (Washington, D. C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2004), p. 54. The 
author writes that since the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947, 
one of Pakistan's "three paramount and nonnegotiable security 
concerns" has been "ensuring to the greatest exent possible that a 
friendly, Pashtun-dominated government rules in Kabul. " 
50Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, p. 17. This 
was of course in conflict with the nationalist segments of Hezb, 
though, despite this, Gulbuddin quickly made a unilateral alliance 
with the foreign intelligence service. See also Roy, Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 75. 
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Persian hegemony in Kabul . 
51 This put him on a collision 
course with the Durrani and Persian members of the 
emerging nationalist faction of his party, who, like their 
predecessors, were both more pragmatic and generally 
better educated than the Ghilzai. The Persian-speaking 
wing of the youth organization was by this time led by an 
individual named Jan Mohammad. 52 
After a year of living underground in Kabul, the 
militants found the tree-lined streets and sunny tea 
houses of Peshawar a great relief. Perhaps these luxuries 
and life without fear of arrest caused Ahmad Shah and 
others in his faction to overlook both the historically 
divergent views and the incidents of suspicious behaviour 
that separated them from Gulbuddin's radicals. 
The stunning failures of the Islamists' two previous 
coup attempts, with dozens executed and hundreds in 
prison, left them without a significant following in 
Kabul. The group soon began planning a new plot against 
Prince Daoud's government that was to consist of a number 
of regional "popular uprisings" throughout Afghanistan. 
These local actions were intended to spur reluctant 
sympathizers in the military under General Mustaghni, the 
51The Afghans' dependence on Pakistan had resulted in the closing of 
the Afghan border in 1955 during an uprising of Pashtun tribes 
(allegedly inspired by then Prime Minister Daoud) and caused the 
virtual cessation of Afghan imports and exports for more than six 
months. The event illustrates the dramatic power the new eastern 
state had come to have over Afghanistan. 
52Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 6: "At that time Jan 
Mohammad was senior to me in the group. " 
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Afghan Army Chief of Staff and former Communist party 
member who by this time was thought to be loyal to the 
opposition, to depose Daoud in the context of a nationwide 
campaign . 
s3 
Ahmad Shah, or "Massoud, " was instructed to return to 
his native Panjsher Valley, along with a small group from 
Peshawar, to organize an uprising there. Other rebellions 
were supposed to occur simultaneously in Badakhshan, 
Paktia, and Nangahar Provinces. 54 In all, the militants 
spent nearly a year planning the operation and by the 
spring of 1975 were prepared to act. Ominously for the 
Persian speakers, Gulbuddin was placed in charge of 
relations with the army. 55 
The 1975 Uprising 
At 10.00 hours on June 7,1975, the Panjsher component of 
the operation was launched, according to schedule. 
Militants burst into the Panjsher Valley District 
Headquarters in the town of Rukha some twenty-five miles 
up the valley and captured five or six soldiers and a 
number of weapons. After securing the building, Massoud, 
whose father was one of the most prominent men in the 
valley and whose mother grew up in Rukha, walked outside. 
He announced to a small crowd gathering there that a coup 
53 Ibid., p. 6. 
54Es-Haq interview, 5 October 1994, p. 10; Roy, Islam and Resistance 
in Afghanistan, p. 75. 
5SAhmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994. 
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led by a group of patriotic military officers was at that 
moment taking place in Kabul, and that they should return 
to their houses and wait for a formal announcement by the 
new government over Radio Kabul. 56 Apparently somewhat 
bemused, the crowd dispersed. While small operations were 
conducted at the same time in Paktia and Badakhshan 
Provinces, the military coup in Kabul never got off the 
ground and, based on the evidence, probably never came 
close to materializing. In retrospect, Massoud and the 
others were rather naive to take such risks without 
verifying that all other operations would occur as 
planned. 
Several hours after the capture of the police 
headquarters, with still no word from Radio Kabul, a mob 
of armed and angry villagers surrounded the building. 
Several grim minutes elapsed for the young militants 
until, faced with few options, Massoud ordered his men to 
charge. Rifles blazing, the militants fled through a side 
door as the surprised villagers dove for cover. Massoud 
and Dr. Latif, another prominent militant leader, left 
last. "Thousands of people surrounding the Woluswali were 
shouting, `Oh, catch them, they are Pakistanis, "' Massoud 
recalled. "Anyhow, we opened a way and the last persons 
who got out of there were me and Dr Latif. ff 57 
Intermittently returning fire, then advancing, several 
56Ibid., p. 5. 
57 Ibid., p. 5. 
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militants were wounded and two others killed as they shot 
their way out of Rukha. 58 It took Massoud and the rest of 
the group about thirty minutes to clear the town and 
escape into the safety of the mountains behind it. There, 
with the help of one of Massoud's family's trusted 
servants who brought them food every day, the militants 
hid in a cave near a spring above the village of Jangalak 
for a week before heading to a relative's house in Rukha 
and then to another house for two months. 59 A couple of 
weeks later, Daoud's security forces halted their 
intensive search. 60 
Split of Hezb 
Returning to Peshawar, Massoud was furious. The failure 
of the 1975 coup seemed linked to the extraordinary 
treachery of Gulbuddin. With only a few men killed or 
captured, the Panjsher group had fared comparatively well. 
In Kabul and Laghman, groups led by Abdul Haq and Mawlawi 
Habib-ur Rahman, respectively, "attempted to incite the 
people, " but were suppressed, with dozens killed and 
arrested. Also, those operations appear at least, 
militarily, to have been less effective; as Roy recounts, 
"only in the north-east [Panjsher Valley] was there 
58Ibid., p. 5. 
59Es-Haq interview, 5 October 1994. 
60Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 5; Ahmad Wali 
interview, March 1995. 
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anything approaching an uprising. "61 Once again the 
Persian Tajiks were taking a disproportionate role in 
attempting to restore their country to its historical 
nationalist equilibrium. 
At best, Gulbuddin was guilty of incredible 
negligence after taking charge of all communications with 
the military, issuing a date and time for the operation, 
and then failing to notify any of the three regional 
groups when, as he claimed, his talks with the army ran 
into trouble. 62 Many came to believe, however, that the 
operation was a sham from the outset and that Gulbuddin 
had conceived of the exercise simply to eliminate some of 
the key Persian-speaking nationalists in Kabul, Laghman 
and the Panjsher Valley. Suddenly Niazi's 1970 case of 
"leukemia" and his death shortly thereafter seemed more 
suspicious. Ayoub, in his account, stated: 
Gulbuddin told lies to everybody. That he had prepared 
the military, there will be a coup, just we will do 
some disturbance all around Afghanistan, until the army 
be ready to give arms to followers, soldiers, and do a 
coup. For this reason he sent everybody inside [the 
country]... 
When everybody came back, we told him that, `You are 
telling lies, you are no military [liaison], you just 
send our friends to be killed. ' Because Mawlawi !. iabib 
Rahman was captured in Laghman with some friend, he was 
killed. And also there was some uprising in Shinwar 
area, those people also escaped to Pakistan. And 
Panjsher, some friend was killed and captured. As well 
as in Konar, and there is no military nothing 
61Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 75. 




Within several weeks of his return to Peshawar, Massoud 
and a large number of the nationalists broke with 
Gulbuddin and formed a new group led by veteran Ikhwani 
activist Jan Mohammad and Engineer Ayoub. 64 Ayoub 
recalled: "I also told him [Gulbuddin], `You told me that 
General Mustaghni is with us, where is Mustaghni? ' Then 
he doesn't have any answer, but Pakistan ISI was 
supporting him in this action. For this reason then we 
were not able to do anything. Just after that, separation 
begins. " 65 
The nationalist offshoot was called "Jamiat-i- 
Islami, " or Islamic Society. 66 As he had with Habib-ur 
Rahman, Massoud seems to have quickly become one of the 
principal deputies of Jan Mohammad, who had become the 
group's leader. Later, after arriving in Peshawar from 
Saudi Arabia, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, a well-known 
Tajik Islamic scholar, came to be recognized as Jamiat's 
spiritual and titular head. 67 In addition to his age and 
his reputation as a theologian, Rabbani had a number of 
63 Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, pp. 20,23. 
64 Engineer Es-Haq interview, 5 October 1994, p. 1: "Perhaps there was 
friction before, but the summer uprising gave opportunity to 
publicly admit the problem. " Ayoub said alternately that the split 
happened "a couple of months" or "six or seven months" after 
Massoud and the other militants returned to Peshawar, Ayoub 
interview, 12 December 2004, pp. 23,24. 
65 Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 23. 
66 As opposed to "Hezb-i-Islami, " or Islamic Party. 
67 There is some disagreement about the leadership. Ayoub seems to 
say that at the time of the split Rabbani was the leader, not Jan 
Mohammad. For example, Ayoub asserted that "Everything was Ustad 
Rabbani, " Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 26. 
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close ties with the Saudi royal family and seems to have 
been able to raise funds quickly for the new group, which 
was unable to depend on the Pakistanis. 
Similar to the more moderate Parcham faction of the 
Communist party, which was put into power at the time of 
the 1979 Soviet intervention, Jamiat was comprised largely 
of ethnic Tajiks and urban Pashtuns, many of whom did not 
even speak Pashtu. 68 The new group was at a significant 
cultural disadvantage to the Hezbis in dealing with 
Pakistan's ISI. The ISI had staffed its Afghan Department 
with Pakistani Pashtuns who quickly became entwined in 
Gulbuddin's party. Whether the ISI played a role in the 
intrigue surrounding the 1975 coup attempt, as Ayoub 
suggested, is not known. The hostility towards the 
nationalists, however - partially a result of the anti- 
Tajik-nationalist nature of Pakistani interests - 
convinced Jan Mohammad and Massoud that the sooner they 
leave Pakistan, the better. 69 
Conception of the Panjsher Strategy 
The bungled 1975 coup attempt caused Massoud, Rabbani, and 
the other nationalists to believe that the way to topple 
Daoud was through a series of regional insurgencies rather 
than a central military coup, which would be extremely 
68The fact that Rabbani was from Badakhshan, a Tajik province, may 
have limited Pashtun membership in the group. 
69Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 6. 
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difficult to keep secret because of the domination of 
Soviet-trained personnel in the army. Thus in 1975 Jamiat 
resigned itself to pursuing a guerrilla strategy. This 
decision would eventually help to trigger the Soviet 
intervention and ten-year-long occupation. 
An additional outcome of the 1975 operation was 
Massoud's realization of the possibilities of using the 
hundred-mile-long Panjsher Valley, his ancestral home, as 
a base for rebellion. Not only did he recognize the vital 
role that he personally could play there, drawing on the 
loyalty of certain kinsmen and acquaintances, but he also 
grasped the significance of Panjsher's geography and 
strategic location. With its interconnecting side 
valleys, such as the one through which his group had 
escaped from Rukha in 1975, the terrain was well suited 
for waging a guerrilla campaign. More important, Panjsher 
was ideally located to control the country's main north- 
south artery known as the Salang Highway. 
Cherat Training Centre 
The next two years, 1976 and 1977, provided time for 
Massoud and the others in Peshawar to contemplate their 
next move. During this period, the militants trained 
themselves mentally and physically in an unprecedented 
manner. They read the works of successful guerrilla 
leaders such as Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung; made contact 
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with foreign opposition movements such as the African 
National Congress ; 70 studied weapons manuals; and became 
proficient in the martial arts. Many of them, including 
Massoud, studied at the Pakistani Paramilitary Centre at 
Cherat, south of Peshawar, which was run by the ISI. 71 
Though still hostile to Jamiat's nationalist motives, the 
ISI instructors were impressed with Massoud's ability: 
after he completed the first course, they hired him as an 
instructor. 72 Unable to tolerate the Pakistanis' 
manipulation of the Afghan militants or the poor state of 
affairs at the training camp, he quit the job only a few 
months later. 
"We fired four or five shots from old rusted 
revolvers of which we were not able to pull the [trigger] 
even with two hands, " Massoud later complained. 73 "They 
did not teach us tactics. " He considered Cherat to be 
more a terrorist training school than a paramilitary 
program that could help build an effective front like that 
of the Viet Minh. 
Also, the problem of Gulbuddin continued. While the 
instructors at Cherat recognized Massoud's talents, their 
bosses at the ISI were just beginning their courtship of 
Gulbuddin. He was exactly what they wanted: an extremist 
Ghilzai Pashtun without any following inside Afghanistan; 
70Es-Haq interview, 5 October 1994. 
71Ibid., p. 2. 
72Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 3. 
73 Ibid., p. 3. 
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someone who would fiercely attack opponents and had public 
relations potential but who, politically, would remain 
dependent on them. 79 
Leaving Cherat in mid-1976, Massoud returned to 
Peshawar where he resumed his study of history, military 
tactics, and other relevant subjects such as political 
Islam. 75 During this period the differences with the 
radicals escalated. In 1977, Jan Mohammad was arrested by 
the ISI and imprisoned on a Pakistani military base. 76 
"They first captured Gul Mohammad, " Ayoub recalled, 
"then Jan Mohammad, and then there was another person, a 
student, I forgot his name, three persons were captured. 
They were from Konar. "77 Regarding Jan Mohammad's fate, 
Ayoub said: 
This much we know, that they killed him someplace. 
Hezb and ISI, both of them. Hezb killed him, in [an] 
ISI area, not away [from the purview of ISI officers]. 
Because after that we tried a lot -I tried to convince 
General Fazel-Haq too much to interrogate about 
[Jan Mohammad' s disappearance]. They didn't. 78 
The Persian-speaking nationalists found the ISI and Hezb 
partnership only slightly weakened after Zia ul-Haq's 
coup. One day the Hezb's deputy leader Qazi Amin and a 
Pakistani agent attempted to arrest Massoud at the house 
of the governor of the North-West Frontier Province. 
74 Ibid., p. 6. 
75Ibid., p. 3. 
76 Ibid., p. 7. 
77 Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004 p. 31. 
78 Ibid., p. 32. 
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After a three-hour standoff, Massoud, who made use of a 
concealed pistol at the time of the attempted arrest, was 
freed when another senior Jamiat member, Ayoub, arrived. 79 
That Pakistani operatives were, by that time, openly 
supporting Gulbuddin in his repression of his nationalist 
rivals indicates both the depth of the schism between the 
radicals and the nationalists and the ISI's commitment to 
widening it. According to Ayoub, "Gulbuddin told him [the 
governor] that, `I'm working for you against [the] 
government. These people are destroying me, not letting 
me do the work. Just eliminate them. "'80 
Jamiat, composed mainly of ethnic Tajiks, whose 
ancestors had been brought into the national process by 
the Barakzai-Qizilbash dynasty in the nineteenth century, 
was dismissed by Gulbuddin and the Pakistanis as an 
"insignificant" national group. Similar arguments were 
made about the Afghanistan Communist Party's less radical 
Parcham wing by the Khalq faction, which was made up of 
radical Pashtuns much like Hezb. 81 Hezb's representation 
as the rebels' "dominant faction" was strengthened by 
numerous flawed British studies of the culturally Persian 
Afghan state, conducted from the east side of the Durand 
79Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 7. According to 
Ayoub's account, Massoud was being held at the governor's house and 
Ayoub convinced the government officials to let Massoud go. Ayoub 
did not recall Massoud having a pistol, Ayoub interview, 12 
December 2004, pp. 29-30. 
80Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, p. 30. 
81The fact that the Hezb-Khalq comparison has rarely, if ever, been 
made demonstrates the degree to which the realities of Hezb in(j 
radicalism within the resistance have been ignored by researchers. 
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line. 82 There, in the cantons of places like Peshawar and 
Quetta - the heartland of Pashtunistan - it was easy to 
misinterpret Afghanistan as a Pashtun state in origin and 
essence. As Chapter 1 recounts, this was not the case. 
In fact, the Khalq faction was soon to prove inept in 
public administration, and the desire by the Soviets to 
install the more learned Persian "Parcham" faction was a 
specific goal of the December 1979 intervention. 83 
Although numerous educated nationalist Pashtuns joined 
Jamiat, as they had Parcham, the anti-nationalist role 
which the ISI played as early as 1977 significantly 
limited the manifestation of the traditional Durrani- 
Persian alliance that directly dated back to Shah Abbas in 
the seventeenth century. 84 
The Daoud-Brezhnev Meeting 
As he landed in Moscow on April 12,1977, President Daoud 
knew that he could expect a tough series of meetings with 
Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev. Over the previous 
8201af Caroe's The Pathans is considered a definitive work on the 
country, as is Fraser-Tytler's Afghanistan: A Study of Political 
Developments in Central and Southern Asia, which was also largely 
composed by research conducted from within India. 
83 Thomas J. Barfield provides a detailed analysis of the managerial 
shortcomings of the Communist regime in the initial phase after 
taking power. See Barfield, "Weak Links on a Rusty Chain: 
Structural Weaknesses in Afghanistan's Provincial Administration, " 
in M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (eds. ), Revolution, and 
Rebellions in Afghanistan (Berkeley: Institute of International 
Studies, University of California, 1984), pp. 170-83. Despite 
committing gross humanitarian atrocities, Parcham was far more 
moderate and competent in public administration than Khalq had been. 
See Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, p. 104. 
84Certainly Tajik and Pashtun nationalism entered into this equation 
as well; however, as we will see from the fierce manipulation 
witnessed in Nuristan, the ISI was as determined as Daoud to 
eliminate the threat of the traditionalist-nationalists. 
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year, Daoud had begun steering a political course 180 
degrees from the one which Premier Kosygin had publicly 
suggested to him at their last meeting in June 1974.85 For 
the USSR - engaged in a massive aid programme to 
Afghanistan which, by April 1978, would surpass the 
combined Arab and Western contributions to the country 
since World War I- such disobedience from a client state 
was unexpected and unacceptable. 86 
Publicly, Daoud's Kremlin talks ran smoothly and a 
joint communique was issued stating that they had occurred 
"in an atmosphere of friendship, trust, and understanding, 
and there was a circumstantial exchange of opinions on 
urgent world problems. " As several participants 
acknowledged, the staid diplomatic prose concealed a much 
more tumultuous reality. 
Former CIA analyst Henry Bradsher has pieced together 
the main points of Brezhnev's comments to Daoud in his 
book, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, and they 
are largely corroborated by former Afghan Deputy Foreign 
Minister Abdul Samad Ghaus, who was present. As Bradsher 
recounts: 
The Soviet leader reportedly complained to Daoud about 
the composition of his new cabinet, accusing some of 
its members of working for foreigners - implicitly, for 
the United States - and saying that new men should be 
brought into the government who better represent the 
85Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, p. 64. 
86 For the Soviets a similar case of "disobedience" developed in Egypt 
in July 1972, when President Anwar Sadat expelled the Soviet units 
deployed in the country in 1970. 
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masses - again implicitly, [Khalq and Parcham] members. 
Brezhnev also asked for the expulsion of some American 
experts working in Afghanistan, including the satellit- 
and seismological specialists, according to some 
accounts. And he was unhappy about Daoud's criticism 
of Cuba for trying to steer the nonaligned movement - 
of which Daoud had been an original founder in Belgrade 
in 1961 - in a pro-Soviet direction. There might have 
been other complaints. 
The basic point is that Brezhnev was trying to bully 
Daoud, the powerful Russian benefactor trying to 
influence or even control the policy of a weak Afghan 
nation. It might work with East Europeans or 
Mongolians, but Brezhnev had misjudged Daoud. 87 
"A chill fell on the room, " Ghaus recalls. "Some of 
the Russians seemed visibly embarrassed and the Afghans 
appeared greatly displeased. " Daoud then addressed 
Brezhnev and, after several platitudes, told him: 
We will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our 
country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and 
where we employ the foreign experts will remain the 
exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan 
shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts 
and decisions. 
The Afghan president then stood and stiffly shook hands 
with the stunned Soviet officials before exiting the 
room. 
88 
Once back in Kabul, Daoud instructed Ghaus to prepare 
a memorandum on expelling many of the Soviet advisors in 
Kabul who, by that time, were engaged in "unlawful 
87Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, p. 73; see also 
Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and 
Mujahid (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 121; 
Volgelsang, The Afghans, p. 301. 
88'jdus Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account 
(Washington, D. C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense 
Publishers, 1988), p. 179. 
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activities" which the Afghan president believed "had gone 
far above the tolerable level . i89 Had Daoud followed 
through on his nationalist instincts (as the more resolute 
Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat had five years earlier) and 
held a press conference divulging Brezhnev's aggressive 
behaviour and announcing the arrest of twenty to thirty of 
the most prominent Communists, he might well have averted 
the impending catastrophe. Instead, he ignored Ghaus' 
memorandum and, as the then-foreign minister later wrote, 
reverted to his decade-old mantra, brought on by repeated 
American snubs, that "the preservation of good relations 
with the Soviet Union was essential `even if now and then 
the Russians make it difficult for us to do so. '"90 
It is not known what effect Daoud's vacillation 
towards the USSR had on his brief November 1977 falling- 
out with his brother and trusted advisor Naim and six 
other ministers. 91 What is clear is that the only reports 
of the Moscow talks to reach the frustrated militants in 
Peshawar were from the official communique of sentiments, 
and it could have only reinforced their belief that 
Communist influence within the Afghan government was 
increasing. 
89lbid., pp. 181-82. 
90 Ibid., p. 181. 
91According to Bradsher, "Naim and six cabinet ministers broke with 
[Daoud] temporarily in 1977 over the inflexibility of his 
increasingly unrealistic policies, " Afghan Communism and Soviet 
Intervention, p. 22. 
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Daoud to Islamabad 
On March 5,1978, President Daoud flew to Islamabad for a 
meeting with President Zia ul-Haq. Nine months earlier, 
Zia, the soft-spoken former Chief of Staff, had deposed 
President All Bhutto. By most accounts, the meeting 
between the two leaders who had both come to power via 
coup d'etats was cordial; both presidents faced tense 
domestic political situations and quickly agreed that 
Afghanistan would crack down on the secessionist rhetoric 
from Pashtun leaders and expel radical Pakistanis, while 
Pakistan would release a number of dissidents from 
prison. 92 
It seems likely that Daoud raised the question of 
expelling the Afghan exiles from Pakistan, and that Zia 
rejected it. 93 If so, Daoud played down the diplomatic 
affront, as he had after his meeting with Brezhnev, and 
proclaimed that the agreement "opened a promising new 
chapter in the relations of our two countries. "94 In 
reality, the longtime Soviet-leaning prince was being 
squeezed by both his Communist allies and the nationalist 
opposition that their partnership had inadvertently 
92 The protocol they signed that day had three basic provisions: a) 
Daoud agreed to pressure Afghan and Pakistani tribal leaders to 
"tone down the Pashtunistan and Baluch issues"; b) Zia would 
release from prison Pakistani political prisoners who had been 
arrested for opposing martial law rule; and c) Daoud would send 
home Pakistani political exiles. 
93Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, p. 63. The 
language of the agreement is not clear on whether President Daoud 
agreed to turn over the exiled Pakistani opponents to Zia's 
authorities or only require them to proceed to some third country. 
94Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, p. 63. 
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engendered; he was increasingly powerless to resist 
either. His trip to Pakistan would be his last visit 
abroad as, twenty-two years after his final rebuff by John 
Foster Dulles, events in the Afghan capital were about to 
overtake Mohammad Doaud's perennial optimism. 
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Chapter 3, War in Nuristan and Herat: The Outbreak of 
Nationalist Uprisings, April 1978-April 1979. 
Death of Mir Akbar Khyber 
On April 25,1978, Agence France Press carried a brief 
report on the murder ten days earlier in Kabul of Mir 
Akbar Khyber, a prominent Afghan Communist. Quoting 
travellers arriving in Pakistan from the Afghan capital, 
the report mentioned that "many of the several thousand 
mourners waved red flags and shouted anti-CIA slogans. " 
In the politically charged atmosphere of the time, it did 
not seem that unusual. 
Shaken by the massive demonstrations, late on the 
same day as the AFP report, President Daoud finally 
ordered the arrest of the civilian leadership of the 
Communist factions. ' Shortly after midnight, Nur Mohammad 
Taraki, Babrak Karmal and two dozen or so senior 
Communists were taken into custody, although Hafizulah 
Amin inexplicably was only placed under house arrest. 
That gave Amin almost twelve hours to finalize details of 
a plot among Communist agents in the military before he 
too was arrested, at 10: 45 hours on the morning of April 
26.2 
1 Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 7. 
2 Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, pp. 57-59. 
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Saur Revolution 
The following day, President Daoud and his cabinet met at 
the Arg Palace to discuss the fate of the jailed Moscow- 
backed leaders. Several participants, including Minister 
of the Interior Abdul Qadir Nuristani, felt that with such 
an unstable situation, the government had little choice 
but to execute the leaders of the Communist groups 
immediately. 3 This position had a strong legal basis, as 
many of the men, such as Taraki and Amin, had been 
repeatedly involved in treasonous acts, all punishable by 
death under the 1977 constitution. 4 At the same time, some 
cabinet members were afraid of turning the men into 
martyrs; opponents of immediate execution argued that the 
previous week's protests by several thousand people might 
yield to protests by tens of thousands. With reports of 
chaos in Iran spreading around the world, the Afghan 
ministers feared a similar leftist-Islamic rage 5 
More than an hour before these sensitive cabinet 
deliberations began, a column of approximately fifty tanks 
of the 4th Armoured Division had departed their base in 
Pul-i-Charkhi and headed for central Kabul, twelve 
3 Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-Party-Communism, p. 59. Also see 
Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, pp. 74-75. 
4 For a synopsis of the 1977 constitution, see Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 
763. 
5 Protests against the Shah of Iran and in support of the exiled 
Ayatollah Khomeini erupted in numerous cities in early 1978. On 
January 9 in Qumm, the police fired on student protesters, killing 
scores. More demonstrators were killed during clashes with the 
police in Tabriz on February 18 and Yazd on March 30. In early 
April, students organized demonstrations at various schools in 
Tehran. Arnold states that "Khalq had gained the sympathy of the 
Iraqi Communist Party and Iran's Tudeh Party, " Afghanistan's Two- 
Party Communism, p. 53. 
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kilometres to the east. Two hours later, battalion 
commander Senior Captain Aslam Watanjar led a company of 
nine tanks to the wrought-iron gates and stone walls of 
the presidential compound where Daoud and his ministers 
were meeting. Forming a battle line, the tanks opened 
fire on the compound's main building at noon on April 27, 
1978 .6 
The blooming rose gardens of the palace were soon 
shrouded in smoke as the 1,800-man Presidential Guard 
counterattacked. Daoud and other members of the 
government frantically called bases around the capital to 
muster loyal forces. Their efforts were unsuccessful, 
raising serious questions about whether the Defence 
Minister, Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, was involved in the 
conspiracy. With a handful of light-armoured vehicles, 
the Presidential Guard, or Republican Guard Brigade, as it 
was officially known, could not match the heavy tanks. At 
about 15.00 hours, a few MiG-21s from the 322nd Air 
Regiment, which was supporting the coup, initiated a 
series of sorties over the mountain-ringed capital, 
strafing the Central Corps and 8th Division headquarters 
to intimidate the units, and bombing the palace. 
Late that afternoon, pro-communist forces released 
Taraki, Karmal, Amin, and others from the National 
Security Ministry, adjacent to the besieged Palace. 
6 Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, p. 136; Guardian, 28 April 1978. 
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Shortly afterwards, rebel forces captured the lightly 
guarded Communications Ministry next to the U. S. Embassy 
on the outskirts of the new diplomatic quarter. At 19.00 
hours, Radio Kabul announced "the takeover of the Afghan 
government by the Revolutionary Council of the Armed 
Forces. "7 Four hours later, rebel forces entered the 
palace and commenced a bloodbath that claimed the lives of 
President Daoud, his wife, six of their children ages 
fourteen to twenty-seven, and thirteen other immediate 
relatives. 8 
For two days after the coup, Afghans and the rest of 
the world waited to see what the Revolutionary Council of 
the Armed Forces would do next. On April 30, the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) formed a government 
with Nur Mohammad Taraki as its Secretary General and 
President, and Hafizullah Amin as First Deputy Prime 
Minister. A document entitled "The Main Guidelines of the 
Revolutionary Tasks of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan (DRA)" soon made it clear that the PDPA 
intended to engage in. radical social reforms, including 
the forced redistribution of land and the partial 
emancipation of women via a massive literacy campaign. 
Although virtually all Afghans knew that the PDPA was 
"Communist, " the new government assiduously avoided public 
mention of Marxist-Leninist ideals. Instead, it spoke 
7 Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 8. 
8 Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, p. 136. 
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euphemistically about its desire "to clean Islam in 
Afghanistan of the dirt and ballast of bad traditions, 
superstition, and erroneous belief. "9 
To ordinary Afghans, however, this sophistry was of 
little significance. Particularly galling for them was 
Decree No. 6, issued on July 12,1978, which cancelled all 
rural debts incurred prior to 1973. This theoretically 
freed millions of poor Afghan farmers from a vicious cycle 
of accumulating financial obligations to landlords and 
local money lenders. In practice, it had the effect of 
unhinging the largest sector of the Afghan economy - 
agriculture - by antagonizing a set of interests which the 
state had never before challenged. As one Nuristani put 
it: 
They dishonored, insulted and killed the tribal leaders, 
and told us that landowners and khans are the people's 
enemy and should be destroyed.... They told us that 
land is not private property. It belongs to the 
farmers, and the farmers are the government's hired 
workers.... They stole the farmers' labor under the 
pretext of co-operatives. 10 
This decree appears to have had a galvanizing effect on 
the populace and in particular on the Nuristanis. 11 Having 
been converted to Islam only by force of arms - by Abdur 
Rahman, the fifth Barakzai-Qizilbash Amir, in a conflict 
9 Nur Taraki, Die Zeit, 9 June 1978, quoted in Urban, War in 
Afghanistan, p. 18. 
10Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 135. 
"Raja Anwar points out that ""the religious establishment, headed by 
the Mullahs, was fully on the side of the threatened but powerful 
[landowning] minority, " The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-Hand 
Account (New York: Verso, 1988), p. 146. 
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lasting from 1895-189812 - the Nuristanis did not consider 
themselves real Afghans, and therefore felt largely immune 
from the state's jurisdiction. 
The government responded to the simmering discontent 
with the arrest of thousands of civil servants and 
intellectuals. This, however, had a rapid polarizing 
effect on the country. In the eastern town of Narang, the 
arrest of one sub-district administrator in particular 
would prove highly counterproductive. 
The Arrest of Mohammad Anwar 
Mohammad Anwar Amin arrived at his office one morning, 
several days after the announcement of the new government, 
to find an armoured jeep awaiting his arrival. An 
experienced and self-confident civil administrator, Anwar 
greeted the officers and inquired why they had come to see 
him, only to find himself arrested and transferred to the 
governor's house by machine-gun-toting guards and held 
there for a day before being moved to the Division 
Headquarters of Jalalabad. From there, after a brief but 
cordial conversation with the acting governor, whom he 
knew, he was loaded onto a. bus full of terrified men. 
13 
For Anwar, the experience was surreal. As he later 
recounted, "I wasn't aware that they killed, that these 
12 See Schuyler Jones, Men of Inf 
Control and Dispute Settlement 
(London: Seminar Press, 1974), 
13 Richard F. Strand and author's 
February-March 1992, interview 
luence in Nuristan: A Study of Social 
in Wakil Valley, Afghanistan 
pp. 6-19. 
interview with Mohammad Anwar Amin, 
2, p. 2. 
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Communists are tyrannical. ., 14 The realization seems to 
have shocked him, though he understood from experience 
that in dangerous situations it was necessary to remain 
calm and clear-headed. "What sins have we committed? " he 
asked rhetorically, attempting to put the men on the bus 
at ease. The answer was evident: they were senior 
government officials and prominent traditional leaders. 
The men soon found themselves in a prison outside of 
Jalalabad with two to three hundred other detainees, 
including the President of Jalalabad University and the 
city hospital's chief doctor. The presence of these well- 
known figures among samovars and plentiful tobacco, 
arrayed on carpet-covered daises, greatly heartened Anwar. 
"From now on these jails are rosebeds. They are flower 
gardens, " he recalled them saying. 15 The illusion, 
however, was temporary. 
Within days, the guards began calling names and 
removing prisoners at night. Anwar soon learned that many 
of the men were transferred to a site in the Gambiri 
Desert outside of Jalalabad and executed. 16 The fenced-in 
tea house became a living hell. On several nights, the 
guards called out his official title, "'Alaqadar, " but 
Anwar remained still; he knew there were other 'Alaqadars 
in the jail. 
14 Anwar interview 2, February-March 1992, p. 6. 
'5lbid., p. 7. 
16 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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Anwar's elder brother, Ghazi, who had been detained 
soon after his own arrest, was also in the prison. After 
five months of witnessing scores of men taken to their 
deaths, even during daylight hours, kinsmen of the 
brothers successfully bribed PDPA officials in Jalalabad 
to release them. Meeting briefly with the Jalalabad 
Division Commander before being set free, Anwar pledged to 
"work cooperatively for [the PDPA] government. " He then 
paid and tipped the local vendor, who had delivered fruit 
to him and washed his laundry while he was in detention, 
and purchased two pairs of sturdy hiking boots. A fierce 
nationalist, Anwar already had a conception of the 
rebellion he would soon lead. 17 
Anwar's Return 
Mohammad Anwar had grown up in eastern Nuristan in the 
1960s. At that time, his highland clan, the Kom, were 
engaged in a protracted, low-intensity conflict with the 
Gujar tribe, who for generations had encroached upon the 
Kom's grazing lands. In response to these land-grabs, 
scores of raids were launched on both sides as the Kom 
fought to preserve their holdings and the Gujars sought to 
increase theirs. Though the primary purpose of these 
raids may have been "the theft of goats rather than the 
killing of men, "18 bloodshed nevertheless occurred and 
17 Ibid., pp. 2-10,23; Anwar interview 6, February-March 1992, p. 1. 
18Jones, Men of Influence in Nuristan, p. 189. 
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these campaigns were pursued by both sides in a most 
serious manner. 
Anwar was one of the principal Kom heroes to emerge 
from the last phase of the so-called Gujar Wars. 19 The 
experience endowed him with an acute sense of property 
rights and made him an expert in guerilla tactics, 
something that by 1978 was unusual among educated Afghans, 
the 1960s and 1970s having been an era of domestic 
tranquility. That this individual, something of an 
anachronism, had become educated, entered public service, 
and became a highly-respected 'Alaqadar, made him truly 
unique. 
20 
Anwar returned to Nuristan in September 1978.21 At 
the time, the border region, and Afghanistan as a whole, 
remained at peace even as its people seethed at the PDPA's 
actions. Reunited with his family in the town of 
Pashingar, Anwar rested several days before continuing up 
the valley to Kamdesh, where he anticipated a large 
welcome. Before leaving Pashingar, he warned his kinsmen 
19 The conflict was eventually solved in the 1970s with the central 
government's penetration of the area and acceptance of the rule of 
law by both sides. This fact may have been a driving force in 
Anwar's later decision to seek a career in civil administration. 
See Richard Strand, Nuristan: Hidden Land of the Hindu-Kush, 
published online at http: //users. sedona. net/-strand. 
20 In addition, while only a small percentage of the Afghan population 
was involved in the military during the twentieth century, every 
male in Nuristan from three to four preceding generations had some 
involvement in the three-year Afghan war, which lasted from 1895- 
1898. In April 1896,2,500 Nuristani prisoners - men, women, and 
children - were taken to Kabul, while in ensuing fighting in 
Kamdesh, 440 Afghan soldiers drove some 3,000 souls into refugee 
camps in Nuristan. Among them were presumably many of Anwar's 
kinsmen. Jones, Men of Influence in Nuristan, pp. 16-18. The Safi 
War (1945-1946) renewed this cycle of combat. 
21Anwar interview 3, February-March 1992, p. 4. 
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either to fight with him in the mountains or to flee the 
town for the safety of the lower regions. 22 
"During the Gujar affair, you were saying that I 
drowned you, " Anwar told the kinsmen who had bought his 
freedom, employing a local colloquialism. "Now for this 
affair you shouldn't say that I drowned you. I am going 
to make war on the government. "23 Anwar's reputation from 
the Gujar Wars was significant and, idealistic as his 
declaration sounded, a number of the men, including his 
older brother Muhammad Kabir, a former member of the 
provincial Parliament, agreed to leave their homes and 
fight with him. An unsuccessful anti-Communist raid on 
Shigal the previous summer and the PDPA's subsequent 
burning of the town of Ningalam also significantly 
influenced the men. 24 The Pachwals clan from Ningalam had 
fled into Kom territory where they were given shelter, and 
this seems to have also inspired the Kom. Several of 
their fighters had joined the Pachwals in a raid on a 
government post at Manugi that July. At that point, 
however, in the midst of ongoing negotiations for the 
22 Ibid., p. 5. 
23 Ibid., p. 6. Jones notes that even in modern Nuristan, "bravery 
and enterprise were honored as affording additional means of rank- 
achievement. " Men of Influence in Nuristan, p. 188. 
24 Edwards says the raid on Shigal was carried out May 23,1978, by 
inexperienced members of Hezb-i-Islami, and essentially involved 
the assassination of one communist schoolteacher, Before Taliban, p. 
148. The burning of Ningalam, on June 23,1978, was in retaliation 
for the previous day's shooting by town residents of a military 
officer and two soldiers who were arresting two Ningalam elders. 
The military attack involved tank and artillery fire, hours of 
bombing by the air force, and soldiers looting and burning down 
houses. Ibid, p. 128. 
121 
release of Anwar and his brother, veteran Kom fighters had 
chosen to bide their time. 
The Outbreak of War 
On one of his first mornings back in Kamdesh, Anwar 
dispatched a number of messengers to neighbouring 
villages, alerting them that he planned to launch an 
attack in ten days. 25 This delay, communicated to people 
in the Mer territory, Kamu, and the Piti Valley, was 
intended to give Anwar time to notify other kinsmen and 
loyalists in Kabul and allow them time to flee. 26 He also 
intended to use the time to plan carefully the first 
operation. 
To Anwar's intense frustration, a young boy arrived 
in Kamdesh later that morning from the neighbouring Mer 
territory and announced that the men in his village had 
launched an assault. Apparently the Mer feared the arrest 
of one of their headmen, an ally of Anwar named Latif, and 
thus took pre-emptive action. 27 With little time to 
prepare, Anwar assembled the Kom men. He pointed out that 
the Communists had fined the people of the Kata Valley 
thirty cows. "How will you exist tomorrow as people 
without agnates [chiefs] or tribe? " the former 'Alaqadar 
asked them. 
25 Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 2. It was a means of 
communication the Panjsheris would soon adopt. 
26 Ibid., p. 2. 
27 Ibid., p. 4. 
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"Death to Taraki! Death to Communism! " the men 
roared. 28 They headed down the valley toward the Kamdesh 
district headquarters, which they intended to capture. 
Fearing that the attackers would be cut off, Anwar spent 
most of the first afternoon arranging the young fighters 
in rear-guard positions. As a Reuters dispatch in the New 
York Times later reported, "the guerrillas, sniping from 
mountain ridges and attacking at night, captured the town 
of Kamdesh, 40 miles north of Chigha Sarai. i29 
The next morning, from heights above the fighting at 
the Kamdesh district headquarters, Anwar fired at close 
range on a few helicopters. The aircraft gained altitude 
and disengaged from the fight, though not before 
prematurely dropping ammunition intended for the besieged 
government force. The rebels recovered the munitions and, 
within several hours, the remaining government 
installation at Kamdesh had fallen. 30 
The following day, Anwar and some men of the Piti 
Valley engaged a government force at a place called Saret 
Farm. Anwar led the attack, firing with a twenty-shot 
automatic, although from his account he appears to have 
aimed low in order to limit casualties. 31 Despite this, 
two soldiers were wounded and one was killed as the 
28 Ibid., p. 5. 
29 "'Revolt Reported in Afghan Province, " New York Times, 8 January 
1979. 
30Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 8. 
31Ibid., p. 9. 
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government forces were swept from the area. That night, 
the rebels slaughtered a ram in celebration. 
A day later, two respected brothers of the Kata clan, 
Zahir and Tahir, approached Anwar and proposed that he 
formally become commander of the rebellion. The 'Alaqadar 
demurred, arguing, "I'm a sick man just out after five 
months in prison. " The brothers were not dissuaded and 
finally won his agreement. The next day, the new 
"Commander Anwar" began positioning rebels on the heights 
overlooking the mouth of the Nicat Valley. It was there 
that he expected the government retaliation to come. 32 
On two successive occasions, the government attempted 
to enter the Nicat Valley. During the second push, the 
rebels outflanked the main body of soldiers, taking fifty- 
six prisoners and killing about ten more. 33 Two valuable 
watermills were also destroyed by light artillery. 34 In 
addition to the large number of prisoners, the rebels 
captured their first Kalashnikov assault rifles. This 
emboldened the fighters, although years later Anwar was 
philosophical about the poor state of their adversaries: 
"They were Afghan conscripts, right? That's why I wasn't 
afraid. "35 
By October, with two government posts at Kamdesh and 
Bargimatal under their control, the rebels decided to push 
32 Ibid., p. 11. 
33 Ibid. 
34 For the Nuristanis who grind their own grain, this would be a 
foreshadowing of the troubles they would soon have feeding 
themselves; however, it was also a stunning victory. 
35Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 13. 
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towards Barikot. Until now, they had fought in their own 36 
upland territory, and some men believed the idea of moving 
into the predominantly Gujar town would inflame the old 
conflict. "This isn't a Gujar war; it's not a Lowlander 
war, " Anwar told them as they waited several days to 
attack. "If you weren't aware of the extent [of this 
anti-Communist campaign], why did you start up this 
affair? " The dissension compelled Anwar to lead the 
attack personally. He built a large bunker at the base of 
a cliff on Shar Ridge overlooking Barikot Road and 
dispatched unarmed rebels from the village of Badzgal to 
demolish the road at Mandra Valley Farms. 37 Reinforced by 
four hundred fifty and ten-shot ammunition clips -a far 
cry from the muskets and single-shot rifles he had fought 
with as a young man - Anwar then awaited the government's 
response. 
38 
Soldiers flooded in to repair the road. From his 
position far above, Anwar began sniping, one by one. To 
his surprise, he would shoot ten or more soldiers in a 
day, only to find another repair party approach the 
following morning. He soon realized that "the government 
wasn't telling them that there was such a situation. , 39 At 
night, Anwar left the bunker to eat his evening meal 
36 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 100. 
37 Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 15. 
38 Many roads in Nuristan are cantilevered over cliffs, so it is much 
easier to destroy a road than it is to rebuild one. 
39 Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 15. 
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further up the valley, fully expecting to have his 
position overrun before he returned. 
The stalemate continued for two weeks. 40 While the 
government soldiers fired mortars, they seemed unable to 
identify the location of Anwar's nest. Each time their 
crews made progress in repairing the road, the rebels 
again destroyed it. A few weeks into the siege, a senior 
captain and a sergeant who had driven up to the front line 
were captured. When Anwar received these prisoners, whom 
he knew, he personally dressed their wounds before 
trussing the enlisted man and sending them both up the 
valley. Interrogations revealed that these officers 
believed their attackers were being supported by foreign 
forces. 41 
Armed with this information, the rebels encircled a 
large government relief force made up largely of Gujar 
fighters. After pinning down the column, Anwar learned 
via a radio intercept that they were running low on water 
and ammunition. Following unsuccessful government bombing 
raids - the first of the one-month siege - the rebels 
moved in, destroying more than ten government vehicles, 
40During this time, Anwar recounts that men from the Kata Valley who 
had not seen the Gujar Wars - shepherds and others - were coming to 
watch the fighting, bringing Anwar increasing notoriety. Anwar 
interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 16. 
4'According to Anwar, the Communists believed them to be supported by 
"Generals from China, " Ibid., p. 19. 
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killing scores, and seizing more than one hundred 
prisoners. 42 
As the rebels pursued their fight, word spread to the 
mosques. "God keep the "Alagadar alive, " the Mullahs 
said. 43 To Anwar, a lifelong and unabashed atheist, it was 
a high compliment. It was also a foreshadowing of the 
political challenges the 'Alaqadar would soon face. 
A primary factor contributing to the guerrillas' 
early success was the high attrition level among the 
paramilitary gendarmerie. These forces, who Urban points 
out were traditionally charged with combating "guerrillas 
and smugglers, " had been trained throughout the 1970s by 
the West Germans. Thus, their loyalties to the new 
government, in comparison to those of the Soviet-trained 
army personnel, were rather shaky, and between detention 
and desertion their numbers throughout 1978 had 
plummeted. 44 In addition, the rebels benefited from the 
fact that at this point the Afghan government possessed 
only about twenty helicopters, most of which were aging 
Mil-4's. 45 A third factor, of course, was Anwar' s earlier 
mastery of guerrilla tactics and his eagerness, following 
his imprisonment in Jalalabad, to put them into effect. 
42 Anwar claims that the number was three to five hundred, Anwar 
interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 21. The Daily Telegraph 
reported on 31 October 1978 that one hundred Afghan soldiers had 
been killed in the fighting in Konar. 
43 Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 19. 
44Urban, war in Afghanistan, pp. 14,18. 
45 Ibid., p. 18. 
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A major government push more than a month after the 
hostilities began finally led to the capture of Anwar's 
bunker one day when he was up the valley. 46 The guerrillas 
managed to recapture the position briefly, but the Gujars 
successfully sent a flanking force through the Charat 
Valley Mountain, overcoming a small Kom group. 47 The 
PDPA's approach to defeating the rebellion by offering 
weapons and money to the Gujars and other groups who were 
hostile to the Nuristanis seemed to work, enabling the 
entrapped government force, perhaps hundreds strong, to 
retreat from the valley via Mumdes. 48 
The lifting of the siege exposed the rebels on two 
fronts. To counter this perilous situation, Anwar divided 
his forces, sending a group of young Kom fighters with the 
clansmen into the mountains, while he and men of the Kata 
clan established a cordon at Ridge Farms. The Kamdesh 
rebels were now on the defensive. 
To make matters worse, three Kata serving on sentry 
duty under Anwar were soon killed, apparently by disloyal 
Korns. Anwar believed the men feared a government victory 
and were trying to hasten the Katas' departure. 
Thereafter, he dispatched every Kata patrol in Kamdesh 
with at least one Kom fighter. 49 Rebel forces deployed on 
the far side of the mountains in Mumdes were also soon 
46Anwar interview 5, February-March 1992, p. 1. 
47 Anwar says the force was seven to ten men, including Abdul Muhammad, 
son of Caaro Merak, who was killed in the engagement, Ibid., p. 2. 
48Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 100; Anwar interview 5, 
February-March 1992, p. 3. 
49Anwar interview 6, February-March 1992, p. 3. 
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attacked, as a Gujar unit tried three times to force its 
way into the Kumari Valley. Though they were repelled, an 
engagement with government forces in the Nicat Valley 
claimed the lives of Zahir and Tahir, the two brothers who 
had encouraged Anwar to formally become the rebellion's 
commander. 50 
Amid these challenges, age-old Kom-Kata rivalries 
reemerged as Kata leaders insisted on replacing Anwar as 
commander with one of their own kinsmen, Ubaidullah. 51 
This move effectively brought an end to Kamdesh's unified 
front, as Anwar set up positions around Ustro-T, and the 
Kata established positions on the far side of the valley 
and in upriver areas. Heavy mortar from the government 
positions soon compelled both Kom and Kata forces, low on 
ammunition, to pull back. 
Anwar cites the inspirational role played by the 
women of the Kamdesh during this final phase of the 
battle. Often carrying baskets with bread and cheese to 
forward positions amid government shelling, they 
encouraged the men to hold their positions. 52 
50 Ibid., pp. 4,6. 
51Anwar acknowledged that he had "'been speaking badly" to the less 
seasoned Kata fighters; out in front in the initial battles, Anwar 
had physically threatened the Kata and acknowledged that Ubaidullah 
had a better way of speaking. Anwar interview 6, February-March 
1992, pp. 8-9. 
52 Ibid., pp. 12-13. He also recounts how girls came to throw ashes 
on boys who shied away from the frontlines, while at the same time 
"showering with walnuts" - as Strand points out, a "traditional 
greeting for notables" - those returning from battle. "The women 
of Nuristan took an uncountably big part in this holy war, " Anwar 
observed of the early battles. 
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Despite this, by November the main part of the 
Kamdesh Valley was again in government hands. Restricted 
to side valleys, Anwar's fighters found themselves cut off 
from the Kata fighters. From positions in the Bargu 
Valley, the Kom rebels could see government forces 
streaming up the central valley. Anwar blamed the 
highland Kata for the setback, while also being 
philosophical: 
I don't find fault with them for not fighting like us. 
They're a free people without a care up in a narr-ow 
valley. Downriver we [Kom and Mumo] have to fight the 
Afghans; we have a fight with the Gahwars; we have a 
fight with the Gujars; we have to struggle over 
territory, we have to struggle over land. These people 
weren't accustomed to battle, and they couldn't take 
part in the battle like we did. 53 
Staging forces at the mouth of the Bazi Valley, Anwar 
continued to the Piti Valley where he had heavily armed a 
number of fighters. To his shock, he found the villages 
there abandoned. He soon learned that most of the 
inhabitants were headed for the Pakistani border town of 
Chitral. Anwar caught up with the party along the Bramni 
Mountain, though he was unable to convince any of the 
fighters to turn back. The burning of Bazi and the 
evacuation of the valley followed shortly thereafter. 54 
Edwards describes the strong traditional clan differences 
in Nuristan, noting that during the summer of 1978, 
"rivalries were held in check as more and more of the 
53 Anwar interview 4, February-March 1992, p. 18. 
54 Anwar interview 7, February-March 1992, pp. 1-2. 
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population of the area threw in their support to those 
advocating armed insurrection against the government. t55 
As autumn set in and the end of the fighting season drew 
near, those differences reemerged. Anwar realized that he 
would need to broaden dramatically support for the 
rebellion if they were to regain the initiative in the 
spring. 
Taking the Rebellion Beyond Kamdesh 
From his headquarters at Ustro-T Farms, Anwar sent wc-r_d to 
the Kom elders, who, for their part, suggested that were 
Anwar to write letters (as he had at the beginning of the 
rebellion) to some sixteen clans and Pashtun tribes, 
including the Sami, the Salarzai, the Mullah Khel, the 
Mamund, the frontier Pashtuns, and others, asking them to 
join the Kom in pursuing the fight, they would support 
him. It was here that Anwar's experience as an 'Alaqadar, 
seeking community consensus and providing civil services, 
made him a particularly dangerous guerrilla. 
This was a "battle of right versus wrong, " Anwar 
wrote, blasting the PDPA as "infidels. " He recognized 
that to continue the war he needed to clearly state his 
case. Before long, the elders took Anwar's letters to the 
khan of Khar, the khan of Nawagai, and even the son of the 
Nawab of Dir on the Pakistani side of the border, and 
55Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 134. 
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others, encouraging them to join the fight. 56 Soon 
thereafter, Pakistani intelligence officers arrived in 
eastern Nuristan looking for "a man named Anwar. " 
Hearing of their inquiries, the now somewhat 
desperate Anwar met the agents in the vicinity of Ustro-T 
Farms. After introducing themselves as ISI oficials, the 
men announced that they were there to invite him to visit 
Pakistan. 
General Akhtar 
Several days later, upon reaching the town of Drosh on the 
Pakistani border, Anwar was appalled at the sight of 
Nuristani refugees. Some were so poor and miserable "they 
were ready to sell their children. " 57 After visiting with 
his wife and children, whom he had sent to Drosh a month 
earlier, Anwar was escorted by the Pakistani officers to a 
meeting with General Abdur Rahman Akhtar, the director of 
the country's Inter-Service Intelligence, who had flown up 
from Islamabad specifically to meet him. Anwar later 
recalled the conversation: 
"Anwar, this thing of yours, this revolution, " the 
general asked, "what does it mean? " 
Though an atheist, Anwar increasingly portrayed the 
fight in religious terms. He realized religion was a hard 
56Anwar interview 6, February-March 1992, p. 14. 
57 Anwar interview 7, February-March 1992, p. 25. 
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argument to reject. "God has commanded us to fight, " he 
told the Westernized Akhtar. 
"How has he commanded you? " Akhtar challenged him. 
""He hasn't commanded twenty million people in Afghanistan, 
but he has commanded you? " 
"'We were the last people to become Muslims, " Anwar 
continued. "And we're the people on the frontier. If we 
don't do this battle, other people won't. I started this 
business so that we could teach the people. " 
A steely-eyed survivor of wars and coups, General 
Akhtar, perhaps sensing the intelligence and confidence of 
the man facing him, next asked, "If it is defeated, what 
will you do? " 
"If all the people die, the country will be divided 
up and handed over to [our enemies], " Anwar concluded. 
"God says it will be theirs. " 
Becoming slightly emotional, Akhtar contradicted him. 
"No, it won't happen, " the usually dour general replied, 
placing his hand on Anwar's shoulder. The conversation 
continued, the two men joking about creating a "Radio 
Nuristan" in Pakistan to incite the Afghans, just as 
Daoud's Radio Afghanistan attempted to incite Pakistani 
Pashtuns. After what Anwar believed was a sincere 
exchange, the two men parted company. 58 
58Anwar interview 6, February-March 1992, pp. 17,19-21. 
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The next day, the Deputy Commissioner of the 
northwestern Pakistani city of Chitral arranged a flight 
for Anwar to Peshawar, where he was taken to the house of 
the governor of the North-West Frontier Province, Fazil 
Haq. Haq picked up on Akhtar's line of questioning: 
"What's this battle all about, why did you start [it]? " 
He then asked if any aid he had sent had reached the 
Nuristani front. When told it had not, Haq became visibly 
angry; Anwar recalled him "rubbing his hands together in 
agitation. " He then gave Anwar three thousand rupees and 
sent him to the commander of the Bala Hissar Fort, General 
Zulfikar. "From now on, if you're not able to see me, see 
Zulfikar, " Fazil Haq told him. 59 
General Zulfikar received Anwar and asked him to 
write a list of whatever materials he needed. "I wrote 
down a ton of stuff, " Anwar remembered. However, when he 
returned the next day, Zulfikar apologized; Islamabad was 
rescinding its offer. The general hoped the situation 
would shift, but at present he had been instructed not to 
provide any military aid. Anwar quickly suspected that 
Hezb-i-Islami, which had already recruited a Nuristani 
named Sabour to oversee the refugees in Chitral, was 
behind Islamabad's reversal. 60 
Several days later, Anwar was invited to Islamabad. 
Having never been in the neighbouring capital before, he 
59Anwar interview 7, February-March 1992, pp. 4-6. 
60 Ibid., pp. 2,7. 
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invited Kush Ahmad, a prince of Chitral, to accompany him. 
Soon after arriving in the capital, the men had a brief 
meeting with General Akhtar, who directed them to Director 
General Aziz Yousef, head of the ISI's Afghan Department. 
Anwar told Yousef the full story of the rebellion and his 
life before it. Yousef took detailed notes, mentioning 
that he would personally be briefing President Zia ul-Haq 
on the Kamdesh Front. As they were leaving, Yousef placed 
an envelope with two thousand rupees into Anwar's hand. 
Embarrassed by the largess, Anwar mentioned that he had 
plenty of money, but Kush Ahmad encouraged him to take 
it. 61 The two men split the money and checked into the 
Faisal Hotel on Liaqat Road. 
During the next few days, Anwar and Kush Ahmad 
visited a number of embassies in Islamabad, including 
those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. Anwar also gave a 
number of press interviews. Shortly thereafter, once back 
at Drosh, he was introduced to a tall, lean, young Afghan 
militant who wanted to know all about the Kamdesh Front. 
He introduced himself as Massoud. 
The young rebel arrived with a man named Jalal and a 
French reporter named Raymond Depardon. Anwar encouraged 
them to go to Kamdesh and to bring out photographs of the 
war. Fighting was still occurring around Bazi and Anwar 
thought it might help the cause. Undoubtedly he was also 
61 Ibid., p. 9. 
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impressed with the young rebel's keen intellect and 
energy. At about this time, it was reported in Pakistan 
that Gul Mohommad, a leading pro-PDPA Gujar figure, had 
been killed in Nuristan, and Anwar hoped the dynamics were 
shifting. 
Both Hezb and Jamiat news sources seized Gul 
Mohommad's death to claim credit for their group for the 
advances in the region. Irritated at the descriptions of 
his fighters and allies as "volunteers" of one or other of 
the Pakistani-based opposition organizations, Anwar 
resolved to call on the leaders of the two groups. After 
a fruitful meeting with Burhannudin Rabbani, the leader of 
Jamiat, whom he found a thoughtful, soft-spoken 
individual, Anwar called upon Gulbuddin. After 
introductions, Anwar extracted from his pocket the 
offending newspaper article. 
"Don't write this stuff! " he said. "There aren't any 
volunteers of the Hesbi army. The men are God's 
volunteers. They are fighting under God's commands. " 
"Whoever doesn't fight under [Hezb-i-Islami], his 
Jihad doesn't count, " Gulbuddin replied, referring to the 
rights of martyrs in a sanctioned holy war. 
"There are a lot of powerful scholars there, as with 
you, and the scholars agree and gave out an edict that a 
Jihad does exist, " Anwar countered. `Those mullahs there 
weren't saying whoever doesn't make [tribute] to 
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Gulbuddin, whoever doesn't fight under his flag, his Jihad 
doesn't count. I'm hearing this for the first time from 
you. " The two men grew agitated and Anwar and his party 
abruptly rose and left. 
The Hesb Party members "are not upright people, " the 
nationalist Anwar concluded. Gulbuddin "is a bad person. 
I like Rabbani; I dislike him. "62 
This was a question of shared values and objectives: 
Hezb was a radical and ethnocentric Pashtun party, Jamiat 
a traditionalist and more nationally focused one. To 
Anwar, himself from a minority ethnic group, he found the 
latter far more inclusive. In addition to hoping to 
displace the Communists, Anwar believed that a "sanctioned 
Jihad" would protect the Kom from their traditional enemy, 
the Gujar. 63 Though the Jihad in Nuristan had been 
initiated by the atheist Anwar, it was exactly the model 
of an effective popular insurgency that the exiled 
theologians Mujadidi and Rabbani were looking for. 64 These 
individuals were happy to sanction a partially ethnic- 
tribal uprising in the hope that it would help trigger a 
general revolt that would lead to the fall of the 
Communist government in Kabul. 
62 Ibid., p. 15- 
63 Roy discusses the tendency of "communities [to react] towards the 
new government on the basis of their ethnic and tribal loyalties, " 
Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 99. 
69The Mujadidi family had played a significant role in domestic 
events including the second Anglo-Afghan war and Habibullah 
Kaliquani's 1929 takeover. See Roy, Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan, pp. 57-67, and Edwards, Heroes of the Age, p. 22. 
Sibghatullah Mujadidi had been exiled to Denmark in 1959 for 
plotting to kill Krushchev, Roy, Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan, p. 43. 
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At a gathering that Anwar was invited to attend in 
the Pakistani town of Takal, the prominent cleric 
Sibghatullah Mujadidi -a descendent of the Pir Mujadidi, 
who had aided Habibullah Kalakani's entry to Kabul in late 
1928 - openly declared that "This Jihad in Afghanistan was 
started by the Nuristani people. " He continued: "This is 
a Jihad. With the approval of a spiritual person, a 
religious scholar, I give you this edict: that every 
person who is a Muslim should make Jihad against the 
Communists. ff 65 Rabbani and other clerics rose to support 
the fatwa, and then Anwar, to his surprise, was asked to 
address the large group. 
"Brothers, I wasn't aware of what was happening 
here, " he began. 
Now I see this gathering and I am both very happy and 
very upset. I am very happy for the reason that the 
people of Afghanistan, who are Muslims, have come to 
think about this Jihad. That now you have gotten 
together and are thinking about this thing, that the 
Jihad exists. Professor Mujadidi ordered it, Professor 
Rabbani ordered it, and one of our great [Nuristani] 
scholars ordered it too. But here I see so many istimo 
people, and there are so many Muslims dying in a single 
creek, and here I see your food going down, and I am 
very upset. About Muslims, they've said if one Muslim 
is on the western horizon and one is on the eastern 
horizon, each one will be upset with the other. You 
all are very happy, putting on this great big thing 
with your turbans on. There are people dying of 
hunger; the people dying of cold. There while the 
people were [fleeing], some three, four, five score 
children gave up their souls, wrapped in the women's 
scarves. 66 
65Anwar interview 7, February-March 1992, p. 17. 
66 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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Although it is not clear whether Massoud was at the 
assembly or exactly when he resolved to go and fight the 
next spring in Nuristan, Anwar's growing prestige was 
certainly a significant factor in his decision to do so. 
Little did either man know that the situation they would 
return to in Nuristan later that winter differed greatly 
from that which had existed the previous fall. 
The Uprising Spreads to the West 
An important impetus to the uprising was provided by the 
return to Kunar of Samiullah Safi Wakil, the son of a 
prominent tribal notable who had led the Safi uprising 
(1945-46) against the central government, and had spent 
twenty-one years in various prisons surviving a death 
sentence and numerous beatings, one of which had been 
witnessed by his son Wakil. The younger Safi's reaction 
to his father's mistreatment was to run for a seat in the 
newly created Parliament. In many regards the decision 
mirrored the one made by Anwar to seek a career in law 
enforcement following his experience with the Gujar 
usurpations. Waikil's decision to enter government 
occurred six years after the USSR's entry into 
Afghanistan, as East-West ideologies and questions of 
national sovereignty came to eclipse those of tribe and 
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state. Within a short time after his election, Wakil 
became an advisor to the Shah. 67 
Having returned to his home province of Kunar in 
January 1979, Wakil invited the Nuristani leader, Abdul 
Jabar of Ningalam, to his house, where they decided to 
attack the district headquarters at Chapa Dara. Reluctant 
to allow the government to pit the Safis against the 
Nuristanis, -Wakil insisted that once the district 
administrator (a member of Wadir-Safi lineage) was 
captured, he would be kept in the Safi territory and not 
removed to Nuristan. 68 
To further reduce the risk of inter-Safi discord, 
Wakil arranged for members of the Wadir-Safi clan to lead 
the first attacks. The success of this operation gave the 
rebellion that Anwar and the Kom had started in September 
fresh strength and led to the creation of a joint Safi- 
Nuristani jirga, or political body. This, in turn, 
incited other Afghans to rise in revolt. A New York Times 
story on February 5,1979, about rebel activity cited 
Afghan resistance leaders in Peshawar who said that until 
that time, "clashes between troops and armed villagers in 
different parts of the country have been largely 
unrelated. The dissidents said, however, that the nucleus 
67 Edwards, Before Taliban, pp. 120-121. 
68 Although the Safis had been concentrated in western Kunar, General 
Mohammad Daoud Khan's suppression of the Safi revolt in 1947-1949 
"resulted in the last large-scale forced migration in modern Afghan 
history. Many leaders of the Safi revolt were scattered in 
extended family units across north Afghanistan, " Dupree, 
Afghanistan, p. 537. 
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of a coordinated move against the government has taken 
shape in Nouristan. x, 69 
Ubaidullah Surrenders 
At about the same time as Wakil returned to Kunar, Anwar 
was informed about the defection of the Kata commander, 
Ubaidullah, to the government side. Anwar immediately set 
out for Afghanistan, arriving several days later in 
Mandragal, where he summarily organized his men for an 
ambush of government forces in that valley. 
The following day, as government vehicles passed the 
rebels, Anwar was shocked and dismayed to spot several of 
his Kom clansmen seated among the Communist troops. For 
an hour, the rebels waited in their positions. 
Eventually, they heard the convoy rolling back down the 
valley. Anwar, who told his men not to fire until he did, 
aimed carefully to shoot out the tires of the lead 
} 
vehicle. Instantly, the other rebels opened fire. Anwar 
estimated the dead and captured to be fifteen to 
seventeen. 70 He released all but one of the prisoners, his 
goal up to that point having been to limit the deaths of 
ordinary soldiers. Years later Anwar would acknowledge 
his naivete in releasing detainees amid an ongoing 
operation. The men soon disclosed his position. The one 
69Robert Trumbull, ""Foes of Afghan Rulers Are Hoping Skirmishes Will 
Bring on Rebellion, " New York Times, 5 February 1979. 
700f those, he estimated six or seven had been killed, including two 
officers and one doctor, Anwar interview 8, February-March 1992, pp. 
3-4. 
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prisoner he detained was his kinsman, Mullah Hazrat Ali, 
who had assisted the government. The cleric, who had 
received some wounds in the initial engagement, showered 
Anwar with invectives. Furious at Hazrat Ali's treachery 
and irreverence, Anwar shot the cleric in "an extremity. "71 
It was in part a warning to other would-be collaborators. 
Within a day of the attack, a delegation of Kata and 
other elders who had reached an accord with the government 
called on Anwar in his bunker. Brandishing a Koran, the 
men explained the hardships and hunger their clans were 
enduring and argued that breaking the truce would be an 
anti-Islamic act. "You bastards, " Anwar replied. "Which 
prophet has been sent up to tell you to make peace? " 72 It 
was a line of argument with which the persuasive non- 
believer was becoming increasingly comfortable. After 
converting the elders to the logic of his position, Anwar 
agreed to leave his bunker and address a larger gathering 
in Ustro-T. 
"If you start a holy war and then you stop it, you 
become infidels, " he told the gathering. Unable to 
disagree with this admonishment, the men asked how they 
should proceed, with the government force entrapped in the 
middle of the valley. Anwar offered to write a letter 
saying: 
Hey, o leader of my enemy. Whatever kind of revolution 
this is that has started in Nuristan, it's a revolution 
71 Ibid., p. 4. 
72 Ibid. 
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about right and wrong. It didn't just start up 
stupidly [through inexperience]. This thing was 
started up knowingly, with brain power. You have gone 
to the Kom Territory. You thought you went up there by 
force. You didn't go up there by force. We allowed 
you up there. For this short time that I have let yc: u 
into the middle [of the valley] I'll do this. I've let 
you up the valley; now I've got you besieged from my 
side, boxed in. You can't move a distance of five 
fingers up or down the valley. You're not able to go 
across the valley in either direction. Until [you 
agree to my terms] you can't go anywhere. If you turn 
over all your arms, your guns, bullets, and gunpowder 
to the holy warriors, I will [grant you safe conduct]. 
Otherwise, not you or one of your men is going to 
escape alive from me. 
Anwar signed and dated the letter, written in Persian, drnd 
handed it to an elder to deliver to the government 
commander. To his dismay, he soon learned that the 
elders, after receiving money, had agreed to let the 
government forces remain in the LanDai Valley on the far 
side of the Kumari Valley, and to keep the rebels on the 
other side. 73 
Frightened by Anwar's rage over that arrangement, the 
Mer Clan agreed to deliver a second ultimatum from Anwar 
and in the meantime hold the middle valley. Instead, it 
appears that they warned the government to flee and 
simultaneously lifted the cordon. Receiving word of this 
development, Anwar attacked the fleeing troops. He 
recalled a scene of soldiers escaping down a path strewn 
with corpses as either compassion or lack of ammunition 
led him to allow some men to pass. 74 
73 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
74 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Having scored this victory, Anwar went with thirty 
troops to Kun, where he contacted Wakil and, sometime in 
late January or early February, had his first wartime 
meeting with him. Shortly after the meeting, on March 10, 
the first joint Nuristani-Safi force attacked the 
government at Bar Kandi. Both leaders agreed strongly on 
the need to minimize casualties, and the fighters 
"followed their victory by not allowing anyone from the 
village [of Bar Kandi] to be punished and offering their 
opponents full pardon if they agreed to join against the 
government. " The operation's success led to another joint 
attack on the government post at Srah Morgah near Utapur 
near the foot of the Pech Valley. The fighting, which 
lasted several days, was reportedly "the decisive battle 
of the uprising to that point. " 75 
Following the capture of the post, the rebels 
occupied the town of Utapur, scattering a convoy of 
Communist sympathizers and military officers. One fleeing 
convoy was attacked in the vicinity of Pirunai Dag, where 
the rebels took a number of prisoners, much as they had at 
Mandragal some months earlier. Additional rebel 
operations soon cleared the remaining government forces 
from Ningalam, at which point the entire Pech Valley was 
free of PDPA control . 
76 
75Edwards says that the battle occurred "later in March, " Before 
Taliban, p. 142. 
76 Ibid., p. 142. 
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Massoud, whom Anwar had met the previous fall in 
Pakistan, arrived in Kamdesh during this campaign and 
participated in the fighting. This was a formative period 
in his tactical and political training, and both Anwar and 
Wakil befriended the bright young militant. 
The focus of the war was about to shift to the 
western Afghan city of Herat. However, for the first 
several weeks of March 1979, after the victories at Bar 
Kandi, Utapur, and Nigalam, Massoud found himself at the 
epicentre of the emerging opposition movement. Riding to 
and from rapidly-shifting front lines on a white horse, 
one of the few in the area, Massoud attracted significant 
attention both as an eager student of guerrilla tactics 
and as Rabbani's envoy to the eastern rebel front. " This 
was to be "the high point of the uprising in Pech - 
militarily, organizationally, and culturally. " 78 
Gulbuddin's radicals would soon arrive in Kunar and hijack 
the prominent uprising from nationalist leaders like Anwar 
and Wakil and their Jamiat allies. They would be replaced 
with Haji Abdul Gaffar and Mullah Afzal Kati, extremist 
leaders who were not as interested in freeing their nation 
of Communists as they were in radicalizing it. 
77 Though Massoud admitted that at that point in his career "I had not 
seen any [fighting], " at the same time he `encouraged Mawlawi 
Abdullah to set a base at the [rear] and threaten the supply routes 
of the enemy, " Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 11 September 1994, p. 
10. 
78Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 143. 
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A Second Front 
In February 1979, according to Olivier Roy, "several dozen 
militants of the Jamiat returned secretly [to Herat] from 
Iran. They had formed a rough plan for a revolt, though a 
date was not fixed, and were in contact with the captains 
of the division stationed at Herat. i79 Another supporter 
of the rebellion monitored Communist guests at the Herat 
Hotel and dispatched men to Pakistan to secure arms before 
the fighting began. 80 To what extent this man or Ismail 
Khan and `Alauddin Khan - two captains of the Herat 
Division who became the two most significant commanders of 
the western front - communicated with the Jamiat 
leadership in Peshawar in the days preceding the rebellion 
is not known. 81 Certainly the Persian-speaking Rabbani 
enjoyed general support among the Persian population of 
Herat. For his strategy of "counter-coup supported by 
popular uprising" to work, Rabbani recognized that the 
rebels needed to broaden their movement beyond the 
Nuristani-Safi Front in Kunar, which at that point 
remained the major focus of the two main Pakistani-based 
resistance organizations. 82 Independent risings in 
79 The captains, Roy writes, included Ismail Khan and `Alauddin Khan, 
who were secret members of Jamiat, Islam and Resistance in 
Afghanistan, p. 108. 
80 Radek Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of 
War (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1990), p. 206. Nur Ahmad, 
an opposition activist, claims to have raised nine hundred thousand 
Afghani among the military which he gave to Mohammad All for these 
arms purchases. 
81Said Nurullah Emad, from Herat province, was a prominent Jamiati in 
Peshawar at this time. 
82Rabbani had dispatched Massoud, or Massoud had elected to go, to 
Kunar, following Anwar's fall visit to Pakistan, in part to attempt 
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Hazarajat and Badakhshan were too far from Pakistan for 
either Jamiat or Hesbi to play a direct role in early 
1979.83 Thus, beyond actual Jamiat "membership" in Herat 
Province prior to the rebellion, which Roy asserts 
existed, 84 it is likely that Rabbani would have attempted 
to disseminate his knowledge of the previous fall's 
Kamdesh fighting, as well as the rebellion in Badakhshan, 
to encourage opening a second front in Herat. 85 If so, 
Rabbani's efforts succeeded in sparking a rebellion that 
would, for the first time, bring the growing Soviet 
"crisis" in Afghanistan to the top of the Politburo's 
agenda. 
Urban claims that "what turned the situation from a 
minor local disturbance into a national crisis was the use 
of soldiers from the army's 17th Division to break up a 
riot" which had started in Herat on March 15,1979, in 
reaction to the new government's radical literacy 
campaign. 86 The New York Times, on March 22, stated that 
according to rebel spokesman Sabatullah Mujadidi, "reports 
from Herat indicated that an army regiment had mutinied 
to ally the front with the political apparatus Jamiat had created 
in Pakistan, thereby giving themselves added credibility. 
83Rabbani, a native of Faizabad, the provincial capital of Badakhshan, 
may have had direct links with the rebellion there. 
89 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 108. 
65 Although the Settem-i-Melli, a Maoist group, was active in 
Badakhshan in the fall of 1978, there is no evidence that Rabbani 
or Jamiat were in any way linked to these activities, Urban, War in 
Afghanistan, p. 27. 
86Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 30. Ala'Uddin Khan later claimed 
that there were only fifteen Communists in the entire division and 
thus discontent with the action was high, interview with Mark Urban, 
7 April 1986. 
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when it was ordered to fire on rebels .,,, 
87 Certainly 
problems in the ethnically Persian city had started well 
before March. For one eventual leader of the rebellion, 
the decisive factor was being compelled to bind the hands 
of anti-Communist detainees "behind their back, cover 
their eyes with plaster of Paris and push them into 
ditches" where bulldozers then buried them alive. 88 Like 
Mohammad Anwar the previous summer, who had pledged to 
start a rebellion in Kamdesh if he survived detention, 
this individual was specifically reacting to the PDPA's 
murderous practices in Herat. The fact that many PDPA 
atrocities were committed, or perceived to be committed, 
by eastern Ghilzai Pashtuns against Persian Heratis, as 
Giorgio Vercellin suggests, also likely exacerbated the 
sense of outrage. 89 An article in the journal Ettefaq-e- 
Islami zealously promoting the theory of evolution - "that 
man comes from monkey" - may have also triggered the 
87%% Afghan Rebels Said to Cut Links With Town of Herat, " New York 
Times, 22 March 1979. 
88Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of W<-tr, pp. 
205-206. Nur Ahmad claims to have participated in eight or nine 
mass executions over half a year in which hundreds of people were 
killed. On one round-up in the village of Mullah Sian, MobajIuT 
Omar Khan, Agah Salam Jan, and "fifteen to sixteen others" were 
arrested and then buried alive. 
89Giorgio Vercellin, Afghanistan 1973-1978: dalla republica 
presidenziale alla republica democratica (Venice: Universita degli 
Studi di Venezia, 1979), pp. 63-64, from Roy, Islam and Resistance 
in Afghanistan, p. 108. If such were the case, certainly it would 
be consistent with the underlying Kom-Gujar conflict that fueled 
the Kamdesh rebellion. Though Roy disputes this claim, earlier in 
his book he acknowledges that "a certain number of communities 
reacted to the new government on the basis of their ethnic and 
tribal loyalties: the Ghilzai were in favour of change because it 
meant that it was now their turn to be in power, " Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 99. The existence of a similar 
phenomenon in Herat seems quite possible. 
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ensuing uprising. 90 Roy suggests that the rebellion was 
"unplanned, but the link to Jamiat militants and the 
mawlawi who preached in the mosques the evening before has 
been established. "91 In other words, while Rabbani's 
communication with Herati clerics may have been 
significant, the execution of what became known as the 
Hoot 24 Rebellion was a spontaneous event. 92 
Hoot 24 Rebellion 
Before dawn on March 14,1979, three soldiers on guard 
duty at the Herat Hotel, where a number of Soviet advisors 
were staying, changed from their military uniforms into 
civilian clothes. The New York Times quoted Mujadidi as 
saying that "Government soldiers had stood aside while 
rebels killed civilian supporters of Prime Minster 
Taraki. " Having played minor roles in planning the 
rebellion, a number of the soldiers were acutely aware 
they could "be mistaken for Communists" that day, as one 
later recalled. 93 
About 07.00 hours, a young man, "one of a new class 
of Afghan professionals educated in the sciences at Kabul 
University, but attached to traditional customs, " joined a 
crowd approaching the police post near the Sepolak Gates 
90Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War, p. 
225. 
91Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 108. 
92 March 15. 
93 David Binder, "U. S. Aides Call Afghan Rebellion Challenge to Pr«, - 
Soviet Leadership, " New York Times, 23 March 1979. Sikorski, Dust 
of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War, p. 207. 
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to Herat. 94 He had been a mechanical engineer responsible 
for overseeing the maintenance of heavy equipment used in 
the construction of the Herat-Maimana Road. 95 
For several minutes, the soldiers assigned to the 
Sepolak Gates post fired over the engineer and others in 
the crowd as they approached their positions. Then, as 
the standoff continued, an armoured personal carrier 
opened fire and the mob surged forward. The vehicle was 
quickly encircled, and the engineer and others detached 
the heavy gun from the vehicle as soldiers began to 
surrender their rifles. A number of officers also sought 
quarter, but, having threatened the soldiers minutes 
earlier, were promptly executed. The crowd then moved to 
the Kandahar Gate, which was blocked by two tanks. 
Obscuring one of the tank's visors with mud, the crowd 
poured gasoline into the vehicle and then immolated the 
crew, as the second tank escaped through the southeastern 
entrance to the city. 96 
Around this time, a former shopkeeper who had sold 
second-hand clothes climbed over a wall behind a police 
station near the Malik Gate of the Old City where pro-PDPA 
forces were firing on the crowd. 97 The merchant, whose 
94Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War, p. 
226. 
951t is noteworthy that eight years after the uprising, the young man, 
Mohammad Khalid, described himself as a member of the "Muslim 
Brotherhood, " not the Jamiat, Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A 
Journey to Herat in Time of War, p. 225. 
96Ibid., p. 226. 
97 As the man described it, "When the communists took power, the 
business stopped because the clothes could not come from Pakistan 
any more. As the prices went up, fewer people could afford them. 
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business had failed after the revolution, stealthily 
approached from the rear, firing on two of the soldiers 
with his English flintlock rifle before fleeing. 98 His 
friend claimed to have shot five soldiers in the same 
attack. 
The Herat Hotel 
At 08.00 hours, as a crowd approached his post, the man 
who had earlier been forced to participate in the 
Communists' mass executions-by-suffocation entered the 
Herat hotel. He approached three unsuspecting Soviets in 
plain clothes and clumsily opened fire with his 
Kalashnikov. 99 They fled, returning fire with handguns and 
wounding the young Afghan. In the ensuing firefight, two 
of the Soviets were killed. Others fled to the hotel's 
roof, from where they fired down at the growing mob on. the 
street until they exhausted their ammunition. At that 
point, the crowd swarmed the building and upon reaching 
the roof, threw the foreigners off to their deaths. 
Eventually, the number of rioters swelled to the point 
that the building's top floor collapsed, crushing many to 
death as it fell. March 15,1979, in Herat was becoming a 
bloodbath. 
/ 
I became poor because I earned less, but food was more 
[expensive], " Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in 
Time of War, p. 213. 
98A "Haji" is the title given to one who has performed the "haj" or 
pilgrimage to Mecca. 
99AK-47 assault rifle, adopted by the Soviet Army in 1949. 
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By 15.00 hours, the mobs were "killing everyone who 
was not dressed in the traditional Muslim clothes. "100 One 
postal clerk only narrowly escaped the crowd's vengeance 
when a man in a traditional long black coat called out 
that he was a "good Muslim. "01 A heavy-set Russian 
mechanic was less lucky: he was shot and decapitated. The 
heavy equipment engineer who had helped disable the 
armoured vehicles at the Sepolak and Kandahar Gates, 
although a respected member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
unable to save two of his clean-cut young employees from 
Kabul. Seized by a mob, their pleas in the dialect of the 
capital city only hastened their demise. 102 As the sun 
went down, pro-Communist elements from the 17th Division 
cautiously reentered the city, securing strategic and 
politically valuable sites. 
That night, after recapturing the Grand Mosque, the 
PDPA announced over loudspeakers that "the uprising was 
the work of agents of China and America and that we, the 
noble people of Herat, should not listen to them. " 
103 The 
following day, the government's 17th Division artillery 
opened fire on civilian sections of the city as I1-28 
bombers104 from the 335 Air Regiment in Shindand bombed 
100Abdul Satar Ahmadi, quoted in Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A 
Journey to Herat in Time of War, p. 203. 
lolIbid., pp. 203-204. The man's name was Abdul Razik; he escaped 
after being stripped of his Western clothing. 
102 Mohammad Khalid recorded their names as Asadullah and Inyatullah. 
Ibid., p. 227. 
103 Ibid., p. 228. 
1o4Il-28 Beagle (Ilyushin) was the first jet bomber to enter service 
with the Soviet air force in 1950. It 
is a three-crew aircraft 
with two Klimov VK-lA power engine and 
has a range 1135 to 2400 km 
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wide areas of the citylos Confined to headquarters while 
only trusted Communists were allowed to respond to the 
attacks, Captain Ismail Khan and Lieutenant `Alauddin Khan 
waited. 106 
Rebellion of the 17th Division 
Senior officers within the 17th Division served as the 
liaison between religious leaders in the city and key 
field officers such as Ismail Khan and `Alauddin Khan. On 
Wednesday, March 13, city elders had also visited Ismail 
Khan and warned him of the rebellion the next day. 107 A 
MiG fighter making suspiciously low passes over the city 
that day appeared to confirm this warning. 
Biding their time on their base for the first day and 
a half of the fighting, Ismail Khan, `Alauddin Khan, and 
one Lieutenant Abdullah decided to plan their attack for 
Friday, March 15, at 13.00 hours. 108 The men were incensed 
by the indiscriminate shelling that had followed the 
initial day of violence and used this event to solidify 
their support in the ranks. Khan's forces attacked sixty 
Soviets and Communists in the mess hall from two 
with maximum speed 560 mph. 
http: //www. globalsecurity. org/wmd/world/ russia/il-28. htm 
105The Guardian, 31 March 1979, quoted in Urban, War in Afghanistan, 
p. 30. 
lo6Khan had been accused of being a rebellion sympathizer, Sikorski, 
Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War, p. 230. 
logIbid., p. 230. 
1081t is unclear whether the attack took place on Friday, March 15, 
as Roy states, or on Sunday, March 17, as Sikorski records it. 
The Islamic "'Sabith" having been March 15, it appears that 
Sikorski's transcript may have mistaken that day for the Western 
Sabbath on Sunday, Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 
108. 
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directions, but inadvertently left one entrance uncovered, 
allowing some men to escape. Failing to enlist the 
support of a nearby artillery battery, which had fired on 
the PDPA supporters with small arms, five of the Soviets 
then attempted to flee in a jeep. Their escape was halted 
by other pro-rebellion soldiers, who shot out the 
vehicle's tires. The men were brought before Captain 
Khan, who identified them as participants in the shelling. 
All were promptly executed, and by 15.00 hours, the base 
was under the control of the rebels. 109 
Later that afternoon, bombers descended on the 17th 
Division Headquarters. Khan suspected that the planes 
were operating out of the USSR. "° Opening fire with 37mm 
anti-aircraft guns, the rebel soldiers were powerless to 
stop the jets, although they shot down two helicopters 
that day. "' That night, Khan's men overcame the crews of 
several tanks, which returned from the city to attempt to 
retake the base. Over the next two days, other PDPA 
forces held their position at the Pashtunistan bridge, as 
most of the soldiers Khan had recruited from the 17th 
Division melted away, returning to their homes. 
On Wednesday, March 2,0, a convoy of tanks, with "a 
green banner on each turret, and [crews] dressed in Muslim 
civilian clothes" entered the city. Khan and other 
109 Ibid. , p. 231. 110Kakar identifies the bombers as having been "based at Doshanbe in 
Russian Tajikistan, " Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the 
Afghan Response, 1979-1982, p. 34. 
"1Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War, 
p. 232. 
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Heratis were momentarily duped by the Islamic symbols and 
slogans echoing from the convoy over loudspeakers; they 
thought the men were defectors from Kandahar. Only after 
the convoy had been allowed to pass though the southeast 
gate of the city did they realize it was composed of PDPA 
troops commanded by Major General Sayyed Mukarram. 112 
Mukarram's forces, with air support, quickly regained 
Communist control over the city. As Urban writes, "events 
of Herat shook the government. f113 Once control was 
reestablished, the PDPA seemed determined to make an 
example of the city. 
Similar anxiety was occurring in Moscow, where the 
Politburo was soon meeting to discuss military aid 
requests from Comrade Taraki. Soviet deaths in the 
rebellion were likely around fifty, while the Guardian, in 
an article on March 31,1979, estimated that five thousand 
individuals on both sides had been killed in the attack. 114 
As Ismail Khan headed into the mountains with the last 
sixty members of the 17th Division, he recalled that 
"gunfire in the city was continuing and I could hear 
distant screams. "lls The city was enveloped in thick 
clouds of dust from explosions and fires. 
112 Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 30; Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan 
and the Soviet Union (North Carolina: Duke Press Policy Studies, 
1983), pp. 100-101. 
113 Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 30. 
114 Quoted in Ibid., p. 30. 
115 Eight years later, six of those men were still active members of 
his militia. Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to HerAt in 
Time of War, p. 233. 
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Rabbani now had an incipient, if only nominally- 
aligned, force in the west. Once word of the Herat fighting 
spread over Persian radio services, neither he nor Massoud 
could have failed to recognize that the Herat uprising had 
overnight eclipsed the eastern front where the war had 
begun. For the Nuristanis and their new allies, the Safi, 
pride dictated that they attempt to support the rising wave 
of rebellion. 
The Kerala Massacre 
For the Kunar Front, after the seizure of Chapa Dara, 
Utapur, and Ningalam, the next obvious target was the 
provincial capital of Chagha Serai. As Edwards notes, the 
string of victories over the previous two months provided 
the front for the first time with "the weapons and 
ammunition to mount such a campaign. "116 Although the 
Nuristani front was becoming irreparably fractured, with 
Massoud serving as "mediator between Anwar and Mawlawi 
Abdullah, i117 a plan was hatched for the assault on Chagha 
Serai. 
On the night of April 18,1979, a force of fifty-two 
rebels approached Kunar's provincial capital through the 
village of Kerala. Whether or not this group knew that a 
second rebel team that was supposed to launch a 
simultaneous assault had failed to enter the town from 
116Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 145. 
117Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 11 June 1994, p. 10. 
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another approach is unclear. In the melee that followed, 
the fighters in Kerala became enveloped by a government- 
mechanized column. The rebels resisted until mid-day on 
April 19 when, despite assistance from the inhabitants of 
the village, they ran out of ammunition. In the most 
costly rebel engagement of the war in Kunar to date, only 
three members of the original assault party managed to 
escape. 
118 
The next day, April 20, the PDPA forces returned to 
Kerala, allegedly with Soviet advisors. After separating 
the women and children and herding them into a mosque, the 
Communists "gathered all the adult men and teenage boys in 
a field, where they were to participate in a `j irga . "'119 
Instead, however, after correctly charging that some of 
them had collaborated with the rebels, the Communists 
executed hundreds of men of the town of Kerala, as the 
women looked on. 120 As Edwards writes: 
This event forever changed the terms of the 
engagement. The government, under the supervision of 
its Soviet advisors, decided that the only way to 
deal with an uprising of the sort they faced in Kunar 
was to terrorize the civilian population [much as 
they had in Herat the previous month] into 
withholding support from the insurgency. For their 
part the rebels were shocked by what happened at 
Kerala, especially the fact that the government had 
targeted non-combatants. -According to tribal custom, 
fighting should be carried out between armed men 
118Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 145. 
119Ibid., p. 145. 
12oAccording to Urban, On 20 April 1979, the village of Kerali in 
the Kunar valley was razed, and over 1,000 of its inhabitants 
killed, " War in Afghanistan, p. 33. Also see Edward R. Girardet, 
Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 
pp. 107-110. Edwards says an estimated seventeen hundred L), -)ys 
and men were massacred, " Before Taliban, p. 
145. 
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willing to court the risks of combat, while civilians 
are kept out of the line of fire. To target unarmed 
men was antithetical to the code of conduct expected 
of men who value [traditional Afghan] honor. 121 
Shocked by these atrocities, Wakil travelled to Bajuar on 
the Pakistani side of the border and lobbied the Mahmund 
and Salarzai tribes to attack Chagha Serai from the east. 
With Safi forces positioned to the west and Anwar's forces 
to the north, Wakil attempted to persuade the Nawab of 
Khar - whom Edwards describes as "the paramount political 
figure in the area" - that a three-pronged attack was 
necessary to dislodge the Communist forces from the 
province. 122 The Nawab, though sympathetic, offered only 
four artillery pieces . 
123 For two months, Waikil's jirga, l 
remaining at Bajuar, watched as the nationalist Kunar 
front, which had existed for less than six months, 
steadily declined and Gulbuddin's radical forces began 
penetrating the area. 
The political divisions among the various Kunar 
fronts, though instructive, appeared too great to 
overcome. At some point, perhaps immediately after the 
Kerala massacre, Massoud decided to return to Pakistan and 
121Edwards, Before Taliban, pp. 145-146. 122 Ibid., p. 147. Also see Richard F. Strand, "The Evolution of 
Anti-Communist Resistance in Eastern Nuristan, " in M. Nazif 
Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (eds. ), Revolution and Rebellions 
in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984), cited in Edwards, Before Taliban, p. 
146, note 8. 
123 Perhaps encouraged by Anwar's trip to Pakistan the previous fall, 
and assuming that his Pashtun credentials might enable him to win 
over the tribal leader, Wakil recalled replying with disdain, "If 
you need artillery pieces, I'll give you the ones we have taken 
from the Russians. " Bajuar was within "the political jurisdiction 
of Pakistan, " Edwards recounts, adding, "in retrospect, Wakil 
appears to have been naive in expecting to receive assistance from 
beyond the border, " Before Taliban, pp. 146-147. 
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begin planning his long-expected return to the Panjsher 
Valley. 124 In addition to his frustration with the Kunar 
groups, he was undoubtedly also influenced by the great 
success of the Herat uprising and his natural propensity 
not to get caught behind events. 
Massoud had achieved much of what he had set out to 
accomplish in Nuristan, having witnessed both the 
political and military realities of a guerrilla war. In 
addition to registering members for Jamiat (a task he 
later recalled as being of dubious value), Massoud was 
able to combine his years of study, and prior brief 
exposure to combat in the 1975 rebellion, with a practical 
framework from which to advance his political-military 
aspirations. He had also surveyed a route by which a 
supply road might be extended from Nuristan to the 
Panj sher . 
125 
Of the broad cross-section of people he encountered 
in his role as Rabbani's envoy, undoubtedly he learned the 
most from 'Alaqadar Mohammad Anwar Amin, under whose 
command he loosely served during much of his time in 
Kunar. The veteran of the Gujar Wars identified with the 
young Panjsheri, whose intellect and energy were similar 
to his own. Anwar could overlook Massoud's slight 
pretensions, such as his omnipresent white steed, as he 
124 "In Taraki's time at beginning of Jihad, Massoud went to Nuristan. 
He was some time with them, he worked with them, he took part 
there, and then came back to Pakistan, " Ayoub interview, 12 
December 2004, p. 27. 
125Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 11 June 1994, pp. 8-9. 
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coached him in Nuristani-style guerrilla tactics. The 
former sub-district administrator and clan chief was also 
acutely aware of the challenges warfare posed to civilian 
populations, and spoke openly about such issues. 
For Massoud, whose astute management of civil affairs 
would later become a hallmark of his success as a military 
commander, this was a formative period. Anwar seems to 
have opened his protege's eyes for the first time to a 
military commander's responsibilities for housing, 
nutrition and public health. 126 It was also when Massoud 
took to wearing his trademark Chitrali cap, an all-season 
garment traditionally worn by the Nuristani. Reminiscent 
of Guevara's beret, the rolled-woolen cover, which became 
iconic during the war against the Soviets, was enduring 
evidence of Massoud's time in Kamdesh. Finally, Anwar's 
atheism, well known throughout Nuristan and clearly to 
blame for many of his later political failings, reinforced 
for the young militant the tremendous power of political 
Islam. 127 
Massoud would soon have the chance to apply the 
lessons he learned in Nuristan, and those gained from 
126Anwar stressed the importance of civil administration for the 
success of the 1978-79 rebellion he led. Although he lacked 
Massoud's Kabul contacts or level of technical education, both men 
shared a similar and practical sense of nationalism. Anwar 
interview February-March 1992. 
'27 Roy states that "Already [by early 1979) there were signs of the 
tension which was to develop between the traditional tribal 
chiefs, such as Amin Anwar, a Khan of the Kom, and the 
fundamentalist mullahs like Mullah Rustam (Kom) and Mullah Afzal 
(Kati), " Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 100. Although 
Roy makes no specific mention of Anwar's atheism, it was 
acknowledged by Anwar in an interview with Richard Strand and this 
author in February 1992. Strand has said it was "a well-known 
fact" in Kamdesh. 
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Maulana Faizani, Niazi and Abdur Rahman and others in 
Kabul, as he began planning what he hoped would be a 
successful return to the Panjsher Valley. 
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Chapter 4, The Militants Return, May 18 - June 10,1979. 
Out of Pakistan 
On May 18,1979, about an hour and a half after leaving 
Peshawar, a bus carrying Massoud and twenty-four other 
militants pulled up to the gates of the Mohmand Agency-' 
Like the other six tribal agencies along the Afghan 
border, the Mohmand Tribe in 1979 enjoyed virtual 
sovereignty over its territory, although it lay within 
Pakistan. 2 Once the militants crossed into the tribal 
area, they did not expect to have much trouble reaching 
the border; until they got through the gates of the arid, 
sparsely-populated region, however, everything remained 
uncertain. 3 That morning, Fred Halliday, a foreign affairs 
analyst in London, had written in an op-ed piece in the 
New York Times: "The highland snows are melting in 
Afghanistan and the dissident tribesmen now face the 
choice of returning to their homes for spring planting or 
using the greater mobility of the warmer months to step up 
1 Hafiz Mansur records the militants' departure from Peshawar as 
having occurred on May 18,1979. He says the two groups "returned 
back from Peshawar on Saur 27,1358, " Mansur, Diary of Jihad 
(Kabul: Jamiat Islami Political Office, 1991), p. 3. Es-Haq 
generally concurs, saying that preparations, which took about ten 
weeks, began in "the month of March or April, " Es-Haq interview 14 
April 1995, p. 8. 
2 See Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, on origins of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Agencies. 
3 Two years later the 2,296-square-kilometre agency's population was 
recorded to be 163,933 or about 71 persons per square kilometre. 
See 1981 census report of Federally Administered Tribal Areas by 
Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, Islamabad, 
published August 1984, pp. 11-12. 
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harassment of Government forces . i4 For Massoud, it appears 
to have been an easy choice. 
Wary of interference by Pakistani authorities, 
Massoud had insisted that only Rabbani and four other 
senior Jamiat members be told of their departure from 
Peshawar. 5 Ever since the kidnapping and presumed murder 
of Jan Mohammad during the last days of the Bhutto regime, 6 
Massoud and the militants had felt unsafe in Pakistan; if 
word of their plan to start a rebellion in the Tajik 
Panjsher Valley, a principal stronghold of Afghanistan's 
Persian-nationalistic tradition, leaked out, Hekmatyar and 
the ISI would certainly have tried to stop them. The 
militants were also on a tight budget and for that reason 
- as well as to protect the secrecy of the mission - they 
took only a minimal amount of arms. Tarjuman Abdul Haq, 
one of the rising figures in the movement with good 
connections in Peshawar, had procured a few weapons in the 
bazaar, including two Kalashnikov AK-47s. The militants 
also obtained six Pakistani pistols, five Stigen machine 
guns, one Shildouz machine gun, fifty grenades, thirteen 
other assorted firearms, and ammunition. 7 Rabbani had 
4 Fred Halliday, "Tough Choices for Afghanistan's Regime and Its 
Opponents, " New York Times, 18 May 1979. 
S Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, pp. 1-2; Haroun Mir interview, 8 
October 2004. 
6 According to Massoud, Jan Mohammad was probably killed after Zia 
ul-Haq replaced Bhutto, Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, 
p. 8. 
Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 4. Also, Massoud recalls that the group 
had one or two Stigen guns. Es-Haq mentions that the group 
"borrowed some guns from Haji Zaman from Darahi Adam Khiel. " "'He 
was Pakistani and a very nice man, " Es-Haq interview, 14 April 1995, 
p. 8. 
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given the men one hundred thousand Afghanis (equivalent to 
about U. S. 3,000), possibly received during his visit to 
Saudi Arabia, "for travel and war expenditures . /, 
8 For a 
group that hoped to overthrow a superpower-backed 
government, it was a modest beginning. 
Since it was likely the bus would be stopped at 
police check-posts, including at the entrance to the 
Mohmand Agency, transport of the weapons was entrusted to 
Pashtun smugglers whom the militants arranged to meet 
outside the small border town of Bajawar. 9 A few Pakistani 
Pashtuns travelling in a truck would attract less 
attention in the North-West Frontier Province than a 
busload of Persian-speaking Afghans. The militants 
planned to embark from Bajawar on their overland journey 
through Nuristan. 
Once through the gates of the Mohmand Agency, the 
remaining one hundred kilometres north to Bajawar must 
have taken the militants nearly two hours. There were no 
more check-posts and they arrived around 09.00 hours. 
Pulling up to the pre-arranged rendezvous point, just 
outside of Bajawar, Massoud and the others were relieved 
to see the smugglers waiting on the side of the road. 
After collecting their weapons and paying the men, 
the militants stuffed their heavy load into backpacks and 
strode off toward the Afghan border several hundred metres 
8 Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 10. 
9 Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 1. 
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beyond. Once inside Afghanistan, they stopped to eat the 
breakfast they carried with them before offering thanks 
for the meal and their safe return home. 
The Amirate of Parwan and Kapisa 
On arriving, Massoud could not have but felt a sense of 
pride: after four years of living with the burden of the 
failed 1975 rebellion, he was finally on the march again. 
Before leaving the Jamiat headquarters in Pakistan, 
Massoud recalled, "Elections were held to choose the 
responsible authourities for each province. As a result I 
was elected the responsible authourity for Parwan and 
Kapisa. "lo 
He had been a key leader of the nationalists since 
Niazi's death in 1970, and with his charisma and sense of 
history, Massoud was probably chosen without consideration 
of other candidates. The election, however, formalized 
his capacity to select (or approve the selection of) the 
men who accompanied him on the mission to the Panjsher. 
In exchange, the men pledged to recognize him as "Amir, " 
or leader. " The great majority of them came from Parwan 
Province and all were Jamiat members, and while 
recognizing Rabbani as their spiritual leader, they knew 
that by joining the expedition they were subordinating 
themselves directly to the front. The group enjoyed an 
loAhmad Shah Massoud interview 6 June 1994, p. 10; Agha Gul interview 
19 June 1994. 
11Es-Haq interview 14 April 1995, p. 8. 
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uncomplicated, rather informal organizational structure, 
but although no nominal ranks were issued other than that 
of Amir, there was a clear chain of command involving 
seven principal figures. 
Massoud's first deputy was Mohammad Ghaus, who was 
also his kinsman and brother-in-law. A MiG-23 pilot who 
had been trained in the USSR in the late 1960s, Ghaus had 
been arrested in the 1974 plot to overthrow Daoud and the 
communists. Unlike the rest of the 300 officers arrested 
with him, who had gone before PDPA firing squads, Ghaus, 
along with Agha Gul and three other detainees, were 
released in mid-1976.12 Through this experience Ghaus came 
to fill a unique moral position within the organization 
while enjoying an informal but elder-sibling-type 
relationship with the less detail-oriented Massoud, who 
looked up to the professional military officer. 
Massoud's second principal deputy was his long-time 
roommate and confidant Kifayetullah Mustafa, who had 
studied chemical engineering at Kabul University. Mustafa 
had co-founded the exiled nationalist faction with Jan 
Mohammad and Massoud, and in the group's elections he was 
chosen to be the "head of the Panjsher District ,,., 13 
Mustafa, who could read English, had studied explosives 
and various weapons systems and was considered the group's 
12Agha Gul interview, 15 June 1994, p. 3. Agha Gul noted that they 
had been "freed separately, " though apparently as the result of a 
single deal, probably involving personal connections and cash. 
13Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 4. 
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chief tactician. "More of an ideologue than Ghaus, " 
according to Agha Gul, the athletic Mustafa wrote 
humourous poetry in his spare time. '4 
Beneath Ghaus and Mustafa in the chain of command 
came Massoud's slightly younger brother, Ahmad Zia, who 
was just out of high school and served as the Amir's 
secretary. Zia had spent several years with Massoud in 
exile and, although reserved and far less politically 
inclined then his brother, possessed a similar poise and 
quickly gained the respect of the other militants. '5 
Tarjuman Abdul Haq, who had joined the nationalists 
in Peshawar, hailed from the Balai town of Dasht-i-Rewat 
and had spent a couple of months with Massoud in Nuristan 
that winter. He was well-acquainted with the territory 
between Bajawar and the village of Linar where the 
militants would enter the Panjsher Valley, and would serve 
as the group's guide on the trek. According to Mansur, 
Abdul Haq was "responsible for relations with [upper] 
Panjsher, "16 and thus also played a key political role in 
the mission. 
Zabet Agha Gul, a tall, courtly, German-trained 
former Kabul gendarme officer who had shared a jail cell 
with Mohammad Ghaus in Demazang Prison following the 1974 
plot, served as the group's quartermaster. Karimallah 
14Agha Gul interview, 15 June 1994, p. 3; Es-Haq interview, 14 April 
1995, pp. 2,8. 
15In 2004, three years after Massoud's death, Zia became Hamid 
Karzai's vice president. 
16 Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 4. 
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Khan, also a senior Jamiat member, led the group that 
would split off in Linar and head for Tagab in Kapisa 
Province, and thus was recognized as "Deputy Commander" of 
Parwan and Kapisa. Finally, Mawlawi Abdul Latif, the 
amiable chief mullah of Bazarak, served as the group's 
chaplain and "head of propaganda. , /17 The men appear to 
have become well-acquainted in Pakistan and, sharing many 
personal and political bonds as well as a strong belief in 
their mission, bonded quickly as their journey back to 
Afghanistan became more difficult. 
Trek through Nuristan 
Tarjuman Abdul Haq had chosen a route that would take them 
from Bajawar through eastern Nuristan over the Kunnival 
Pass and down into the village of Linar on the edge of the 
Panjsher. Kunar Province was still under the control of 
the nationalist Samiullah Safi's Kunar Shuna; although his 
organization would be displaced by Hezb-i-Islami two 
months hence, at the time there seemed to be little 
probability of the Jamiat group being intercepted. 
Despite the low risk, they posted sentries each night 
outside their encampments, generally in various village 
mosques. Additionally, the Associated Press reported on 
May 3 that U. S. intelligence sources believed that "the 
Soviet Union had supplied 12 rocket-armed helicopter 
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
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gunships to Afghanistan and that Soviet pilots might be 
flying them, " so there was some danger of attack from the 
air. 18 
The Nuristanis, as expected, received the party with 
hospitality, and the militants apparently made no secret 
of their plans. The villagers had little, if any, contact 
with the government, and with the success of their own 
local Nuristani rebellion near its peak and news still 
trickling in of the massive Herat uprising, it was logical 
to them that the Panjsheris would be launching their own 
rebellion. 
In one village, the chief, who had become acquainted 
with Massoud and Abdul Haq the previous winter, presented 
the group with a gift of two captured rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers and seven shells. 19 In other villages, 
feasts were held to fortify the travellers before the most 
difficult part of their journey over the Kunnival Pass. 
About five days later, and eighteen days after 
leaving Peshawar, Tarjuman Abdul Haq guided the twenty- 
four exhausted, sunburned, and bruised men into the small 
village of Linar on the southeast edge of the Panjsher 
Valley. The militants' plan was to make their base in 
this border settlement until the ground was prepared for 
their return to the Panjsher. 20 One of Massoud's first 
18Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 2. "Afghans Said to Obtain 
Soviet Copter Gunships, " New York Times, 4 May 1979. 
9 120 Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 4; Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 10. 
2Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 11. 
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acts was to dispatch a messenger to Safid Chihr, the 
largest town in the upper Panjsher, to inform a man named 
Pahlawan Ahmad Jan that the party had arrived. 
Pahlawan, or "wrestler, " Ahmad Jan had competed in 
the 1968 and 1972 Olympic Games and was without doubt the 
most famous living Panjsheri. Like Massoud, the son of a 
military officer, he had transferred from the Military 
High School after his first year to the Physical Training 
High School to overcome a frail condition . 
21 Like other 
figures who have gone through major transformations, Ahmad 
Jan appears to have possessed a strong will. His 
wrestling career flourished and with it came significant 
political stature. 22 Following the communist takeover, 
Ahmad Jan, supported by another well-known wrestler, Agha 
Shrin, and his brother Waissuddin, organized an anti- 
communist cell of seventy to eighty men in Kabul. 23 
Whether or not this group had links to Faizani's 
former organization, Ahmad Jan appears to have been more 
nationally-oriented than Islamically-minded. When two 
prominent Panjsheri communists warned Ahmad Jan in early 
1979 that the government might arrest him, the Olympian- 
turned-anti-communist-organizer fled the capital for the 
Panj sher . 
24 
21Biography of Pahlawan Ahmad Jan provided by his father, Mohammad 
Sediq. Mohammad Sediq interview, 22 February 1995, p. 1. 
22 Anwar Jegdaleq interview, 20 February 1995, p. 5. 
23 Mohammad Sediq interview, 28 February 1995, p. 2. 
24Mia Gul interview, 20 February 1995, p. 4; Anwar Jegdalek interview, 
20 February 1995, p. 6; Mohammad Sediq interview, 22 February 1995, 
p. 2. 
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Massoud had first contacted Ahmad Jan the previous 
winter through a man in Kabul named Arif. Though little 
is known about this individual, who went by the code-name 
Ahmad Khan and was a relative of Massoud's, it is possible 
that he was connected to Hezb-i-Tauhid and the late 
mystic, Mawlawi Faizani. It is known that he possessed a 
wide network, particularly in the military in Kabul, but 
also among athletes, and may have been heading elements of 
Faizani's organization at the time. "It was through 
[Arif] that we were in touch with Ahmad Jan and to some 
extent with the Panjsher, " Massoud later acknowledged. 25 
Communication with Arif most likely began shortly 
after the communist takeover in April 1978. Through those 
discussions, in which Ghaus seems to have played a central 
role, the militants gained confidence that they could win 
acceptance in the Panjsher if they were able to form a 
partnership with Ahmad Jan. 26 There were several reasons 
for this belief. First, given his fame, Ahmad Jan was 
naturally a more effective public face for 'a developing 
popular movement than Massoud, who, though from a leading 
family, remained largely unknown at the time. Second, 
Ahmad Jan had remained in the country and, through Arif 
and perhaps others, had good contacts inside the military. 
The third, and most pressing, issue was tied to local 
25Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 11. Arif was the 
leader of the "Chandawal uprising" and appears to have died in that 
event. 
26Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 10; Agha Gul 
interview, 6 June 1994, p. 2. 
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Politics. The militants knew that they would have to 
overcome a longstanding cultural divide in the Panjsher 
Valley. Here the inclusive politics of Faizani, which had 
brought Ahmad Jan and Arif together, may have been a key 
factor in securing the former's support for the second 
Panjsher uprising, much as it had been in the founding of 
the Islamic movement in 1970. 
The Bala Strategy 
Historically, the Panjsher Valley has been divided at the 
town of Sha'bah into two culturally and economically 
autonomous regions, one in the northeast and the other in 
the southwest. Over the years the two areas - known as 
the Bala and the Pa'een, or, literally-translated, the 
"up" and the "down" - developed subtly distinct cultures, 
as differences ranging from diet to politics emerged 
between them. The discovery in the mid-1970s of emeralds 
in the Bala widened the divide, as new mining income 
augmented that more open and fertile region's already 
superior agricultural output. Massoud, Jagran Ghaus, 
Kifayetullah Mustafa and Mawlawi Latif were all from the 
Pa'een. Among the core group of formerly exiled 
militants, only Tarjuman Abdul Haq was from the Bala, 
having grown up in the town of Dasht-i-Rewat above Safid 
Chihr . 
27 
27Agha Gul was from Jabal as-Siraj, the town immediately below the 
southern entrance of the Panjsher. 
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To unite the entire valley behind their group, it was 
clear that the militants would need the support of a 
number of prominent Balais. Ahmad Jan had returned to 
Safid Chihr earlier that year. In an area that for 
centuries had lionized great wrestlers, and is said by 
locals to have been first settled by the son of a famous 
wrestler, the 33-year-old former Olympian would be an 
ideal front man for the new movement. 
Massoud would later describe the unsuccessful 1975 
rebellion, in the Pa'een town of Rukha, as having been 
"the most difficult period of my life. The people were 
against me, my family was against me, the government was 
searching for us; we were near starvation. " 28 Following 
this experience, it was a natural decision for the 
militants to initiate their 1979 effort in the Bala rather 
than in the Pa'een. Although now, unlike four years 
earlier, segments of the Pa'een were ripe for rebellion, 
Massoud and the others knew that they would need to move 
cautiously in the lower valley where a large number of 
people, particularly in Rukha and Bazarak, supported the 
new government. The reason for this was simple: in part 
because of the lower region's infertile lands and its 
historic ties to the capital, a large percentage of the 
Pa'een's population worked in Kabul as soldiers, 
28Massoud made this comment in 1997 as the Taliban besieged Shamali, 
although four years earlier in an interview with the author he had 
cited late 1979 as his most challenging period. Haroun Mir 
interview, 21 August 2004. 
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bureaucrats, shopkeepers and servants; individuals whose 
livelihoods were linked to the government were naturally 
more reluctant to oppose it. 29 
Conversely, in the Bala most men worked as farmers, 
herdsmen or miners, and thus remained apart from Kabul 
politics. Much of the upper valley at this time was 
accessible only by horse, so government officials rarely 
ventured off the main road and almost never travelled up 
the valley beyond the town of Dasht-i-Rewat, where the 
rough dirt road ended. From there, the Panjsher contiiued 
approximately twenty-five kilometres northeast to the 
Anjuman Pass, which leads into Badakhshan Province. 30 
"Massoud and the others knew that isolation from the 
national government enabled people in the upper Bala to 
look at political questions in black and white, " a former 
political advisor to the guerrilla leader commented. 31 
This, along with the Balais' Islamic puritanism and links 
to neighbouring Nuristan, the militants believed, would 
incline the population to support a military campaign, 
particularly if it was presented in a traditional, 
Persian-centric political context. 32 If Ahmad Jan and 
highlanders offered their support, the militants knew it 
was probable that they would see the campaign through with 
29 Additionally, their tough upland culture made them some of the most 
reliable individuals in the country. See Elphinstone's second 
description of the Tajiks, note 1 in the introduction. 
30 The Anjuman Pass has generally been considered the end of the 
valley, though the last villages of Paryan are some five kilometres 
before it. 
31Haroun Mir interview, 16 September 2004. 
32Es-Haq interview, 16 September 1994, p. 1. 
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the same determination with which they pursued most 
endeavours. 
Uniting the Khans 
During his first night in Linar, Massoud met Ahmad Jan, 
who persuaded him to abandon the plan to remain in Linar, 
and to enter secretly the valley while leaving the rest of 
the party at the camp. 33 Massoud, eager to make contact 
with as many khans and elders in the Bala as he could, was 
willing to go. They planned to establish a base at the 
house of Ahmad Jan's paternal cousin in Mukuni. 34 During 
Massoud's absence, Ghaus would oversee gunnery practice 
and military drills in Linar to keep the men focused on 
the coming challenge. 35 
The next morning, about three hours after Massoud and 
his group set off from Linar, the first mud houses of the 
upper Panjsher came into view. It was a moment Massoud 
had spent four years in exile waiting for. 36 Not wanting 
to attract attention, the group went directly to Mukuni 
where they assembled a group of local activists who 
happily offered Massoud their support, agreeing to make 
another house in the village available to the militants as 
a shelter and base. But not all who met the young rebel 
were as enthusiastic about the prospects of a Nuristani- 
33Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 2. 
34 Mohammad Sediq interview, 28 February 1995, p. 5. 
35 Ibid., pp. 3,5; Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 2. 
36 Though he had made several clandestine trips to Kabul, there is no 
record indicating that he had been back to Panjsher since 1975. 
175 
style rebellion. Even one of the front's strongest 
supporters was frank about the commander's immaturity. 
"Usually people in Panjsher don't gather around a young 
man who is still called a "bacha, "' commented Mohammad 
Pannar, using the Persian word for boy. 37 
To overcome anxiety about his youth and inexperience, 
Massoud embarked on a letter-writing campaign. The tactic 
was intended both to begin laying the basis for a valley- 
wide movement and to convince his inner circle of new 
supporters in the Bala that he had the necessary 
leadership qualities. His missives, as he later described 
them, were both reverent and assertive. 
I asked the people from each village about the number 
of clans living in their respective villages, who their 
khans and famous clergymen were. I asked about their 
local problems. Afterwards I wrote letters to these 
people telling them that they were representatives of 
mine, and I asked them to tell me how many armed men 
they had and particularly to tell me the number of 
their unarmed men. This was very important work. I 
wrote letters, signed and stamped them, and got them 
distributed from the beginning to the end of Panjsher. 
Almost everyone was opposed to the government. Now the 
question was how to bring them together. 38 
Messengers were secretly dispatched to carry these appeals 
to men believed to be sympathetic to the cause. They were 
often invited to clandestine night-time meetings. As a 
result of these efforts the youth of the Bala, who 
traditionally participated in local skirmishes, became, in 
37Pannar interview, January 1995, p. 6. 
38Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, June 1994, pp. 11-12. 
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the words of one, "very enthusiastic for the fight against 
the communists . f/39 
Massoud soon saw for himself - as he had been told by 
others - how dramatically the political situation had 
changed since his perilous escape from the valley four 
years earlier. While in 1975 President Daoud may have 
been unpopular in the Panjsher for nationalizing the local 
emerald mines and forging close ties with the USSR, he had 
posed little direct threat to the Balais and therefore had 
been tolerated. In contrast, by June 1979 the Communist 
regime was viewed with far greater disdain. The 
government's radical political activities in places such 
as Kunar and Herat, combined with the successful rebellion 
in neighbouring Nuristan, convinced many in the Bala that 
they would eventually have to fight. In particular, the 
killing of several clerics in Bazarak had a profound 
effect on people's feelings about the regime. 4° At the 
time of Massoud's arrival, two other resistance 
factions - Harikat-Islami and Hezb-i-Islami - were already 
operating in the Panjsher, though neither had gained 
significant support. 41 The valley was a hotbed of 
discontent in search of capable leadership. 
39Pannar interview, 10 October 1994, p. 2. 
90Sa'duddin Khan interview, June 1994. 
41Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 11. Also, Es-Haq 
points out that ""Gulbuddin had sent men trying to contact 
influential people, " although these efforts, by a Pashtun whose 
anti-nationalist views were already known, appear to have garnered 
little support in the nationalist-oriented Panjsher Valley, Es-Haq 
interview, 14 April 1994, p. 9. 
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Putting the Theory of Revolution into Practice 
Revolutions are often driven more by fear of oppression 
than by actual exposure to it, for once the cycle of 
totalitarian violence begins, it is extremely difficult to 
break. Successful anti-totalitarian resistance fighters 
must therefore seize the moment when fears are 
sufficiently heightened to sustain popular action, but 
governmental controls are not strong enough to block them. 
Having studied a number of wars, Massoud knew that timing 
was critical: in 1975 it had been too early to engender 
mass support; by late 1979 it might be too late. Hezb 
might start a drive to displace the traditional leadership 
(as it would in Nuristan in July 1979 and in the 
neighbouring Andareb Valley in early 1981), or the state 
might increase political control in the area to prevent 
such an action and co-opt the traditional leadership (as 
it vainly attempted to do in April 1980). 
Massoud returned to the Panjsher at a time when only 
about twenty government troops were stationed in the Bala. 
An increase of only one hundred and eighty soldiers, or 
two infantry companies, would expand the militants' 
challenge by a significant order of magnitude. "While 
there still had been no arrests, and certainly no killings 
by the Khalquis in the Bala, we knew from the stories 
coming out of Kabul that it was only a matter of time 
before we started having our own problems, " as one local 
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leader later remembered the deteriorating situation. 42 The 
militants based their plan on forming an alliance with the 
khans at the moment when that group's discontent with the 
government was swelling, but before either the communists 
or Hezb could undermine the khans' traditional authourity. 
Within two weeks of Massoud's return to Panjsher, 
three of the most respected Bala clans - the Bakaw Khail, 
represented by Haji Zahir, nephew of the Malik43 of Safid 
Chihr, and the Malik's brother, Gulestan Khan, both 
kinsmen of Pahlawan Ahmad Jan's; the Abdullah Khail, also 
represented by Ahmad Jan and also a Safid Chihri clan; and 
the Dahane Rewati clan, headed by Haji Abdul Matin - had 
offered their full support, while perhaps a dozen other 
Balai traditional leaders made lesser commitments in 
response to the secret invitations44. Though probably many 
of the local leaders intended to take a "wait and see" 
attitude, as long as the valley remained under the 
government's control, the militants were not yet ready for 
active supporters. Once the rebellion commenced, Massoud 
hoped that the vague pledges from the other Balai groups 
would turn into more substantial popular support. 
Within one week of gaining the khans' support and 
confident that he could count on key people in Dasht-i- 
Rewat, Massoud summoned Jagran Ghaus and the rest of the 
men who were still in Linar to join him. The twenty-odd 
42M. Arab interview, June 1994, p. 1. 
43 An appointed governmental post, essentiallythat of "mayor. " 
44 Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 8. 
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rebels arrived within a few days and they were treated by 
the population of Dahane Rewat to a sumptuous feast at the 
home of Haji Matin. It would be remembered years later as 
a turning point in the development of the rebellion. 
Somehow, with all their ambition and exuberance, the young 
militants, primarily Kabul-educated and from the Pa'een 
and Shamali, won the respect of the tough old highlanders. 
Although opposites in many regards, the two groups held 
common beliefs about religion and freedom, and seem to 
have united that evening in a campaign against the Taraki 
regime. 
Winning the support of the prominent headmen of the 
Bala removed some of the pressure from Massoud and his 
group. However, security remained a major concern. The 
government had a post seven kilometres down the road from 
Mukuni in Zenay, and it was known that officials there 
were "seriously investigating" reports about the 
militants' activities and conducting sweeps of the local 
mountains. 45 If details of the rebels' location and plans 
leaked out, an attempt would certainly be made to arrest 
them. Such an action, even if the militants fled, would 
likely upset the fragile political balance that was 
rapidly turning in their favour. The militants were 
counting on residents from the Bala to fight the 
rebellion. As Massoud recalled, "The groups that were 
45 Mohammad Sediq interview, 22 February 1995, p. 3. 
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fighting with us were the local groups that were mobilized 
by us. Among the people who had come from [Pakistan], 
only three persons, including me, Mustafa, and Agha Sharin 
from Jabal as-Siraj, were engaged in fighting. " For this 
reason the task of identifying prospective combatants and 
bringing them into the militants' ranks was central to the 
plan of the rebellion . 
46 
To reduce the risk of detection and to facilitate the 
integration of new recruits, Massoud divided the group: 
half the men remained in Dahane Rewat, while the other 
half joined him at the base he had established in Mukuni 
about five kilometres down the valley, above Safid Chihr. 
In both locations, the young militants quietly worked to 
"organize and form groups, and carry out training, " while 
laying low to avoid notice by government officials . 
47 
Shortly before this bifurcation, Jagran Ghaus had set out 
for Kabul to establish contact with Arif and other 
sympathizers in the military and to assess the situation 
in the capital. All the while, Massoud and Mustafa 
shuttled back and forth between the two camps to begin the 
initiation of several exceptional Balai leaders into their 
organization. 
Although rumours may have trickled through the valley 
about the militants' presence, some even alleging that 
they were Chinese, the rebels' identities and especially 
46Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 13. 
47 Aziz interview, 7 October 1994, p. 9. 
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the locations of their safe houses remained a tightly 
guarded secret, even from some of the most trusted chiefs 
they had contacted. Despite these precautions, a couple 
of weeks after their arrival the militants received a 
disturbing report: the government had become convinced of 
their presence in the Bala and was planning to bomb the 
region. 48 Alarmed, Massoud sent for Haji Zahir, a stout 
energetic man who was one of the most capable leaders of 
the Bakaw Khailis clan, and with whom the rebel commander 
was developing a close relationship. Massoud "met me to 
say that the government intended to bomb Safid Chihr and 
Dasht-i-Rewat, aimed at putting pressure on inhabitants to 
rise up against us, " Zahir recalled. "He told me to go and 
prevent the plan from being fulfilled. it49 Zahir at once 
agreed to go to the provincial capital in Charikar and 
speak with the governor to refute the allegation that the 
town was harbouring rebels. 
Failing to find the governor, Zahir travelled to 
Kabul, where he persuaded the Minister of Public Affairs, 
whom he knew, to call the president's office and cancel 
any attacks that were possibly being planned . 
50 That 
Massoud, some three weeks after his arrival in the valley, 
was already manipulating events on a national level, even 
if in a small way, was testament both to his own 
98 Similar bombing had taken place earlier in the year in Herat and 
Nuristan. 
49 Haji Zahir interview, 11 April 1995, p. 1. 
50Ibid., p. 1- 
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competence and to the fragility of the Communist regime's 
position in early June 1979. 
While it is not clear how firm the government's plans 
to bomb Safid Chihr actually were, Zahir's manoeuvres 
discredited reports that had reached Kabul about the 
militants' activities and bought more time for the rebels. 
Zahir was able to use local connections to reach virtually 
the highest levels of the Afghan government. Massoud must 
have been impressed with the potential for such 
penetration and with the level of commitment and 
effectiveness of a man like Zahir. For several days 
following the incident, the militants continued their 
outreach campaign and organizing activities, though they 
must have realized that the risk of detection was 
increasing. Ironically, it was a pro-Communist mullah who 
would precipitate the first clash. 
Outbreak of the Rebellion 
In mid-June, Faqir Ahmad Tufan, a minor cleric in Dasht-i- 
Rewat with links to government security forces, discovered 
through one of his agents the location of the militants' 
safehouse. He then communicated with 'Alaqadar 
Faizuddine, who immediately gathered a small force and 
sped off up the valley. 5' 
51Mohammad Ayoub interview, May 1995, p. 3. 
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The militants were staying in the house of a man 
named Mir Alam and did not know that the attack was 
coming. Nearby, some twelve to twenty-five of them were 
"busy with their affairs inside the mosque when they were 
besieged by the soldiers. When small boys saw the soldiers 
around the mosque, they went inside and informed the 
Mujahedin. "52 With the first shots of the attackers, the 
men inside hit the floor and crawled to their guns. They 
knocked out a few low timbers in the walls of the building 
and returned fire. "Commander Ibrihim was at home when 
the war broke out. He jumped out through the window and 
took position. " 53 Within minutes, some forty rebels came 
to the aid of the trapped fighters. 
The government troops, inexperienced in such 
operations, had attacked from quite a distance and were 
not able to direct their fire accurately. However, they 
had managed to cover most of the possible escape routes, 
thus trapping the militants and producing a stalemate as 
other rebels moved to surround the government forces. 
Under continual heavy fire, Mohammad Gada, the senior 
rebel leader, dispatched a runner to inform Massoud and 
his group in Mukuni of the attack before government 
reinforcements could come up the valley. The 'Alaqadar 
must have been thinking along the same lines; shortly 
after the attack started, his jeep was seen headed down 
52 Ibid., p. 4. 
53Ghaffar interview, 10 October 1994, p. 5. 
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the valley, much to the rebels' alarm. "The danger at 
that time was that the jeep of 'Alaqadar had passed 
towards the lower portion of the valley going very fast, " 
Massoud remembered. "We were anxious that it would come 
back" with reinforcements. 54 
Making their way down from Mukuni, Massoud and a 
group of militants ran into Haji Zahir, fast becoming one 
of Massoud's most trusted Balai lieutenants. Massoud, who 
was on his way to the scene of the engagement, was 
"holding a gun in his hand, running down, " Zahir recalled. 
"He wanted to block the road in Awreng at the mouth of a 
gully. He instructed me to gather people for the 
battle. //55 They agreed that Massoud's group would head 
down by foot to ensure that the defences were sufficient 
to stop any reinforcements; Zahir would continue up the 
trail to Mukuni to pick up Ahmad Jan and more armed men, 
and then drive up the valley by automobile. 
Arriving in Dahane Rewat a short time later, Zahir 
came under fire from rebel forces who mistook his men for 
government troops. The first rebel casualties of the 
uprising were thus caused by friendly fire. 
Meanwhile, as Massoud's party arrived in Awreng just 
below Dasht-i-Rewat, they discovered that several young 
men from the local village of Ghrenju had already erected 
a barricade of cut timbers and large rocks at the point 
54Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 12. 
55Haji Zahir interview, 11 April 1995, p. 2. 
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where the road rises from the sandy flood plains and 
begins to climb steeply toward Dasht-i-Rewat. 56 With the 
road secured, the villagers stood by with flintlock 
muskets and shotguns to attack any government forces that 
might try to come back up the road. They had set up their 
post at the very spot where Massoud wanted to block 
government reinforcements - it was an example of the 
initiative and intelligence that would benefit the revolt 
over the coming weeks. Leaving behind a few men armed 
with PPSh machine guns to reinforce the local fighters, 
Massoud and his party continued up the valley. 57 
At about midday, other rebels surrounded the emerald 
mines, where the soldiers quickly surrendered, handing 
over not only their rifles and ammunition but also a large 
quantity of dynamite from the mines. The liberation of 
the mines, which the government of Prince Daoud had 
recently nationalized, provoked tremendous excitement 
among the villagers. More importantly, the captured 
dynamite would prove critical in the upcoming campaign in 
the Salang. 58 
Word quickly spread of the rebels' victory. They 
followed up their initial success by counterattacking, 
killing 'Alaqadar Faizuddine along with some of his 
soldiers and arresting several others. 
56Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 10. 
57Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 11. 
58 Mohammad Pannar interview, January 1995, p. 41; Ayoub interview, 
May 1995, p. 2. 
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As Massoud arrived at the centre of Dasht-i-Rewat, he 
was received by an ecstatic crowd. Yet the young rebel 
did not lose his composure. While the government's 
initial attack up the valley had been repulsed, Massoud 
was worried about a new attack from below. More than 
fifty men, including the groups from Ghrenju now under the 
command of Zahir, were assigned to defend the road. 
Still, Massoud was concerned. The action was moving too 
quickly. He needed to devise a plan before word of the 
clash reached the Wuliswali, or district headquarters, in 
Rukha and beyond. 
Massoud spent the rest of the afternoon in Dasht-i- 
Rewat, strategizing with Pahlawan Ahmad Jan, who had been 
slightly wounded in the leg during the fighting, as well 
as Mustafa and others. "At night Ahmad Shah Massoud 
divided [the] Mujahedins into four groups of twenty 
members. Only the distinguished individuals were chosen 
for the [combat] groups. "59 Massoud selected Zahir as one 
of the group commanders. "I was told to separate my men 
and move toward Sha'bah and work out the plan of 
fighting, " the important clan leader later said. 60 
In less than one month, Massoud and the militants had 
succeeded in expanding their active cadre nearly four- 
fold, while conducting a broad outreach in the Bala to 
sustain mass support for a rebellion against the Taraki 
59Aziz interview, June 1994, p. 4. 
60Haji Zahir interview, 11 April 1995, p. 4. 
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regime. Critical to the effort's success was Massoud's 
ability to unify the Panjsheris. As Ayoub, who had 
earlier secured Massoud's release from Pakistani 
detention, later recalled, 
The main thing that Massoud did at that time was that 
he was able to collect all Panjsher peoples under one 
organization, and convince them to work together. In 
other parts of Afghanistan, there were good commanders, 
good activity, but some people were with Hezb-i-Islami, 
some people with Jamiat, [some with] Harakat, this and 
that, they were fighting each other, they were denying 
each other. But in Panjsher he did the best thing 
6 there. He collected all the people under one name. 1 
Ayoub added that "Massoud's leadership for the people was 
very active. Also, because his relationship with the 
people, his ability to converse with the people, keeping 
the people happy; it was a very high level of intelligence 
and personality. " 
The success of the rebels' return was also the result 
of careful planning, particularly by Massoud, Ghaus, Agha 
Gul, Mustafa, and Tarjuman Abdul Haq. They had studied 
guerrilla movements from Indochina to the neighbouring 
Kamdesh Valley of Nuristan and their frank and 
inspirational communications with the influential clan 
leaders were as much a result of this historical framework 
as they were of the militants' strong personal ties with 
recent Afghan nationalists including Faizani, Arif, 
Rabbani and Anwar. In this way, Massoud and his cohorts 
were able to present themselves as learned envoys to the 
61Ayoub interview, 12 December 2004, pp. 33-34. 
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local chiefs while also benefiting from their own local 
clan affiliations. Matin, Zahir, and other prominent 
Balai leaders all remembered and revered Yahya Khan, 
Massoud's grandfather, and knew Massoud's father, Dost 
Mohammad, and thus the militants were perceived as 
internal representatives as much as external ones. 
With the political groundwork laid, the rebels' first 
organized attack on the government's principal post in the 
Bala was about to begin. 
189 
Chapter 5, The Valley in Revolt, June-July 1979. 
The Rebels' First Attack 
Just before dusk of June 10,1979, an armed, chanting 
crowd, approximately two hundred to three hundred strong, 
entered Safid Chihr. l Mawlawi Latif, the movement's 
spiritual leader, and several men stood up on the porch of 
one of the shops, a few feet above the crowd, and began 
delivering speeches on their grievances against the 
communists. "The communists have taken over our country, 
they are the enemies of Islam, and it is our duty as (j,, -od 
Muslims to fight them, " Latif proclaimed. 2 
In addition to the religious rhetoric, the speeches 
had a distinct note of local patriotism. "There was the 
idea that for the first time in our history, we as 
Panjsheris might play a leading role in our country's 
history, " Es-Haq late explained in an interview. "That 
was enough to get a lot of people excited., 3 Neither 
Massoud nor any of the other young militants spoke to the 
group, instead, for obvious political reasons, allowing 
local residents to run the event. 
The speeches, most of which were delivered by chiefs 
and mullahs, lasted for about half an hour, during which 
another two to three hundred people joined the militants 
and their supporters at the bazaar. The crowd soon 
1 Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 6; Aziz interview, 6 June 1994, p. 1. 
2 Mawlawi Abdul Latif interview, 12 October 1994. 
3 Es-Haq interview, 1 December 1994. 
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numbered between five and six hundred, including defecting 
government soldiers from the emerald mines. 4 Following the 
conclusion of the remarks, the group, fast becoming a mob, 
set out down the road toward Khinj. 
Many of the people who found themselves marching with 
the militants that first evening seem to have had little 
prior knowledge of the anti-Communist movement and appear 
to have simply gotten caught up by the tumult. Despite 
widespread hostility toward the government and the 
excitement of the moment, most must have wondered if the 
opposition movement could last more than a few days. 
Since the reign of Dost Mohammad, with few exceptions - 
such as the interludes prior to the first British 
occupation of Kabul in 1839 and Abdur Rahman's return in 
1880, and the Kalakani takeover in 1929 - the valley had 
always been under the control of a central government. 
Although not a single person in the entire Bala 
Valley had been arrested since 1978, a few had been 
interrogated by the 'Alaqadar prior to his death that 
morning, and now that violence had erupted, a threat by 
the new government clearly existed. The New York Times 
reported in June that the rebels included "Moslem 
traditionalists, infuriated by measures that they feel 
undermine their religious principles, and a large rural 
4 Aziz interviews, 6 June 1994, p. 1, and March 1996. 
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element that violently opposes the regime's land reforms. i5 
The success of the Nuristani rebellion provided a positive 
precedent, but even that uprising put little direct 
pressure on the government. Furthermore, the Nuristanis, 
having endured forced conversions to Islam and integration 
into the country in the 1890s, were not considered real 
Afghans, as indicated by the continued use of the suffix 
"stan" (meaning land or nation). 6 Thus, the Panjsheris 
perceived the rebellion in the neighbouring region more as 
a local affair than as the first rumbling of a nationwide 
movement. 
The events in distant Herat did demonstrate the 
crippling effects that an uprising, when directed against 
urban and strategic centres, could have on the central 
government. But the Panjsheris on that first day could 
not have gauged the probability of achieving a similar 
result in the northeast. As traders and travellers, the 
Panjsheris, particularly some of the khans like Matin, 
knew that their country had been under increasing Soviet 
pressure for twenty-two years. As one of the young Safid 
Chihri leaders who had participated in the capture of the 
emerald mine that day put it, "We also revolted [like the 
Nuristani and Heratis] in the hope of overthrowing the 
5 Robert Trumbull, "Insurgency Poses Growing Threat To Afghanistan's 
Pro-Soviet Rulers, " New York Times, 24 June 1979. 
6 For more on the Afghans' view of the Nuristanis, see Jones, Men of 
Influence in Nuristan. 
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communist regime. We considered it a big shame not to be 
part of Jihad against the communists. "' 
With the momentum from the victory over the 'Alaqadar 
and the growing strength of the mob, Massoud decided to 
attack the 'Alaqadari, or sub-district headquarters, 
located in Zenay. He divided the men into three groups 
and, moving south from Khinj, sent one group to the 
northeast of Zenay and one to the northwest, leaving one 
unit with him in the middle. 8 The plan was to triangulate 
fire on the post from positions a few hundred metres away, 
but as most of the men were armed with hunting weapons and 
had never seen combat prior to that morning, preparing for 
the assault was time-consuming. Massoud had to help each 
group find suitable cover in the darkness and instruct 
them on what to do once the fighting began. Tarjuman 
Abdul Haq and Haji Zahir led the two flanking groups while 
Mustafa led the group in the centre. 9 
Early the next morning the militants were arranging 
their forces when shots rang out. One overly excited 
villager opened fire with his pistol and both sides 
7 Pannar interview, January 1995, p. 6. Other rebellions had taken 
place in Hazarajat, Paktia Province, Konar Province and other areas, 
as reported by the U. S. embassy in Kabul. See confidential State 
Department cable from Bruce J. Amstutz, Embassy Kabul, 6 September 
1979, No. 06697. See also "Revolt Reported in Afghan Province, " 
Reuters dispatch in New York Times, 8 January 1979; "Insurgency 
Spreading, " Agence France Press, 30 January 1979, cited in Index to 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Middle East and 
Africa, 31 January 1979; "'Foes of Afghan Rulers Are Hoping 
Skirmishes Will Bring on Rebellion, " New York Times, 5 February 
1979; "'Moslem Tribesmen Conduct Guerrilla War in Afghan Hills, 
Washington Post, 11 March 1979; "'Afghan Insurgency Threatening 
Regime, " New York Times, 13 March 1979. 
8 Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 10. 
9 Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 3. 
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started shooting. For the second time in twenty-four 
hours, Massoud's plan was pre-empted by events. Moments 
later the machine gun atop an armoured personnel carrier 
in front of the post took aim at the rebels. As Massoud 
recalled, mayhem ensued: 
An APC arrived and started firing on us. People were 
firing on the APC with their guns. I was shouting to 
the people not to fire, but they did not care about 
that and continued their firing. 10 
Less than an hour after daybreak, it was the attackers who 
found themselves pinned down. Not knowing any better, 
many of the villagers fired their scarce ammunition into 
the hardened plates of the vehicle. The bullets bounced 
off harmlessly as Massoud and the others struggled to 
establish command. 
The objective of knocking out the armoured car became 
paramount. Seeing little choice, Massoud decided to use 
one of the precious rocket-propelled grenades Mawlawi 
Ghafur had given the militants in Nuristan. Mustafa, who 
had the most experience with explosives, volunteered to 
ll take the shot, only to miss three times in a row. 
The fighting continued for several hours, with the 
government soldiers pinning down the militants. At this 
point, rumours - perhaps generated by Gulestan, one of the 
rebel leaders, who resented Massoud - began circulating 
'°Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 13. 
11Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 3; Aziz interview, 12 October 
1994, p. 11. 
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among the attackers that government reinforcements were 
headed up the valley from Rukha to relieve the besieged 
post. Massoud later recounted the conversation with his 
deputy, Mustafa: 
It was a bad situation. If we didn't capture the 
'Alaqadari, it would be a big setback. We realized 
that if we were defeated completely, people would 
surrender us to the government. I discussed the 
situation with Mustafa and reminded him of the `75 
uprising and told him, `If we fail again, everyone 
either will be killed or captured. Better to die 
facing the enemy than be. ' And he agreed one hundred 
percent with me. 12 
Returning to the assembled men around nine in the morning, 
Massoud underscored his battle cry by taking it upon 
himself to destroy the armoured personnel carrier. Moving 
to within fifty metres of the target, he calmly took a 
shot with a rocket-propelled grenade, just as the vehicle 
turned its barrel towards him. 13 As flames engulfed the 
vehicle, several of its occupants escaped through the 
hatch and ran toward the main building. Seeing the 
soldiers flee, the militants rushed forward hurling hand 
grenades as other fighters fired repeatedly at the post. 
Ibrihim shot to death four soldiers cowering behind the 
vehicle. 14 
12Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 14. 
13Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 3; Aziz interview, 12 October 
1994, p. 11; Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 15. 
14Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 11. 
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Inside the government building the militants found 
several dead and wounded. 15 Mansur puts the number of 
captured soldiers at thirty-five, but far more important 
were the two hundred assorted arms and twelve cases of 
ammunition that the militants seized. 16 
"Everyone wanted weapons and ammunition, " Massoud 
recalled, "and I suddenly realized that in the future it 
would be a big problem. " 17 Aziz amplified this prognosis, 
noting that while "all the Mujahidins involved in the 
battle made the commitment to submit all the seized 
weapons to the Amir.... because of lack of order, most of 
the Mujahidins looted the weapons. "' 18 
Mustering all of his presence, Massoud assembled as 
many men as he could and threatened that unless they 
immediately brought all of the weapons and bullets to the 
mosque, he and the other militants who had just led the 
villagers to victory would leave the valley. 19 The 
hillmen's euphoria ceased as they realized that although 
they had won a battle, they had just started a war. In 
addition to playing on the men's natural fears of anarchy, 
by insisting on having the weapons counted in the mosque 
rather than in the captured post or the school, Massoud at 
this key juncture began promoting the idea of collective 
15Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 15. 
16 Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 6. 
17Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 16. 
l8Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 11. 
19Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 11. 
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spiritual interests taking precedence over personal 
material ones. The episode demonstrated the pious young 
leader's ability to successfully foster a notion of 
political Islam, in contrast to the ultimately ineffective 
efforts in Nuristan by the atheist Anwar. 
Yet this was but a small step on along and difficult 
road. No sooner had the militants brought the captured 
weapons to the mosque than many of the precious arms had 
disappeared. 
"I asked what happened to the arms, " recalled Aziz, 
the young man who had blocked the road the previous day. 
They [Agha Gul and others] said someone had stolen them. 
I cursed those who committed the theft. Unknowingly, I 
addressed Gulestan Khan and said, "What kind of people 
are they? They claimed to be good Muslims but still 
commit crimes. " He [Gulestan Khan] suddenly got mad, 
suddenly started quarrelling with me. 20 
Although it was obvious what had happened, Massoud decided 
not to aggravate the situation by publicly accusing 
Gulestan, whom he had never met until that morning, of the 
theft. Massoud had spent weeks trying to unite the clans 
and could not allow a single incident to pull them apart. 
The Bakaw Khails were still the most important group in 
the coalition and even if Gulestan could not be trusted, 
Massoud realized that "it was not necessary to flare up 
the flames of any skirmishes, " which might risk offending 
Ahmad Jan and Haji Zahir. So he chose to say nothing. 
20Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 12. 
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Instead, to again highlight the religious basis of the 
emerging movement, Massoud gathered all the mullahs and 
khans to discuss their next move. 21 
He asked Aziz if he was experienced with assault 
rifles. Although Massoud had privately encouraged Aziz to 
show restraint with Gulestan, the rebel commander was 
publicly acknowledging the young man's intellect and 
initiative. The militants were looking for new leaders to 
join their core group from Pakistan, and Aziz appeared to 
be a good candidate. 
Two principal targets remained in the valley: an army 
post in the Dara-e-Hazara Valley, similar to the one the 
militants had just captured in Zenay; and the Wuliswali, 
or district headquarters, in Rukha. With over one hundred 
men, the second was by far the larger and, even without 
reinforcements, would put up stronger resistance. Dara, 
on the other hand, was a backwater, and so long as the 
forces there remained blocked and could not attack the 
rebels from the rear, they posed little threat to the main 
operation against the Wuliswali. With this in mind, 
Massoud must have been relieved when Gulestan - who had 
fled during the last battle, returning just in time to 
organize the weapons theft - volunteered to lead a force 
against the Dara post. 22 While Zabet Agha Gul and others 
were sceptical, they did not object. Gulestan left Zenay 
21Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 16. 
22 Ibid. 
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that night with about sixty to seventy fighters, heading 
toward the Dara Valley on the southeast side of the 
Panjsher River, while Massoud and the rest of the 
militants led several hundred people down the valley 
toward Bazarak. 23 
The Capture of the Pa' een 
The militants formed the villagers into a column, once 
again putting Pahlawan Ahmad Jan at the front. In case 
they were attacked from the south, his men were well-armed 
and ready to fight. At every village the lead group would 
stop, causing the column, perhaps five hundred to eight 
hundred strong, to close ranks in the centre of the 
village. As Ahmad Jan, surrounded by several clerics, 
greeted the villagers, the fighters would lead a 
thunderous chant of "Allah Akbar. " For people who rarely 
saw crowds a tenth that size, the effect of this shrieking 
human wave must have been profound. 24 At each stop the 
column was joined by more and more supporters. "As we 
passed through villages, youths carrying axes joined us, " 
Mohammad Pannar remembered. 25 
The militants had tried hard to contact chiefs in the 
Bala, but had made less effort to contact people in the 
23Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 13; Agha Gul interview, 19 June 
1994, p. 3. Dara is the largest of some twelve side valleys that 
run roughly perpendicular off the Panjsher. 
24Ahmad Shah Massoud interview 28 September 1994, p. 16. 
25Pannar interview January 1995, p. S. 
199 
Pa'een. "We had wanted our contacts further extended to 
all parts of the Panjsher, to Rukha, Bazarak, and the 
other villages, but [at the time of the 'Alaqadar's 
attack] our activity remained confined to Safid Chihr and 
Dasht-i-Rewat, " Mohammad Pannar later explained. 26 
As it turned out, Massoud's father, Dost Mohammad, 
was in Kabul and would not learn of Massoud's role in the 
rebellion for some weeks. 27 When the column arrived in 
Bazarak, it was apparently a complete surprise to the 
townspeople. The Khan of Bazarak, Bashi Sa'duddin, 
provided Mawlawi Abdul Latif, Ahmad Jan and Haji Zahir 
with a hero's welcome. Massoud and Mustafa, meanwhile, 
continued to shun the limelight as they set about seeing 
the important men of the town. Massoud was back in the 
Pa'een for the first time since the ill-fated 1975 
endeavour, and with thoughts of that episode fresh in his 
mind, he would have been very wary. It was known that the 
government had many supporters in the area, although so 
long as his "army" remained camped in the town he had 
little to fear. 
On the way from Zenay the militants had casually 
inquired in different places about Communist supporters. 
Some residents "would say that they had no Communists, and 
some would say that they have hidden themselves here, " but 
26Ibid., p. 2. 
27 Mrs. M. Ghaus interview 11 April 1995, p. 2. 
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. Or 
usually the militants received vague answers. 28 Panjsheri 
villages, like most places, harboured a spectrum of 
political views, but generally a villager's political 
opponents were also his kinsmen. 29 However vehemently 
individuals disagreed politically, marriage and clan 
relationships were such that one would rarely speak ill of 
a villager with outsiders. Although this would change 
during the war, as political identities often rose above 
family ties, ideological differences were not clearly 
defined in mid-1979 and it was difficult for Massoud to 
get much information on the communists. There was one 
notable exception: his own village. 
Jangalak epitomized the reasons Massoud feared the 
Pa'een. It was a poor village within Bazarak with little 
arable land, located on a rocky outcropping above the 
Panjsher River; many of the villagers had long since left 
to work in the capital. While most of Jangalak's 
emigrants had taken menial jobs in Kabul, several, such as 
Massoud's grandfather, had managed to achieve a measure of 
financial success. Those individuals had used their gains 
to send their children to institutes of higher learning 
and this, Massoud knew, was where the danger lay. The 
problem was not education itself but attendance at one of 
the no more than a dozen prestigious schools in the 
28Ahmad Shah Massoud interview 28 September 1994, p. 17. 
29Pannar and Gulestan, for example, though from the same clan, took 
very different approaches to the rebellion. 
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capital where the Communist factions had conducted most 
of their recruiting during the 1960s and 1970s. Having 
lived in Kabul and risen to become a top student leader at 
one of those schools, Massoud understood the phenomenon 
well. 30 
For the next couple of days, the militants travelled 
around Bazarak semi-secretly to avoid certain prominent 
leftists while Mawlawi Latif and the other clerics gave 
anti-government speeches and organized mass prayer 
sessions for the crowd that had remained camped in 
Bazarak. As one Balai leader recalled, "During these five 
days a large number of people joined us and a number of 
mawlawis [religious scholars] were preaching in favour of 
Jihad. "31 Pahlawan Ahmad Jan, Haji Zahir, Mohammad Gada 
and a few other respected Bala men were given credit for 
organizing the movement. 
With the political side of their operation going 
better than expected, the militants focused on the next 
military objective: the Panjsher Valley District 
Headquarters at Rukha, which was well fortified and, with 
a number of officers present, bound to put up a strong 
fight. Massoud and the other leaders began developing a 
plan involving a coordinated, multi-pronged attack, for 
which they would need several group leaders. The 
30 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, 
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001 (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 109. 
31Fazel Ahmad interview, May 1995, p. 5. 
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militants did not lack manpower, but they had identified 
only a few men capable of battlefield leadership. In 
preparation for the battle, the militants had established 
a logistical base in Bazarak, where they began storing all 
the weapons and ammunition that they had accumulated up to 
that point. 
On the second morning in Bazarak, Gulestan quietly 
slipped into town. Apparently too embarrassed to face 
Massoud directly, he sent for Zabet Agha Gul. "Gulestan 
Khan sent me a personal message saying, `We could not 
capture Dara, can you help? '" Agha Gut related years 
later with a grin. "They had attacked the post, but the 
soldiers did not surrender. He was embarrassed, they had 
fought for a whole day and used up most of their 
ammunition. " Agha Gul conveyed the news to Massoud, who, 
undoubtedly tiring of living in semi-seclusion in Bazarak, 
announced that he would lead an attack on the Dara post 
himself . 
32 
Hiking quickly, they arrived in Dara around noon and 
found the attackers "very tense" and suffering from low 
morale, one of their number having been killed in the 
fighting. Massoud quickly devised a plan and after a 
brief but intense attack, the post fell. The 'Alaqadar of 
Dara managed to escape, but was captured a day later. The 
rebels returned to Bazarak late in the day, where word of 
32Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 2; Ayoub 
interview, May 1995, p. 8. 
203 
Massoud's victory had already travelled. 33 Despite their 
elation, the militants knew that they were another day 
behind schedule for the attack on the Wuliswali; they must 
have had a sense that time was running out. 
At midday the following day, government jets 
screeched over Bazarak and bombs fell on the ancient 
Panjsher town. Although the bombing did not last very 
long, the blasts and tall dust clouds they left behind 
created panic, sending the still large assembly of men 
fleeing into side valleys north of the town. More than a 
dozen people were killed and wounded, and the bridge from 
Bazarak to Manjahour and a school were damaged. 34 But the 
five-day political-religious event seems to have 
strengthened the villagers' resolve: Bashi Amir and Bashi 
Sa'duddin, the khans of Bazarak, made no effort to expel 
the rebels from the town. 
Why it took the government four days to realize that 
it had a serious threat on its hands in the Panjsher is 
not clear. Even with the lines of communication from 
Zenay and Dara cut off, it is unlikely that the district 
headquarters went more than a few hours without learning 
of attacks, and its troops appear to have been 
anticipating an assault. 
33Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 2; Ayoub 
interview, May 1995, p. 8; Fazel Ahmad interview, 1 May 1995, p. 5. 
34Fazel Ahmad interview, 1 May 1995, p. 5; Ayoub interview, May 1995, 
p. 9; Aziz interview, 7 October 1994, p. 13. 
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Be that as it may, this indecisiveness worked in the 
rebels' favour. Under cover of darkness, an advance group 
of fifty rebels moved cautiously toward the fortress in 
Rukha. Having left Bazarak after dark on the day of the 
bombing, the men did not reach the town, some eight 
kilometres south of Bazarak, until close to midnight. 
Their instructions were to get as close as possible and 
attack that night to gauge the enemy's strength. The 
group's assault with small-calibre machine guns was 
quickly answered by mortars, cannon fire, heavy artillery, 
and scores of smaller arms. Compared to the battle at 
Zenay, where the Government had only one. cannon mounted on 
an APC, the strength of the Wuliswali's response was 
overwhelming. Realizing that there was little they could 
accomplish against such force, the men pulled back and 
sent a report back to Massoud. 35 
By the time the runner reached Bazarak, it was in the 
early hours of the sixth day - June 15, according to 
Mansur's record. 36 Massoud apparently sent a runner back 
with the reassuring message that he would be arriving with 
reinforcements late in the day. Just a few months later 
the militants would not have considered entrusting the 
commander's plans to a runner, but at this critical time 
Massoud seems to have wanted to give the men as much 
encouragement as possible. 
35Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 1. 
36Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 6. 
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Later that afternoon, some of the fighters returning 
from the capture of the Dara 'Alaqadari were informed of a 
second, and larger, operation scheduled for that night, or 
shortly afterward. Massoud set out toward Rukha leading 
three hastily arranged groups. 37 Leaving a blocking force 
of ninety Paryanis below Karwashi and dispatching others 
to Hesarak, the commander climbed to a position at Chemal- 
Warda in the heights above the fortress where he began 
gathering intelligence. 
Over the course of the day Massoud learned that the 
government had used the time since the first attack in 
Dahane Rewat "to strengthen its position by bringing a 
number of cannons, tanks, and other supplies" to the 
Wuliswali. 38 Seeing the strength of the government's 
defences, he realized that a daylight assault would be 
fruitless. Late in the day he sent a messenger to 
Karwashi with instructions for Fazel Ahmad and the other 
groups to meet him in Sarban for a nighttime attack. When 
they arrived at the village they found Massoud with a 
group of about ninety men. Ibrihim, who seems to have had 
a contact within the fort, was assigned to Aziz's thirty- 
man group, which would lead the attack from the Hesarak 
heights with long-range assault rifles. 
It was a risky plan for the teams on the heights who, 
once their locations became known, would become easy 
37Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 1. 
38 Ibid. 
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targets for government artillery pieces. Understanding 
the danger, Massoud ordered the men to press the attack 
"no matter what the casualties are and no matter what the 
number killed. /, 39 
This time the plan worked impeccably. After three 
hours of fighting, in the dead of the night, the Wuliswal 
began evacuating en masse. "We were preparing to stage an 
offensive during the night, and suddenly the news spread 
that governmental forces had fled, " Massoud said. "When 
we arrived at the site they had already fled. i40 For the 
rebels, the capture of the district seat was a dramatic 
victory: the valley was on its way to being liberated. 
Later, the commander met with Ahmad Jan in Rukha and, 
still shunning the spotlight, offered the wrestler the 
prestigious position of "Wuliswal of the Panjsher. "41 
Further raids in the town yielded seventy guns from the 
communist youth organization. 42 The liberation of the 
valley was a source of great excitement in Rukha, much as 
it undoubtedly was a source of grave concern in Kabul. 
Determined to push home the advantage, on June 16, 
1979, a large force, spurred by the capture of the 
Wuliswal, set out down the valley from Rukha to Gulbahar. 
39Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 1; Fazel Abmad 
interview, 1 May 1995, p. 6; Aziz interview, 7 October 1994, p. 13; 
Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 6 June 1994, p. 1. 
90Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 2. 
41 Throughout the war Massoud maintained the practice of appointino 
civil administrators, who soon became known as "Amir Panjsher, " to 
serve beneath him. He himself, in the capacity of general 
commander, was known as "'The Honorable Amir" or Amir Sahib. 
42 Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 6. 
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To avoid travelling during daylight, when they would be 
exposed to air strikes, the fighters began the thirty- 
kilometre journey along the main road around dusk, with 
Zahir again in the lead. 43 
The idea was to exit the valley, cross above Gulbahar 
before dawn, and surprise the government forces stationed 
at the sub-district headquarters in Bulaghain, just east 
of the town. From there the rebels would fan out to the 
heights to the east and west. The militants knew there 
would be a counterattack and planned to move into a line 
of defensive positions above the northeastern ridges of 
the Shamali plain before it happened. 
As on the march from Safid Chihr to Bazarak, the 
group periodically halted in the significant villages 
south of Rukha to drum up additional support in the 
Pa'een. Now that the rebellion could almost claim to have 
"liberated the valley, " recruits came quickly, as even the 
more pro-government villages of the lower Pa'een offered 
up men, young and old, to join the advance. 
Additionally, as the U. S. State Department would 
acknowledge one month later, reports were coming out of 
Afghanistan that "more than 3,000 political prisoners have 
been executed" by the government and that there were 
"nightly executions of 20 to 50 people at Pol-i-Charki 
Prison outside Kabul. " Speaking in Dubai in mid-July, 
43Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, pp. 3-4. 
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Rabbani sought support for "the Afghan people who are 
threatened with a war of annihilation. "44 
At approximately 01.00 hours, the group entered the 
Dalong Sang - by far the most dangerous part of the 
journey: if government commandos attacked from the rear 
before the rebels could exit the tight mouth of the gorge 
- with the river on one side and sheer cliffs on the other 
- the whole force could be trapped. Yet, in an act of 
faith, the group stormed down the narrow road across which 
Alexander's army had once marched, and in less than an 
hour stepped triumphantly, if cautiously, out of the 
Panjsher Valley onto the heights of the Shamali Plain 
above Gulbahar. 
Unsure if the government had been informed about the 
fighters' approach, Massoud dispatched Zahir and a party 
to make contact with some of the villages in the 
surrounding area. A couple of hours later, the young 
chieftain Zahir brought back mixed news. The good news 
was that the government troops at Bulaghain seemed unaware 
of the rebels' approach. The bad news was that the 
Shamali were lukewarm about the rebellion and unwilling to 
support it. Part of the reason for this was that many of 
the local residents had ties to the government garrison in 
the nearby town of Jabal as-Siraj. Massoud may not have 
99"3,000 Afghans Reported Executed, " New York Times, 23 July 197. 
Doha QNA radio report, July 13,1979, translated, from Index to the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, Middle East 
and Africa, July 18,1979, No. JN131201. 
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been surprised by the response and obviously was pleased 
that the advance from Rukha had not been detected. He 
ordered the main group of fighters to march towards 
Bulaghain and attack. 
The post fell with hardly a shot fired. Massoud then 
divided his men into three groups. The first, led by Gada 
and Aman, but accompanied by Massoud, would take up 
defensive positions to the east in a village called 
Darband. The second group, led by Aziz and Zabet Agha 
Gul, would establish positions on top of Kohe Sorkh, above 
Gulbahar, to prevent the town from being attacked from the 
west. So long as Gulbahar and the mouth of the valley 
remained liberated, the rebels could easily escape any 
number of ways back into the Panjsher from either Shotul 
or Darband. It was the final group, led by Mustafa, that 
would go on the attack. 45 
The target was the Salang Highway, the southern leg 
of Afghanistan's main north-south traffic artery running 
just to the west of Gulbahar. The road connected Kabul 
with the northern part of the country via a 1.7-mile 
tunnel through the Hindu Kush Mountains that had been 
completed by the Soviets in 1964. 
During the militants' years in exile, as they stuHied 
previous guerrilla campaigns from China to France, someone 
- perhaps Massoud himself - seized upon the idea of the 
45Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 1; Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 
28 September 1994, p. 4. 
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Salang Route strategy. "Over and above their importance 
in a state's specific domestic and foreign policies, " 
Mahnaz Ispahani writes in her 1989 study, Roads and 
Rivals, The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of 
Asia, "routes stubbornly retain a more substantial 
importance. /, 46 Perhaps knowing this, the militants 
developed the idea that if opposition forces could control 
at least a portion of the Panjsher Valley, they could 
launch attacks along the Salang and control the flow of 
goods down the highway into Kabul. And that, they 
realized, was enough to cripple the government. 47 For a 
communist regime dependent on supplies from the USSR, the 
Salang was an Achilles heel. Massoud's father, Dost 
Mohammad, soon to become one of the rebels' key 
strategists, had "specifically persisted on the importance 
of Salang. 1148 
The plan was to start by taking out the bridges. 
Repair crews sent to work on the damaged bridges could 
then be attacked, requiring the dispatch of additional 
security forces who, in turn, could also be attacked. As 
Anwar had taught Massoud that spring, once a couple of 
repair crews and security teams had been fired on, it 
46Mahnaz Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in 
the Borderlands of Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1989), p. 232. 
97lspahani points out that Afghanistan's focus on "routes" as a key 
to its sovereignty went back to the nineteenth-century Amir Abdur 
Rahman, who believed "that the only solution to the threat of 
foreign encroachment on Afghan land lay in the denial of access, " 
Roads and Rivals, p. 99. 
98Agha Gul interview, 19 June 1994, p. 3. 
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would be extremely difficult for the government to find 
other workers willing to take their place. Eventually, 
the army would have to attempt a major operation, tying 
down large numbers of troops and assets and creating a 
significant embarrassment for themselves and their Soviet 
benefactors. 
Accordingly, the third group commanded by Mustafa 
moved toward the strategic highway. The three initial 
targets were the Dehnaw and Padzhar bridges and the small 
Salang 'Alaqadari located up the road from Gulbahar. 
After the two bridges were demolished, with dynamite 
captured from the emerald mines, the rebels moved to 
attack the soldiers of the 'Alaqadari, who had abandoned 
their post and taken up defensive positions on heights 
just behind it. After besieging the group for several 
hours, the rebels convinced them to surrender, immediately 
releasing all but two officers who were brought to Shotul. 
"Treat the prisoners well, " Massoud preached, "and it will 
encourage others to surrender. " 49 It was another lesson he 
had learned from Anwar. After the destruction of the 
bridges and the capture of the 'Alaqadari, the rebels were 
able to operate in the Salang with impunity. For the 
Afghan government, the loss of the two bridges and the 
security post guarding the strategic road was a dramatic 
49Es-Haq interview, 16 September 1994, p. 2. 
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setback, the consequences of which were soon felt within 
the Defence Ministry. 
Amin Takes Charge of Security 
Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, Taraki's American-educated 
deputy, appears to have begun jockeying for control of the 
country's security forces just at the time of the downing 
of the Dehnaw and Padzha bridges. The New York Times 
reported on June 24 that diplomats in Kabul believed that 
"Moscow has become disenchanted with Mr. Taraki's 
performance and would welcome his replacement, through a 
coup if necessary, by someone with more appeal among the 
Afghan people. "-50 Several weeks later, during a July 21 
meeting with the Soviet ambassador A. Puzanov, Amin 
"lamented that he does not have the authourity to run 
military affairs, and Taraki, who is concentrating the 
leadership in his own hands, cannot to a sufficient extent 
control the execution of his orders. "51 Several days after 
the Salang attacks, the Soviet Communist Party Central 
Committee had approved the deployment of an airborne 
battalion, "disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an 
aviation-technical maintenance team, " to Bagram Airbase, 
50Robert Trumbull, "Insurgency Poses Growing Threat to Afghanistan's 
Pro-Soviet Rulers, " New York Times, 24 June 1979. 
51Transcript of conversation between USSR Ambassador Puzanov and 
Prime Minister Amin, 21 July 1979, from '"The Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German 
Archives, " in Cold War International History Project Electronic 
Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1997/1997, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D. C., p. 41. 
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eighteen kilometres south of Panjsher. S2 The covert 
battalion was presumably sent in part to ensure that the 
Panjsher Rebellion, occurring at a time of increasing 
anti-communist opposition, would not threaten the 
strategic airbase. 
On July 27, Amin replaced Aslam Watanjar as minister 
of defence. The move illustrates the increasing fragility 
of the Communist government and Amin's eagerness to remove 
Watanjar, a career officer who had played a key role in 
both the 1973 and 1978 Communist coups. Two weeks earlier 
the New York Times had quoted an unnamed U. S. government 
official who warned that the Afghan army "could 
disintegrate" and "is losing a lot of men and equipment. " 
The source added: "You could get more desertions. Soviet 
advisers can't inspire Afghan troops. " The day after 
Amin's takeover, the State Department announced the 
withdrawal from the country of about 100 non-essential 
U. S. government employees and their families. By mid- 
August the U. S. Embassy in Kabul was reporting Soviet 
plots to depose Amin. 53 
52 Report on the Afghanistan situation presented by Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko, Defence Minister D. Ustinov, KGB Director Yuri 
Andropov, and Boris Ponomarev, chief of the International 
Department at the Central Committee, to the CPSU Central Committee, 
28 June 1979, from "The United States and Afghanistan 1978-1989: 
Documents from the Russian and East German Archives, " p. 40. 
Alexander Lyakhovsky, a former major general in the Russian Army, 
notes that the recommendations made in this document were approved 
during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June, 1979, in 
Resolution No. P, 156/XI. Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of 
Afghan (Moscow: GPI Iskon, 1995), p. 76. 
53 David Binder, "U. S. Aides Say Afghanistan Army Is Crumbling Under 
Rebel Pressure, " New York Times, 13 July 1979; Richard D. Lyons, 
"U. S. Will Withdraw Most of Staff From Afghanistan as Strife 
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Though it is difficult to quantify the exact role the 
Panjsher Rebellion had on the national security picture, a 
declassified U. S. Department of State cable dated July 30, 
1979, concluded that the switch by Amin was made "in 
response to increasing insurgency operations, " but added 
that the "cabinet reorganization is inadequate to pacify 
domestic political opposition. " 54 Two weeks earlier, 
Kuwaiti radio reported that a spokesman for the Afghan 
rebels in Kuwait had said that the rebels "destroyed the 
two-kilometre (Salang) tunnel and halted traffic through 
it. " Though the statement was inaccurate - only the 
bridges had been neutralized - the report correctly 
grasped the political significance of the events, 
reporting that the Salang highway "links the capital with 
the Soviet Union, and through it the Taraki government 
obtains military reinforcements from the Soviet Union. "55 
Another declassified cable, dated September 6,1979 - 
seven weeks after the decision to deploy the Soviet 
parachute battalion in Bagram - cited four significant 
security developments outside of Kabul. The events 
listed, and the document's descriptions of them, are 
indicative of their perceived relative significance at the 
time. They included: 1) the fall of the government base 
Grows, " New York Times, 24 July 1979; Urban, War in Afghanistan, pp. 
36-37. 
54 Bruce J. Amstutz, confidential cable, U. S. Embassy, Kabul, to U. S. 
State Department, 30 July 1979, item number AF00601. 
55Ar-Ra'y Al'Amm radio report, Kuwait, 17 July 1979, translated, from 
Index to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, 
Middle East and Africa, 20 July 1979, No. LD191551. 
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in Asmar, Kunar Province, which had occurred in July and 
according to the document "was not directly attributable 
to the insurgents"; 2) the siege of several border towns 
in Paktia Province, including Khost, which were 
"surrounded by the insurgents and are dependent on air 
resupply"; 3) poor security in the second-largest city, 
Kandahar, where "sporadic shooting especially at night has 
been reported"; and 4) lastly, the Panjsher rebels' 
action, which is described somewhat nonchalantly: 
Fighting in the north is marked by the cutting of the 
Salang Pass Road. Two reinforced concrete spans on the 
southern approaches to the critical Salang Pass were 
dropped by insurgent action during the month, thereby 
causing transportation headaches for the regime, but 
also indicating a growing military sophistication on 
the part of the anti-regime forces... 
[text was apparently excised by issuing authourity] 
Required an expertise in demolitions which probably 
surpassed the skill normally associated with mountain 
56 villagers. 
Of the four developments, only the Salang attacks directly 
threatened the security of Kabul. Though this is not 
mentioned in the declassified portion of the report, the 
cable acknowledges both the strategic and qualitative 
significance of the bridges' destruction. An Agence 
France Press report on July 25 said that `After several 
setbacks last month, opponents of the regime have resumed 
their offensive throughout the country; notably in the 
56 Bruce J. Amstutz, confidential cable, U. S. Embassy, Kabul, to U. S. 
State Department, 6 September 1979, No. 06697.02 of 03 0612072, pp. 
2-4. 
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Panjsher Valley, 60 kilometres north of Kabul, where the 
rebellion threatens to cut the strategic road linking the 
capital to northern Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. t157 
That these attacks, and the possibility of the 
Soviets being cut off from their client regime, were in 
the forefront of the minds of the senior Soviet officials 
when they presented their urgent report on June 28 seems 
beyond a doubt. For Massoud and the rebels, the fact that 
their attacks had made it onto the Central Committee's 
agenda may not have been a surprise. 
The militants at this point had a number of good 
contacts within the crumbling Taraki regime and knew they 
could expect a full-fledged government response to their 
successful attacks. While Agence France Press just one 
month earlier had reported that, "Faced with the 
strengthening of the government's defensive power, few 
observers believe the Moslem rebellion can overthrow it, " 
following the Salang attacks the news agency declared that 
"Western observers in Kabul say there is no doubt that the 
Soviet Union, which arms and supports the revolutionary 
regime, takes the chaotic situation into which the country 
is sliding very seriously. " 58 
57Jean-Francois le Mounier, "'Reports Describe Fierce Fighting in 
Paktia Province, " Agence France Press, 23 July 1979, from Index to 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, Middle 
East and Africa, 25 July 1979, No. 0W231939. 
58"Pushtu Rebels Inactive After Setbacks, " Agence France Press, 24 
June 1979, from Index to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
Daily Reports, Middle East and Africa, 26 June 1979, No. BK241611; 
Jean-Francois le Mounier, "Reports Describe Fierce Fighting in 
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Although the first attempts by the government to 
counterattack, probably from the nearby Jabal as-Siraj 
garrison, were not successful in relieving the 'Alaqadari 
in the Salang before it was captured, soon forces were 
sent in from the Kabul-based Central Corps. 59 "After nine 
days the government forces arrived from Kandahar and 
Mazar-i-Sharif, " one fighter who was present recalled . 
60 
As the fighting intensified in the first weeks of 
July and Amin sought to assert his control over the 
defence ministry, the rebels suffered a number of 
casualties. Despite this, a mobile rebel force of forty 
to fifty fighters under Zahir's command fought tenaciously 
over a twenty-four-hour period, briefly forcing the elite 
government troops to pull back. 
A defensive line was thus established at the foot of 
the valley above the town of Jabal as-Siraj, and the 
rebels retired to Shotul to plan their next move. Fearing 
the collapse of his ten-kilometre defensive line north and 
west of the mouth of the Panjsher, Massoud maintained a 
vigorous routine in an attempt to personally encourage the 
various groups of fighters who were increasingly short of 
food and suffering from dysentery. 61 
Paktia Province, " Agence France Press, 23 July 1979, from Index to 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports, Middle 
East and Africa, 25 July 1979, No. OW231939. 
59 Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 37. 
60 Abdul Hai interview, 6 October 1994, p. 6. 
61 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Reports of the Salang campaign soon filtered back to 
Pakistan. When Gulbuddin heard of one of Massoud's treks 
- beginning in Salang in the morning, continuing almost 
all day to Darband, and including a return to Shotul 
before ending in Salang twenty-odd hours later - he argued 
that such a feat was impossible. 62 Such was the dichotomy 
that developed between the actions of ISI's surrogate 
Gulbuddin and Massoud, literally from the first days of 
the war. "Pakistan all but forced the CIA to back 
[Hekmatyar and its] favourites, " a U. S. official 
responsible for covert aid would later complain. 63 The 
ISI's eagerness to discredit the Persian rebels, perhaps 
augmented by the rebels' presence in the field and 
inability to participate in the Pakistani-based 
discussions, was to greatly skew the perceptions of the 
conflict among Western and other observers as they 
attempted to make sense of the burgeoning Afghan 
insurgency. 
With the two bridges down and the 'Alaqadari 
captured, the rebels' strength was the greatest it had 
been since the rebellion began. They controlled an area 
some one hundred miles long and in places as much as 
62Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994 p. 5. The trek 
from Salang, only eight kilometres west of Gulbahar, easily took 
the better part of a day since one had to travel back and forth 
through the mountains, up the narrows at Dalong Sang gorge, across 
to the east ridge of Shotul and down into the small gorge, and back 
up the other side - perhaps more than ten kilometres in vertical 
feet. 
63George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War (New York: Grove Press, 2003), p. 
195. 
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twenty miles across, and more importantly, they had closed 
Highway 1, briefly cutting off Kabul from northern 
Afghanistan. 64 Less than three months after Massoud had 
returned to Afghanistan, he had risen to become the most 
influential opposition leader in the country. While in 
1994 Massoud modestly described the Salang Strategy as a 
tactical step, "aimed at cutting off reinforcement and 
supply of Salang 'Alaqadari, " he realized very well that 
his actions in the late summer of 1979 had had a profound 
impact on the government, though at the time he probably 
had no way of knowing that they had reverberated directly 
to the halls of the Kremlin in Moscow. 65 
By July it was widely known that General Aleksei 
Yepishev, who had played a key role in the 1968 Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, was in Kabul. 66 In early July, 
Massoud, with a sense that the government was growing 
desperate, received an urgent message in Darban from a 
trusted Paryani fighter in the Salang, informing him of 
the arrival of a senior colonel of the security ministry 
in the area above Jabal as-Siraj. The colonel was 
propagandizing against Massoud and Ahmad Jan and offering 
64 According to Ghafur, the highway was blocked for seven days before 
government forces reopened it, Ghafour interview, 24 February 1995, 
p. 2. 
65Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 4. 
66An anonymous writer, described by the New York Times as an Afghan 
living in the U. S., wrote in an op-ed piece: "Soviet influence is 
also apparent in large-scale military aid, in the presence of 4,000 
to 6,000 Russian advisers and in the extended visits by Gen. 
Aleksei A. Yepishev, head of the Political Directorate of the 
Soviet armed forces. " "The Afghans See Red, " New York Times, 26 
July 1979. 
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to feed the hungry rebels. "Why are you killing 
yourselves for the sake of Massoud, Pahlawan Ahmad Jan and 
Tarjuman Abdul Haq, while they are leading a luxurious 
life and eating better than you? You have nothing to eat 
and all of you have dysentery, " the colonel told the 
fighters over a loudspeaker from a post in the heights 
above Jabal as-Siraj. 67 
Almost until that moment, despite the hardships faced 
by the rebels on the front lines, the rebellion's progress 
had far surpassed the years of planning and expectation 
that had led up to it. But upon reading the note, Massoud 
immediately recognized the intensification in the 
government's tactics that he must have feared. He hastily 
departed for the town, fearing the rural, upland rebels' 
inability to resist the political pressures of the 
disingenuously solicitous communist agent. He knew that 
he would have to meet the new challenge head-on. 
67 Abdul Hai interview, 6 October 1994, p. 6. 
221 
Chapter 6, On the Defensive, August-October 1979. 
The Commander's Injury 
Massoud arrived at the rebel base in Kohe Sorkh before 
dark. Realizing that the Mujahedins' morale was broken 
following several days of heavy fighting, and in the wake 
of the colonel's anti-rebel propaganda campaign, he 
quickly organized a counter-offensive, which pushed the 
government forces back and captured several of their 
positions. ' 
This success, however, was hardly conclusive. The 
next morning, as Massoud and Abdul Ghafur, the local 
commander, were observing the terrain, previously unseen 
government positions that were far closer than the rebels 
expected opened fire from close range. Realizing that 
they were vulnerable, Massoud, who appears to have been 
caught off guard, dispatched a fighter for hand grenades. 
Massoud was right to be concerned, as shortly 
thereafter concentrated fire blasted apart piled stones on 
his side of the bunker, forcing the commander to shift to 
Ghafur's more heavily fortified side of the post. At this 
point, Massoud, who was unarmed, turned to Ghafur and 
asked, "What shall we do? " "Ghafur, who had suffered some 
minor facial wounds from shrapnel or rock shards thrown up 
1 Ghafur interview, 24 February 1995, p. 3; Abdul Hai interview, 6 
October 1994, pp. 6-8. 
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by the blast, suggested that Massoud withdraw up the slope 
behind them. 2 
Although Ghafur could not see the enemy position, he 
continued firing intermittently as Massoud made his way up 
the hill. Most of the commander's ascent was shielded 
from the enemy gunners, but "when he was moving along the 
hilltop, " Ghafur recalled, "he was exposed. " Ghafur saw 
bullets hitting the mountainside some one hundred metres 
above him, where Massoud had stopped. There followed a 
pause during which Ghafur thought that Massoud was just 
catching his breath. Then, scanning the heights again, he 
saw Massoud gesturing to him. Even at a distance, Ghafur 
realized from the commander's movements that he was in 
trouble. 3 He broke into a sprint up the steep bank. 
When Ghafur reached Massoud's position, he saw that 
the commander was wounded in his upper thigh. "Be careful 
not to fall into the enemy's hands, " the commander told 
him. Then he added, "You have to do your best to evacuate 
me from here. "4 
Having paused for only about a minute and a half, 
Ghafur, who had grown up carrying game through the 
mountains, picked up the taller man and continued up the 
bank towards the rebels' main position. Some thirty 
2 Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 8; Ghafur 
interview, 24 February 1995, p. 4. 
3 Ghafur interviews, 7 April 1995, p. 2; 13 March 1995, p. 1; 24 
February 1995, p. 4. 
4 Ghafur interviews, 13 March 1995, p. 1; 24 February 1995, p. 4. 
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minutes later they arrived at the base held by Haji 
Matin's son Ibrihim, who was also Ghafur's kinsman, and 
about thirty other men .5 
"Massoud calmly told the men to remain in their 
positions and that he would send me back after taking him. 
However, they were anxious, " Ghafur recalled. "Massoud 
said he would soon recover and be at their service. " The 
commander was still lucid and instructed the men "to 
strengthen their positions. "6 Ghafur again put Massoud on 
his back, they said good-bye, and set out for Shotul, 
accompanied by an elderly man from Paryan. 
Outside of Shotul, Massoud suggested that Ghafur set 
him down in the shade of an almond tree. The commander 
propped his head up on a rock and said he would stay with 
the old man who had travelled with them from Ibrihim's 
base, while Ghafur continued on to the village to find a 
doctor. 
Upon reaching Shotul, the exhausted Ghafur met Agha 
Gul, who happened to be in the village. Agha Gul 
immediately took charge of the situation, leading a doctor 
and some men carrying a stretcher toward the place where 
Massoud had been left. Ghafur himself, after catching his 
breath, departed for Dalong Sang to summon reinforcements. 7 
S Ghafur interview, 7 April 1995, p. 2. 
6 Ibid., p. 3; 24 February 1995, p. 5. 
Ghafur remembered Abdul Woodood and Nazar Mohammad being there when 
he arrived, Ibid., p. 3. 
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An hour later Agha Gul found Massoud lying under the 
almond tree, alert and in good humour. It was about ten 
in the morning, some four hours since he had been shot. 
Although Agha Gul must have been shocked at the sight of 
Massoud's wound, even more disturbing would have been the 
thought of the effect that the commander's injury would 
have on the front. The experienced security officer knew 
that, some two weeks since the first clash with government 
forces in the Salang, the rebels' position was precarious. 
With the chief out of action, there was a real danger of a 
reversal in their fortune. 
This fear was not that exaggerated. Having almost 
perished on the road, Massoud was given superficial 
treatment at a local clinic before being taken to the 
house of his sister and brother-in-law, Ghaus, in his 
native village of Janaglak. There he lay for a couple of 
days, feverish and falling in and out of consciousness, 
before he began to regain his strength. 
Recovery 
Within a day or two of his recovery, Massoud, while still 
bed-ridden, resumed his operational activities. A field 
telephone was set up in his room and he began taking 
reports from the front, many of them negative, scrawling 
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notes with a pen while he spoke. 8 As word of his injury 
leaked out, scores of well-wishers came to visit. One day 
shortly after his arrival, his sister served lunch to 
seventy-two people. 9 Five days after his injury, Massoud 
was already able to drive down near the front line where 
Jagran Ghaus, Mustafa and many others were attempting, 
with increasing desperation, to hold back a government 
advance into the valley. 
The Front at Feraj 
Three days earlier, perhaps two days after Massoud's 
injury, the front in Kohe Sorkh above Gulbahar had 
collapsed. The government forces counterattacked from the 
Shotul mountains and from the Gulbahar Road, killing a few 
insurgents and wounding others. Aziz recalled that after 
he was evacuated to `Anabah, the fighting became very 
fierce. 
A number of brothers remained in Gulbahar along with 
Rahmi Khoda. At night the government forces surrounded 
them. With suffering and difficulties they were able 
to retreat from Gulbahar and the Darband area. 10 
Mustafa at this time assumed general command of the 
defence of the valley at Dalong Sang. Although he appears 
to have had less rapport than Massoud had with certain 
Dasht-i-Rewati front-line forces, the commander later 
8 Mrs. M. Ghaus interview, 11 April 1995, p. 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 1- 
loAziz interview, 10 December 1994, p. 2. 
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verified the central role played at this time by his 
longtime deputy. " For his part, Ghaus, functioning as the 
senior headquarters officer and having received a report 
on the deteriorating situation at Dalong Sang and "the 
possibility of the defeat of the front, " ordered the 
establishment of a second line of defence. He dispatched 
Qayyoum, a reliable local leader, to ask representatives 
of Dada Khiel and Sata (regions of Bazarak) to immediately 
send new recruits to the fighting zone. As Qayyoum 
recalled, "Each region had its own representatives and 
clergy and these representatives were duty-bound to 
recruit people. People were sending in groups for ten 
days, and after ten days the next group was occupying the 
position of the previous group. "12 
Qayyoum and Ghaus arrived at the Bazarak Bridge to 
find Bashi Sa'duddin, khan of Bazarak, Haji Sayfuddine and 
thirty or so volunteers from Mala, Manjahor and Parande 
ready to march to Dalong Sang. After two months of 
fighting in the Panjsher, few of the men had really 
distinguished themselves as soldiers, so Sa'duddin, the 
tall, energetic chief with a booming voice, was a natural 
choice to lead the group. He had worked in the 1970s as a 
foreman on the construction of the Salang-Mazar-i-Sharif 
Highway and was an experienced organizer of men. 13 
"Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 6. 
12Qayyoum interview, 17 July 1995, pp. 2-3. 
13 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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Sa'duddin's group had made it only as far as Rukha 
that morning when they started encountering rebels heading 
up the valley, having quit the fight. The Bazarakis, 
natives of Massoud's town, may have felt a particular 
obligation to press on, but along the way some of the men 
deserted and the morale of the rest was depleting rapidly. 
About five miles from Dalong Sang, they saw government 
forces in the distance advancing up the road towards them. 
Taking cover behind rocks in the wide-open area, the 
rebels opened fire from several hundred metres, only to 
realize after some time that their chances of holding the 
enemy on the open ground were slim. They withdrew to 
Feraj, about three kilometres back up the valley. 
Mustafa arrived in Feraj probably that same afternoon 
with a number of other fighters, having withdrawn from 
Dalong Sang through. the mountains. He quickly took charge 
and deployed Sa'duddin and the Bazarakis in positions on 
the southeast side of the road. "Mujahedins were divided 
in different groups, " Qayyoum explained. "Each group was 
led by its representative such as Tarjuman Abdul Haq, 
Commander Aman, Haji Habib, and Haji Sa' duddin . X14 For the 
next three or four days the front at Feraj held out in the 
face of intermittent government shelling, as Mustafa and 
the other leaders rallied the men to hold their ground. 
14Qayyoum interview, 15 April 1995, p. 1. 
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On the fourth or fifth day of fighting, following the 
re-suturing of his wound, Massoud, aided by a walking 
stick, visited the front. 15 This encouraged the rebels, 
though the fact that they had been pushed so far back in 
the previous week and were now fighting inside the valley, 
in the face of an intensifying challenge, seems to have 
rapidly drained morale. "The news of defeat on the Salang 
and Shotul fronts spread in the village, " Ayoub recalled. 
"Mujahedin forces retreated up to `Anabah and Rukha. i16 
With the government firmly entrenched on the valley's 
southern approach, the defeat of the rebellion in the 
Pa'een appeared imminent. Chaos developed in Rukha where 
the prisoners, never evacuated as Ghaus had ordered, 
overpowered one of the rebel leaders, Mohammad Arab. The 
important Balai fighter was not seen for six days. '' For 
experienced military men such as Ghaus and Agha Gul, the 
desperation of the situation was becoming clear. 
Decision to Flee Bazarak 
Massoud followed the news of the stand at Feraj very 
closely. As the defence began collapsing (probably on the 
sixth or seventh day after he was wounded), he decided, 
after consulting his father and Ghaus, to evacuate 
Jangalak with their families for the safety of the Bala. 
15Mrs. M. Ghaus interview, 11 April 1995, p. 2. 
16 Ayoub interview, May 1995, p. 12. 
17 Ibid., p. 12. 
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The men did not know how quickly the government forces 
were advancing, and Ahmad Jan and almost all of the 
militants' other supporters had already fled Rukha. The 
families packed a few possessions into a car and prepared 
to bid farewell to the village and the peaceful life that 
they had enjoyed there for many generations. Still 
injured, Massoud reluctantly took a place in the car. 
Near the village of Malaspa, several hundred metres 
from Bazarak, the group was stopped by a roadblock manned 
by some of Massoud's kinsmen, including a well-known 
Communist. Though stopping short of trying to seize the 
rebel chief, the armed men resolutely refused to let the 
family pass. The bodyguards accompanying Massoud wanted 
to open the road by threat of force, but Massoud ordered 
them not to fire their weapons. 18 Even for Massoud, clan 
bonds took precedence over the success of the rebellion. 
With little choice, the family returned to Rhaus's house. 
"When we returned back home, the government forces 
had reached up to Rukha and Khaniz, " Mrs. Ghaus recalled. 
"Enough time had elapsed, and they were definitely able to 
reach Bazarak. i19 It was then decided that Ghaus and Dost 
Mohammad would lead the women overland to Zenay. While 
the prospect of trekking overnight in the high mountains 
with women and children in late summer was daunting, it 
18Mrs. M. Ghaus interview, 20 August 1995, p. 7; Ahmad Shah Massoud 
interview, 3 March 1995, p. 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 8. 
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was a better option than declaring war on their kinsman. 
The family bid an emotional farewell as they left Massoud 
and several of his men in the cut-off location and began 
the march into the mountains. 
Over the field phone Massoud succeeded in getting a 
message to Haji Zahir in Rukha, where Communist 
sympathizers were attempting to seize control ahead of the 
government advance. Zahir arrived in Jangalak three to 
four hours after Massoud's first attempt to leave the 
village. He forced the stunned commander into his car and 
drove to the roadblock. Zahir, who had distinguished 
himself on the front lines during the rebellion, shot out 
of the vehicle and ordered the road cleared. Faced with 
the resolve of the respected Balai leader and his well- 
armed men, the Jangalakis acceded and the party passed 
through the roadblock and continued up the valley. 20 
The Government's Advance Into the Bala 
That night, Massoud dined at the home of Zahir's uncle, 
Jalaluddin, the malik or mayor of Safid Chihr. As the 
government's representative and the most important khan in 
the largest Balai town, Jalaluddin occupied a position of 
unique importance in the valley and his support when 
Massoud had first returned from Pakistan had been critical 
in getting the rebellion started. 
2 0Haji Zahir interview, 6 April 1995, p. 1. 
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Now that the front had collapsed, Massoud needed to 
sell his concept of challenging the government all over 
again. He realized that Jalaluddin was in a difficult 
Position: while the malik was impressed with Massoud and 
Zahir's idealism, at the same time he had to confront the 
possibility that government forces might soon be occupying 
his town. In addition, Jalaluddin's brother, Gulestan 
Khan, was continuing to propagandize against Massoud, with 
whom he appears to have been developing a rivalry. For 
Massoud, after being shot, seeing the rebellion crumble, 
and leaving his family to escape over the mountains, the 
meeting that night became in many ways the biggest 
challenge in what had already proved to be a difficult 
week. 
Panjsheris rarely hold serious discussions during 
dinner and thus Massoud and Jalaluddin probably did not 
discuss these issues until after the meal was finished. 
Massoud began the meeting with what was becoming his 
catch-phrase for such situations: "What should we do? " 
The question was discussed at length. "I told him I 
was afraid to keep him here and advised him that it was 
better for him to leave for Dasht-i-Rewat or Paryan, " 
Zahir recalled. Eventually it was decided that Zahir and 
his family would accompany Massoud to Paryan while 
Jalaluddin, having played little public part in the 
rebellion, would remain in Safid Chihr. Zahir remembered 
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that Massoud said "that he would go only if I would follow 
him with my family to Paryan. "21 
The rebel leader was apparently anxious about going 
into exile in the upper Bala, and felt that he would be 
safer if he were in the company of the respected Balai 
fighter who already that night had stared down Massoud's 
own kinsmen. Perhaps, too, the prospect of his family 
seeking refuge there seemed less socially daunting if 
another prominent Balai family accompanied them. Other 
issues may have been addressed: speculation about the 
situation in Rukha, an accounting of the rebel forces, and 
the disturbing increase in anti-rebellion sentiments in 
the valley, all of which had reached a crisis point that 
day. 
The Front 
Within three or four days of Massoud's arrival in Paryan, 
government forces had completely secured the Pa'een. 22 
With the crumbling of the front in the lower valley came 
resentment towards the fighters in the upper valley. 
Still, in its first days the rebellion had won a great 
deal of support, particularly in Dasht-i-Rewat and Paryan, 
and it was in those two highland areas that Massoud now 
focused his attention. Nationally, the situation remained 
promising. In a New York Times report of August 2,1979, 
21 Ibid., Pp. 1-2. 
22Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5'April 1995, p. 1. 
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Western and Muslim diplomats characterized Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan as "a last-ditch attempt to 
find a political solution to the nine-month-old civil war 
that has left the Government in full control of only 25 
percent of the country. "23 
Shortly after his return to Safid Chihr, Massoud met 
with Ahmad Jan. "You have to blow up the Sha'bah Bridge, " 
he told the wrestler, "otherwise they'll capture the upper 
part of the valley. " At the time, Ahmad Jan's fighting 
abilities were considered comparable to those of top 
fighters such as Aziz and Gada, 24 but he was still an odd 
choice to lead such an important operation. The former 
Olympian had played a negligible role in the rebellion 
fighting over the previous two months, spending most of 
his time holding court in Rukha like a traditional Afghan 
administrator, while Mustafa, Aziz, Gada and Zahir had 
spent much of their time on the front lines. 
In addition to Ahmad Jan's apparent aversion to 
combat, there were other signs - such as his refusal to 
obey Rhaus' request to transfer the prisoners the previous 
week - that his commitment to the rebellion was waning. 
But Massoud desperately needed to energize the movement 
and again pinned his hopes on the local celebrity. The 
commander probably believed that if Ahmad Jan succeeded in 
23"Moscow Said to Urge Shaky Afghan Regime to Broaden Its Base, " New 
York Times, 2 August 1979. 
29Both would rise to the highest levels in the resistance hierarchy. 234 
destroying the bridge, the people in Safid Chihr, the main 
beneficiaries of the planned action, would be inspired to 
rejoin the rebellion. 
One morning during the second or third week of 
September 1979, Ahmad Jan left Safid Chihr with a small 
contingent to blast the bridge at Sha'bah. He must have 
realized that if the government crossed the bridge and 
moved into the Bala, the rebellion would be in grave 
peril. Though Massoud seems already to have been 
contemplating a plan to reorganize his forces in Paryan, 
if cut off from Dasht-i-Rewat and Safid Chihr the 
continued support from men like Zahir and Matin would be 
unlikely. Fearing for the success of the operation, 
Massoud decided to go to the forward rebel town himself. 25 
Just before reaching Sha'bah the men suddenly heard 
the sound of heavy vehicles. Looking down the road they 
could see three tanks rounding a bend some two to three 
hundred metres away. As they took shelter on the far side 
of a mud wall, Massoud realized that Ahmad Jan and his 
group had failed in their mission to blow up the bridge. 
Fortunately for Massoud, the tanks continued on their way, 
without realizing that they had just missed one of the 
most wanted men in the country. 
26 
Having had a narrow escape, Massoud and his party 
took to the mountains to avoid the valley road, and after 
25Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 3 March 1995, p. 2. 
26 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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a harsh journey of several days reached Chai-a-hoo in 
Dasht-i-Rewat, where Massoud hoped to find a warm welcome 
from his friend Haji Matin. 
The Coming of the Nuristanis 
For about the next twenty days Massoud remained encamped 
in a small cave above Dasht-i-Rewat at Bamwarder, as he 
focused on his recovery. Several times he ventured down 
to spy on the government's tanks at Grenju and make 
clandestine visits to Matin's house in Dahane Rewat, but 
generally he stayed close to his cave-headquarters. With 
Safid Chihr and Dasht-i-Rewat now occupied by the 
government, Paryan - the last group of villages in the 
upper Bala, inaccessible by the road - became the rebels' 
primary operating zone. 27 As word spread up and down the 
valley, the group in Bamwarder soon grew from about twenty 
men to about sixty. During this time a number of key 
supporters of the rebellion trickled in from the Salang 
and Ghorband, as the people of Paryan began to play a 
central role in the rebellion. 28 
Two or three days after arriving in the upper valley, 
Massoud sent a message to Mawlawi Abdul Razzaq in Nuristan 
asking him to send armed men, with a view to using the 
27Mistary Shah Nawaz interview, 17 July 1995, p. 8. 
28 Ibid., p. 14. 
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still-energized Nuristani rebels to reignite the Panjsher 
front. 29 
Approximately twenty-five days after Massoud arrived 
in Bamwarder from Sha'bah, an army of Nuristanis arrived 
in the Paryani village of Shari Bland with a DShK heavy 
machine gun. For a year prior to Massoud's arrival, the 
people of Shari Bland had had relations with the 
Nuristanis; one of the Paryani khans, Fazel Ahmad, had 
bought a Kalashnikov from them. In all, several hundred 
fighters arrived, some of them coming via Chamar and 
others via Waryaj directly to Deh Paryan. 30 Abdul Razzaq 
and Abdul Haliem, their military commander, and the group 
met Massoud in Deh Paryan as the leaders began to make a 
plan of attack. 31 
Massoud established a base there and set about 
arranging for food to be collected for the guest fighters. 
The group stayed for two nights in Deh Paryan before 
moving down the valley via Dasht-i-Rewat towards the 
Shamaruq, where the government had a base between Zenay 
and Peshawar that they hoped to recapture. The Nuristanis 
were in high spirits and eager for a fight, and before 
long the battle was joined. 
29The communications were conveyed "'through the inhabitants of 
Paryan. " The Mawlawi of Paryan seems to have also had some role in 
the discussion that followed. See Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 
April 1995. 
30Fazel Ahmad interview, 11 June 1995, pp. 4,6. 
31Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 3 March 1995, p. 4. 
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"We were divided in four groups, " Shah Nawaz later 
recalled. "The first group was assigned to the Sha'bah 
Bridge, the second to Zenay, the third and the fourth on 
top of mountains over Shamaruq. I belonged to the 
Shamaruq group. We left early in the morning with a group 
of one hundred and fifty men, and the group's commander 
was a Nuristani. "32 Massoud provided a detailed account of 
the journey of one of the Shamaruq groups that he 
accompanied. It is highly informative in regard to both 
the complexity and challenges of mountain warfare and the 
remarkable stamina, and even sense of humour, that enabled 
Massoud to succeed under trying conditions. 
We moved along the mountain skirt, in order to not 
disclose our location to other people. We came along 
the mountain skirt from Safid Chihr to Khinj. Then we 
arrived near Peshghour. We went there through some 
areas heading for a big gulch. When we arrived the sun 
had set and was also slightly raining. I asked who our 
guide was. They replied that Mawlawi Saheb Daoud is 
the guide. Mawlawi Saheb Daoud started to show us the 
way. We didn't arrive to the gulch. We were farther 
down from it. 
Mawlawi Saheb Daoud, instead of turning a little bit, 
he went up to the mountain and we are continuing to 
walk on that mountain. We were frequently asking, "Oh 
Mawlawi Saheb, where is the place? " He was replying 
that, "I have seen this place, you follow me. " Finally 
it was midnight and he brought us on the top of a 
strange mountain. From there we got down and brought 
us to the extreme end of-the Peshghour mountain. We 
were together with six hundred Nuristanis on the top of 
the mountain. It was nighttime, cold and rainy. 
In the morning we had marched from Safid Chihr and at 
midnight we were on the top of the mountain. Each and 
32Mistary Shah Nawaz interview, 17 July 1995, p. 17. 
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every Nuristani was calling Mawlawi Saheb Daoud a 
Communist and infidel. Mawlawi Saheb had hidden 
himself behind us. Finally we arrived in a village 
where a few people were living. They found there a 
room. My problem was that I was walking with a lame 
leg. I fell down there utterly unconscious. We spent 
the night there and in the morning we divided our 
people into groups and sent them here and there. 
We came down again in the Peshghour village in the 
morning. In climbing up and coming down from the 
mountain, my right leg which had stiffness, became all 
right. I asked the Almighty God to not trouble Muslims. 
I walked many times along the skirt of Peshghour 
mountain with my injured leg. I visited many positions 
there till I decided on placing the heavy weapons, the 
Dashaka, the cannon and the anti-tank weapons. Here I 
was looking for a tire to place in it dynamite and 
detonators. Then burn it and leave it to be rolled 
from the top of the mountain inside the government 
division and exploding there. We had dynamite and 
detonators, but were not able to find a tire. Then we 
prepared big boulders and tried to roll them inside the 
government division but when we released the boulders 
they didn't go down to the division and they stopped 
halfway. 33 
With the men disoriented, poorly armed, and in 
increasingly poor morale, Massoud dispatched a group under 
two Dasht-i-Rewatis, Aman and Gada, to Bazarak to try and 
sever the road there. "The enemy arrived and they 
attacked a number of Panjsheri guys by heavy shelling of 
cannons. There a number of the guys were killed. " 
Despite the losses, the rebels appear to have briefly 
"halted the enemy forces. /,, 34 The engagement, which took 
place at the foot of the Narma Mountains, resulted in the 
destruction of a government Jeep. Eventually, however, a 
33Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, pp. 2-3. 
34 Ibid., p. 4; Ayoub interview, May 1995, p. 13. 
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government tank broke through the rebel cordon and 
continued on towards Puli Sha'bah. A second group of 
Nuristanis lying in wait then attempted to cut the 
government off at Sha'bahSha'bah Bridge. Heavy fighting 
ensued in this second battle. Massoud recorded that a 
number of Nuristanis "fought up to the last and about 
eight of them were killed and we buried them next to Puli 
Sha'bah beside the road. /, 35 Part of the problem for the 
rebels, according to Shah Nawaz, was government informants 
in Sha' bah: 
A number of local people guided the enemy tanks and 
informed them about the Nuristani position on Sha'bah 
Bridge. They caused casualties to the Nuristanis there 
and also put our positions under fire. We did not have 
any anti-tank weapons and the whole Nuristani group did 
not have more than four or five Kalashnikovs. 36 
The failure of this hard-fought second engagement appears 
to have demoralized the remaining Nuristani fighters for 
whom mere survival was quickly becoming the main concern. 
In the two days that the fighters were in Shamaruq, 
Massoud's supply chief, a young mullah from Sha'bah named 
Fahim, "was nearly killed two times by the Nuristanis. " 
Unable to gather more significant sustenance, the 
commander recalled, Fahim (who would later become minister 
of defence) "had given bread in pieces to the Nuristanis. 
35Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 4. The place, which 
is called "the martyred place, " was an example of the popular 
mysticism practiced by Massoud. As he would later recount, "People 
have seen time and again that light was flaring up from that region 
to the sky during the night. " 
36Mistary Shah Nawaz interview, 17 July 1995, p. 17. 
240 
They became angry with Fahim and told him, `We are not 
chickens, why are you giving us the bread in pieces? "' 
Accusing the highly intelligent and devout cleric of being 
a "Khalgi-Communist, " guns were pointed at him until 
Massoud "arrived and rescued him. f/37 On a separate 
occasion, he was similarly cornered by angry Nuristanis 
when Ghaus, always urbane and self-confident, arrived and 
freed the young cleric. The attacks on Massoud's 
representative demonstrated the low morale that had 
overtaken the Nuristani fighters within just a few days of 
their arrival. 
Deeply alarmed by this setback, Massoud and his 
lieutenants spent two full days reviewing the situation 
and the rebels' remaining options. "They [the Nuristanis] 
said they were not properly guided by the locals, and they 
were unfamiliar with the terrain. Therefore, they were 
defeated and lost their men, " Fazel Ahmad, Massoud's key 
ally in Paryan, remembered. 38 
"We didn't know what to do, " Massoud recalled. "One 
of our men proposed to go to Peshawar. "39 Only a few dozen 
supporters remained camped in the furthest reaches of the 
valley following the last defeat. Massoud was still 
debilitated from his wound, winter was approaching, and 
the majority of the population in both the Pa'een and the 
37Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 4. 
38Fazel Ahmad interview, 11 June 1995, p. 9. 
39Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 3 March 1995, p. 4. 
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Bala - having been bombed and having had their access to 
the main road cut off - were now opposed to the rebellion. 
The ambitious venture, which the militants had dreamed of 
for so long, appeared destined to fail. 
A U. S. Embassy cable, of 6 September 1979, largely 
confirmed this view. It concluded: 
The situation around the Salang is relatively calm. 
The rugged and sparsely-populated Panjshir Valley a few 
miles east of the Salang Pass also erupted in vice 'I-(. n -e 
during August [and July], but the regime apparently has 
contented itself with punitive air strikes against the 
valley's inhabitants, as well as with a blockade at the 
valley's mouth in order to prevent any insurgent act-i oon 
against the nearby Bagram Air Base, the most vital 
military air field in the country. 
On the same day, the New York Times reported that "Near 
the [air] field is the Panjsher Valley, where one rebel 
group has been dug in for three months, reportedly 
attacking Government forces with great success. " 40 
The American Charge d'Affaires, who had signed the 
September 6 cable mentioning the calm in the Panjsher, had 
no way of knowing that in the upper reaches of the valley 
on the night before the Nuristanis departed, the khans of 
Paryan had made a dramatic decision. Led, in particular, 
by the persuasive Fazel Ahmad, the khans' agreement, at a 
dire hour, would begin to shift the balance of power back 
90 Bruce J. Amstutz, confidential cable, U. S. Embassy, Kabul, to U. S. 
State Department, 6 September 1979, No. 06697, Section 02 of V 
0612072, p. 3. From National Security Archive collection, 
Afghanistan: The Making of U. S. Policy, 1973-1990. Michael T. 
Kaufman, "Soviet Role in Afghan Clash Shows Signs of Toughening, " 
New York Times, September 6,1979. 
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against the Communists and thrust the Panjsher Rebellion 
into a new phase of development. 
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Chapter 7, From a Rebellion to a Guerrilla Front: 
Rejection, Oaths and the Return to Bazarak, November- 
December 10,1979. 
Although the full implications of the most recent def, ý)t 
ten days earlier were still unclear, Massoud and his 
supporters knew that with government forces on the 
outskirts of Dasht-i-Rewat, the situation was bad. Many 
of the men, including Matin, Zahir and others, had been 
present at the militants' arrival the previous summer and 
all had been active supporters of the rebellion. If the 
army advanced into Paryan, most of them would have to flee 
for their lives. They had come to Fazel Ahmad's house to 
hear what Massoud had to say; they were hoping for some 
reassurance. Yet when the meeting finally started, the 
commander's words offered little encouragement. 
The Nuristanis "didn't fight well and lost their 
spirit when two or three of them were killed, " Massoud 
said. "I am going to take my family to `Nuristan' and I 
want you to give me time for a few days. I will not leave 
the front. I will shed my blood or bring victory to the 
front. " He went on: "I will come back and we can build a 
new front. " Physically and emotionally, Massoud was worn 
out from the campaigns and believed that a few weeks in 
"Nuristan" would give him the strength he needed to build 
a true guerrilla front. Privately, some of the men feared 
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that the affluent Massoud would use the opportunity to 
return to Pakistan. ' 
Massoud's suggestion that he would quit the Panjsher 
was thus met with a cool response, and the meeting 
continued with opinions ranging from open hostility, 
especially on the part of the Safid Chihris and Dasht-i- 
Rewatis, many of whom had already fled their homes, to the 
contrite remorse of men like Fazel Ahmad, who apparently 
said little. The men, all upstanding, law-abiding 
citizens, were perhaps in shock at the realization that 
they were now fugitives. and at the thought of what that 
meant for them both individually and collectively. 
Finally, at around 21.00 hours, Fazel Ahmad made a 
move. A maternal cousin of Matin's, he had played the 
leading role in getting the Paryanis to support the 
rebellion. Now, watching it unravel, he felt bound to try 
to do something. Discreetly, he got the attention of 
seven of the other most important Paryani khans and elders 
and directed them to the upstairs room of his nephew's 
adjacent house, where he carefully laid out his plan for 
saving the rebellion. With apparently little discussion, 
the men concurred. Perhaps it was a question of honour: 
1 Fazel Ahmad interviews, 1 May 1995, pp. 16-17; 11 June 1995, pp. 10, 
12. At the height of the civil war in 1995, Fazel Ahmad cited 
Massoud's desire to travel to "Nuristan, " but Massoud almost 
certainly envisioned returning to Pakistan's North-West Frontier 
Province, where he had spent much of the previous five years and 
where Rabbani and other close confidants maintained safe 
houses in 
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Ahmad had gotten them into the situation, and they would 
give him a chance to try and solve the problem. 
Once confident of his peers' support, Ahmad brought 
Massoud into the meeting and told him of the evolving 
consensus: the Paryanis would support the front but would 
not allow Massoud or his family to leave. "We asked him 
to wait until the spring and then we'll see, and pledged 
that we all from 7 to 70 years old are ready to stand with 
him. " The Paryanis' pledge was based on their fear of a 
government advance. "It was a matter of concern for us 
that the government might attack and Massoud would not be 
there to organize and lead the fighters. "2 
In part, the statement demonstrates, even at this 
early stage, the almost mystical value that the 
highlanders placed on Massoud's leadership. The men saw 
the presence of Dost Mohammad and his family as a control 
factor: If Massoud's family were part of the community, it 
might encourage him to be more cautious than if he did not 
have a personal stake in the villages' security. 3 
Although "not upset" by the Paryanis' order, Massoud 
appears to have had some reservations about the 
arrangement and the discussions continued at length. 
Massoud "wanted to leave with the Nuristani malawis, " and 
2 Fazel Ahmad interview, 11 June 1995, pp. 12-13. 
3 Dost Mohammad seems to have welcomed this idea, and would spend the 
next three winters in Paryan, long after his obligation to . 7, _ . -, O 
had expired. 
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made that desire known to the eight leaders. 4 Ahmad knew 
that the twenty villages of Paryan at the intersection of 
Badakhshan, Nuristan and the Panjsher were vulnerable from 
different directions, and he was instinctively more of a 
pragmatist than his cousin Matin. 
While he admired Massoud and the cause of the 
rebellion, Ahmad was also committed to protecting his, and 
the other seven chiefs', territory, and had specifically 
not invited Matin and the others from already occupied 
towns. In this way, Ahmad successfully bolstered the 
position of the Paryanis, whose territory the rebels were 
relying upon. In so doing, he also put himself in the 
position of becoming both the local leader of the 
rebellion and the de facto chief of the eight leaders, 
committed to the best interests of Paryan. Years later 
Ahmad acknowledged playing such a role in the pivotal 
meeting, saying, "Since the meeting was in my [kinsman's] 
house maybe I talked more than the others. " 
In resigning himself to staying in Paryan, Massoud's 
first task was to communicate to Ahmad and the other 
chiefs the necessity of moving from conventional war to 
guerilla warfare. ""If you are ready to provide me men, I 
will start guerrilla war, " he said. "Otherwise, we cannot 
do anything. i5 This was more than a tactical shift. It 
4 Fazel Ahmad interview, 11 June 1995, p. 11. 
5 Ibid., pp. 11,13.247 
represented an overall transformation in Massoud's 
strategic outlook. As he later explained: 
A small, trained and disciplined group is far better 
than a big one. I understand that I had been wrcn, -, g the 
last time, and all the activities carried out later in 
the Panjsher and in the north were the result of the 
thought that surfaced after the defeat.... We decided 
to find a number of dedicated and decisive people to 
take the oath that they will never lay down arms unless 
Afghanistan is liberated. We pledged to devote our 
lives and wealth. 6 
After Massoud had just spent the majority of the evening 
trying to make the case for his temporary return to 
Pakistan, the men's firm rejection may well have been just 
what he was hoping for. If Ahmad would now join Matin and 
the other Dasht-i-Rewatis in taking financial 
responsibility for the movement, it would enable Massoud, 
as their contractor, to start building a true guerrilla 
front. In many ways it was the same strategy that he and 
Ghaus had planned to employ when they first returned to 
the valley the previous summer: let men like Matin and 
Ahmad Jan be the visible leaders of the rebellion while 
the militants worked in the background. This approach had 
worked quite well until the movement spilled into the 
Pa'een, Darband and Salang at such a rapid pace that it 
forced Massoud and the other former exiles to take direct 
charge of military affairs. 
6 Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, pp. 23-24. 
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With the exception of a few individuals like Mohammad 
Gada and Zahir, who had been able to make quickly the 
transformation from tribal leaders to military commanders, 
the role of the khans had progressively been marginalized 
during the rebellion, leaving Massoud, Ghaus and Mustafa 
visibly running the movement. With Fazel Ahmad stepping 
forward with the other Paryani chiefs, Massoud must have 
felt encouraged: surely he had a better chance of 
recapturing the valley with these men than he did if he 
returned to Nuristan or Peshawar and waited until the 
following spring.? 
No sooner had Massoud gained the support of the 
Paryanis than he assembled his men and told them of his 
intention to launch a sustained guerrilla programme. To 
begin, he would need to find a small number of capable, 
committed recruits. They should be unmarried, of good 
mind, and healthy. These men, or "Fedayees" as Massoud 
called them, would be personally beholden to him, and had 
to be willing to die for the cause. As Aziz later 
recalled, Massoud told the group: 
I need a number of devotees that they should agree with 
me and carry out my orders. They would agree if I put 
them into fire, throw them in the river, or fasten a 
bomb on their belly and ask them to lay down under a 
tank. 8 
It is possible that Massoud's threat to leave was simply a ploy for 
aid, and he had used the same threat in Zenay, but 
it is m-rk, 
likely that this time the combination of defeats, dissent, his 
injury and the honour of his family may well have seriously tempted 
him to consider returning to Peshawar. 
8 Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 5. 
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Soberly those assembled began thinking about young men 
from their villages whose names they might put forward. 
During tense discussions over the next few days, Matin 
told Massoud, "In my life I have nothing more than a pot 
and a cow, which I want to give you - you take the cow and 
slaughter it. "9 It was agreed that Paryan would provide 
thirty candidates if Dasht-i-Rewat would provide the same 
number, and Kawak and Arew would each provide ten. 10 The 
Paryanis, who up until that point had played a 
significantly lesser role in the rebellion than the Dasht. - 
i-Rewatis - who had started the movement and could already 
claim a number of talented fighters - now wanted to be 
seen as near-equal partners. 
Given that the vast majority of the fighters who had 
fought in the rebellion had come from Dasht-i-Rewat, the 
offer was somewhat unrealistic, though certainly the 
decision to support the war was genuine: to the Paryanis, 
this move seemed the best way for them to protect their 
villages and to continue to oppose the government. Also, 
by including the Dasht-i-Rewatis in the deal, Ahmad 
ensured that the movement remained a Bala-wide affair. 
Even if the Safid Chihris would revert to backing the 
government (as Ahmad might have suspected from his meeting 
9 Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 24. 
loFazel Ahmad interview, 1 May 1995, pp. 15-17. 
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with Ahmad Jan a month earlier), Dasht-i-Rewat would 
remain a protective buffer for Paryan. 
With one thousand families in Paryan, the thinking 
was that it would not be an excessive burden to feed sixty 
men and their instructors for a number of months. " They 
hoped this would be enough to reignite the rebellion. For 
Massoud, still seriously injured, the decision to build 
his assortment of militants into a coherent guerrilla 
force was dependent on the support of his loyal deputy, 
Mustafa. 
Knowing the intense physical and mental strain that 
Massoud had been under, and probably aware that his best 
friend was on the brink of returning to Pakistan, Mustafa 
might have been surprised to find him at all when he reached 
Dahane Rewat. Mustafa had just escorted his own parents 
into exile in Pakistan. While the situation still looked 
bleak, the Paryani khans' pledge to support financially a 
front and provide Fedayees had created some hope that the 
movement might endure. Around the time of Mustafa's 
arrival, Massoud had already established a camp in Chah-e- 
ahoo, and with the return of his comrade of ten years the 
training moved into high gear. 
To accomplish their goal, the two men decided that 
once they had selected acceptable men they would insist on 
a personal "oath of total devotion" to Massoud the "Amir, " 
"Fazel Ahmad interview, 1 May 1995, p. 16. 
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since for political reasons they did not want to expel 
faint-hearted individuals after they joined. 
The ceremony was administered by Massoud in the form 
of a series of questions. Candidates were required to 
answer "Yes" to indicate their willingness to carry out 
each of the gory challenges. Massoud's recent serious 
injury seemed to strengthen the credibility of the 
process. He would ask the recruits: 
If I ordered you to walk from here to Badakhshan in the 
snow, would you obey? If I ordered you to put your arm 
under a tank, would you obey? If I ordered you to 
explode a grenade in your hand, would you obey? 
Years later Massoud would take pride in the memory that of 
the "tens of participants" in the first meeting, "only 
eleven or twelve took the oath the first time., 12 The 
message was extraordinarily plain: anyone who joined the 
Fedayees should be prepared to endure all suffering, 
including death, in pursuit of victory. 
There seems to have been a week-or-two delay between 
the meeting in Shari Bland and this first recruitment 
drive, perhaps in order to let Massoud recuperate and to 
give others, like Mustafa, who were taking care of 
personal matters, time to return. Massoud later recalled 
that the training started about a month after the 
Nuristanis left. Soon, the guerrillas' number increased 
to twenty and Massoud set about establishing a base and 
12Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 24. 
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training the men in the art of guerrilla warfare. 13 "The 
Mujahedins went to Dahane Tul, " Aziz remembered. "This 
was a very convenient place, and Massoud chose this place 
as his headquarters. "' 14 
Mustafa, who had been outranked by Ghaus in the very 
political early days of the rebellion, when the latter's 
age and military rank had been critical, assumed a major 
role in the Fedayee training. While Ghaus, a consummately 
practical ex-fighter pilot, was a stern individual who 
believed in mathematical solutions to problems, Mustafa, 
though himself an engineer, was a romantic who had thought 
a great deal about the theory of revolution and was thus 
far better suited to serve as the executive officer for 
the elite corps. He was also a keen student of guerrilla 
warfare and had spent years studying weapons manuals and 
explosives. His tenacity in the Salang campaign, 
particularly his role in the blasting of the Shikargah 
Bridge, earned him the title of Deputy Commander. '5 
The announcement that Mustafa would begin explosion 
and demolition instruction generated excitement among the 
Fedayees. The men had already spent time with Massoud 
learning how to fire a Kalashnikov AK-47 and had been 
lectured by Mustafa on the weapon's tactical 
13 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
14Aziz interview, 10 December 1995, p. 5. 
15Mansur refers to Ghaus as "Deputy Commander of the Panjsher Front, " 
Diary of Jihad, p. 9. Ghaus remained active, as he had throughout 
the rebellion, but generally in a supporting role, working 
political deals, organizing logistics, and quietly counselling 
Massoud. 
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applications. 16 Mustafa had also begun instruction on how 
to use a rocket launcher, although, with shells being a 
precious commodity, he was able to fire only one or two 
practice rounds for the entire group to observe. Most of 
the men had been at Zenay and had seen the weapon in the 
field. '? Grenades, though still scarce, were more 
plentiful, being fabricated from the stores of dynamite 
captured the previous summer. 
This allowed for significant training, and the 
militants had set aside several dozen homemade explosives 
for the purpose. The recruits would finally have the 
chance to work with live ordinance and spend time with the 
jovial Mustafa. The grenade exercises would be a welcome 
break from the monotony of physical fitness training that 
up until this point had been a primary, and unpopular, 
focus of the programme . 
18 
Mustafa's sudden death in an explosives accident during 
these exercises had a deep impact on Massoud, who would 
later call his deputy's death "the absolute low point of my 
life.... Mustafa was my everything. He was 
irreplaceable. " 19 The effect that Mustafa's optimism, high 
spirits and determination had had on the movement's recovery 
from its darkest hours had been significant. For Massoud, 
his death marked the loss of perhaps the most consistent 
16 Arab interview, 12 November 1994, p. 6. 
17Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 6. 
18Arab interview, 12 November 1994, p. 5. 
19Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, p. 23. 
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factor in his life since the arrest and execution of their 
mutual friend and mentor Habib Rahman in 1974. For all of 
the Fedayees it was a stark illustration of the dangers that 
lay ahead. 
The training continued at Chah-e-ahoo, but the 
lighthearted atmosphere that had existed during the first 
critical weeks following the Nuristanis' departure was 
gone, never to return. In its place, throughout the war, 
Massoud developed the ability, in trying times, to remain 
upbeat, often making little jokes. In this way, and 
perhaps others, the emulation of the fallen deputy 
commander was to have a lasting effect on the front's 
development. 
One of the first major problems that the men had to 
confront was that by the time the Fedayee training began, 
fewer than twenty automatic weapons remained of the more 
than two hundred that had been collected during the 
rebellion. "Our number increased. Half of us had arms 
and the others did not, " Massoud recalled. 20 To rectify 
this shortage, the fighters asked the men whom they knew 
had captured arms to either become Fedayees or give up 
their rifles. Few complied with this order and it was 
consequently decided to seize forcibly weapons from men 
who had received them during the summer fighting. A 
search of certain houses in Safid Chihr yielded a ný_Jn 110r 
20 Ibid., p. 25. 
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of the captured weapons and, more significantly, 
delineated for the first time the rebels' marshal 
authourity over the area. 
Despite their rising stature, however, the rebels 
seem to have soon exhausted many of the resources and 
goodwill of the upper-Balais, as tensions between the 
group and the Safid Chihris reemerged. The fighters were 
soon forced into a meagre existence. "We had no lamp at 
that time, we made candles from the fat of goats that we 
slaughtered for meat. We had no tea or sugar, and instead 
we used walnut shells [for making teal .,, 
21 
It is interesting, and indicative of the implicit 
contract with the valley's khans, that while it was 
considered acceptable to seize weapons by threat of force, 
no similar efforts were made to obtain food. The 
shortages were partly made up for by a number of Panjsheri 
traders and khans who continued secretly to send the 
rebels assistance despite the disapproval of some of the 
other khans. Much of this relief was delivered at night 
to prevent the government or Ahmad Jan sympathizers from 
knowing its source. 
Return to the Pa'een 
When the men had reached a satisfactory level of 
competence, the decision was made to take the group, then 
21 Ibid., p. 25. 
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about fifty strong, down the valley to "renew the 
commitment" of various men who had supported the rebellion 
and to retrain them. Massoud was eager to use his newly 
trained force to try to reactivate veterans of the 
rebellion: "The programme was to go to all the sub-valleys 
of Panjsher. From valley to valley we set up centres. "22 
Additionally, there remained the question of the ownership 
of weapons seized during the summer; clearly Massoud 
wanted to control as many arms as possible. The front's 
position was that "if someone captured an arm, he cannot 
claim ownership. The arm should be handed over to the 
headquarters. No ownership can be claimed. " It was also 
decided that the "commitment" would involve a non-compete 
clause: "No one is allowed to form a special group for 
himself, everything should belong to a single 
authourity. "23 This was in part directed at Ahmad Jan and 
the people of Safid Chihr, about whom Massoud had been 
receiving increasingly alarming reports. 
Similarly, despite the fifty-percent Paryani, fifty- 
percent Dasht-i-Rewati force envisioned by Fazel Ahmad, in 
reality about two-thirds of the initial recruits came from 
Dasht-i-Rewat while the remaining third were mainly from 
Paryan, with only two volunteers from the Pa'een. In all, 
about ninety-four percent of the Fedayees were Balais 
(Table 1 below). 
22 Ibid., p. 25. 
23 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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Table 1: 
LIST OF ORIGINAL PANJSHER FRONT FEDAYEE* 
NAME VILLAGE AGE ROLE IN REBELLION 
M. Ibrihim Dahane Rewat 22 Salang 
A. Ghafur Dahane Rewat 20 Salang 
M. Arab Dahane Rewat 40 
M. Razzaq Dahane Rewat 28 
M. Khalid 
Sayad Ja far 
M. Aman Dasht-i-Rewat 22 Darband 





Amir Hamza Grenju 28 




Azmuddine Bazarak 28 
A. Wasie Shasht 28 
M. Hakim 
Rahman Beg 




A. Hanan II (? ) 




*Source: Hafiz Mansur, Diary of a Jihad, p. 8; and 
information collected during author interviews. 
**Matin was not a real fighter, but had honourary Fedayee 
status. 
This composition of fighters contrasted with the 
predominantly Pa'eeni leadership of the militants, who 
were now the "instructors. " In the absence of Mustafa, 
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Tarjuman Abdul Haq, a Balai, now played an increasingly 
important role in supporting Massoud and his kinsman 
Ghaus, both Pa'eenis, and Zabet Agha Gul, who was from 
Shamali and also considered a flatlander. 24 Their chaplain 
Mawlawi Abdul Latif was another Pa'eeni. 
Ahmad Jan, their former partner, recognizing this 
disparity and hoping to discredit Massoud, with whom he 
had now completely fallen out, attempted to disparage the 
rebel commander and the other militant leaders as 
outsiders in the Bala. Recalled Massoud: 
They were making attempts to divide Panjsher into two 
parts, Bala and Pa'een, and provoking differences. I 
am from Pa'een while the Mujahedin and commanders were 
all from Bala. I was alone. Ahmad Jan was inciting the 
people to not allow a man from Pa'een to come here and 
be a commander: "[Massoud] should go back to his 
village. He has no money. The work of the state is in 
progress. X25 
The problem was, to a great extent, alleviated by the fact 
that while Massoud and others began taking on more formal 
leadership roles, in a very real sense Matin, Fazel Ahmad 
and other Balai khans were still in charge. Not only did 
they control the purse strings, but they also maintained 
the loyalty of their clansmen enlisted as Fedayees. If a 
problem arose with one of the recruits, the militants 
would take the issue directly to that man's khan, and if 
one of the men had a problem with the front's leadership, 
he could rely on his khan to resolve it. With most of the 
24 Even more foreign to a Bolahi than a Pa'eeni. 
25Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 28 September 1994, pp. 23-24. 
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khans in the villages above Dasht-i-Rewat supporting the 
movement, Ahmad Jan's argument was greatly diminished. 
Much as with the mullahs - outsiders who were brought 
in by the khans to provide services, were given authority 
in their field, and were treated with respect and paid - 
the rebels quickly became integrated into the villages. 
This arrangement had the benefit for the militants that 
politically they were viewed as representatives of the 
khans, and thus were given respect similar to that 
a 
accorded to the traditional leaders themselves. And as 
outsiders they did not have to worry much about local 
politics. This might have worked less well in other 
places, but with men as respected and direct in their 
communications as Matin and Fazel Ahmad, there were 
apparently few problems, even despite the animosity some 
of their own clansmen felt towards the militants. 
Massoud, Ghaus and their colleagues attempted to 
organize the Fedayee, much as they had planned the 
rebellion before it, so as to eliminate the distinctions 
between the clans and to elevate their shared identify as 
"Panjsheris. " "I asked the people of Dasht-i-Rewat to 
make an oath on the holy Koran not to flare up ethnic 
conflict, " Massoud said, "and after that we were all 
brothers among ourselves and started our Jihad. "26 As the 
fall of 1979 wore on, however, it became clear that Ahmad 
26Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 6. 
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Jan's ongoing provocations to the south posed a real and 
grave threat to the rebels' political strategy. Quite 
literally, the Safid Chihris became a bottleneck 
restricting the rebels' ability to broaden their guerrilla 
movement below the northern end of Safid Chihr. 
Greatly alarmed by this state of affairs, Massoud 
decided to confront the problem before it assumed 
uncontrollable proportions and headed for Safid Chihr for 
a meeting with Jan. As he recalled later: 
There was no other choice, either we had to fight 
against Ahmad Jan or make reconciliation with him... All 
the Mujahedin, all the guests, the people from Sharnali, 
all in all we were sixty men. We had little weapoil,; 
but we were sixty people. I thought and thought, but 
could not find a solution. I said, "We are going to 
his house. " So we went directly to Ahmad Jan's 
house. 27 
A heated meeting at the wrestler's residence failed to 
produce results, as Jan refused to acknowledge Massoud's 
authority. Yet Massoud clearly had the upper hand, as a 
growing number of the town's residents, including severlil 
of Ahmad Jan's people, expressed their readiness to join 
the rebellion. Ignoring a desperate attempt by Ahmad Jan 
to convince the fighters to stay in the town and mend 
fences, which Massoud and his officers suspected to be y. -t 
another devious ploy, the rebel force departed en route 
for the town of Sha'bah, which they reached after a few 
days of hazardous journey in the snowy mountains. 
27 Ibid., p. 7. 
2o1 
Locating themselves in the large house of a local 
supporter, in the mountains above the town, the rebels 
were assigned their first operation by Massoud: an ambush 
of a government convoy. "Massoud [wanted] to see the 
skill and the operation of the group, " recalled Aziz. 
"For this reason he sent a number of the Mujahedin down 
the valley and he himself became the [overall] commander 
of the operation. " 28 
Return to Bazarak 
This baptism of fire was an unqualified success. Waiting 
along the side of the road one night, the rebels attacked 
a truck, killing a couple of officers and injuring some 
others. In the pocket of one of the dead officers, most 
likely an intelligence operative, the rebels found four 
thousand Afghani in cash. The truck was also carrying 
three hundred kilograms of sugar. 29 
Emboldened by this success, Massoud made an important 
strategic decision. Having learned that government forces 
had quit Bazarak and were garrisoned in Rukha, he decided 
to return to his hometown. Setting out for Bazarak with 
half his forces, Massoud left Mohammad Gada, who had 
distinguished himself on the first day of the rebellion, 
in command at the base they had set up in Sha'bah. 
28Aziz interview, 10 December 1995, p. 9. 
29Ahmad Shah Massoud interviews, 28 September 1994, p. 26, and 5 
April 1995, p. 11; Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 9. 
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"Commander Gada was more intelligent than the others. 
Therefore, I assigned him as the commander in Sha'bah and 
we went to [Bazarak], " Massoud explained. 30 
At this point the political situation in the lower 
valley remained extremely jumbled as men like Bashi 
Sa'duddin, the khan of Bazarak, who had led men into 
battle against government forces during the rebellion, 
were compelled to embrace the Communists, much as Anwar 
had while in detention eighteen months earlier. Like many 
of the other chiefs, Sa'duddin had established cordial 
relations with the government intelligence officials who 
had moved in when the front collapsed, and had done his 
utmost to put them at ease. He did not like them hanging 
around his town and hoped that by being polite he could 
minimize their presence. 31 
Recognizing how tense the situation in the Panjsher 
remained, the Amin government, not noted for restraint, 
had exercised caution in the key Persian valley. That 
decision may well have been guided by Soviet security 
personnel; by September, some two to three thousand Soviet 
officers were reported to already be in the country, 
working closely with the Afghan security forces. 32 The 
Soviets, more familiar with Afghan history than their U. S. 
30Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 11. 
31Bashi Sa'duddin Khan interview, June 1994. 
32International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1979. 
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counterparts, well understood the Tajiks' significance in 
the nation's development. 
Between the time of the collapse of the front at 
Feraj and the Fedayees' first ambush in Sha'bah, fewer 
than a dozen Panjsheris had been arrested and only the 
Bazarak malawi, Haji Buhanuddine Jan, and his two sons are 
believed to have been executed. 33 Still, a climate of fear 
pervaded the valley as stories of mass executions 
continued to filter out from Kabul. All knew that the 
peace in the Panjsher was fragile, though the disingenuous 
but earnest pledges of men like Sa'duddin that the rebel 
movement was finished may have helped lull government 
representatives into a false sense of security. Even the 
attack on the military vehicle at Sha'bah might have been 
minimized as a criminal act, though officers in Rukha were 
likely disturbed by the incident. 34 
Arriving in the Parandi Valley above Bazarak in late 
November 1979 with some twenty men, Massoud apparently 
received a cool reception. "In Parandi the people 
gathered, " the commander later remembered. "Bashi 
Sa'duddin and other people like him and Bashi Amir were 
against this [establishment of a rebel base]. They had 
contact with Parchamis. i35 Although a number of men came 
out to greet the party, none seemed willing to shelter the 
33 Bashi Sa'duddin Khan interview, June 1994. Also see Roy, Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 96. 
34Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 11. 
35 Ibid., p. 11. 
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outlaws in their home until a former army officer, Toran 
Abdullah Jan, finally stepped forward. 
Abdullah Jan was one of the most respected men of the 
clan, and while Sa'duddin was willing to criticize Massoud 
in the hope of driving him out of town, he would not go as 
far as to countermand his venerated kinsman's invitation. 
"When we were settled in the house of Abdullah, people 
demonstrated against us and protested our stay in 
Parandi, " Aziz recalled. "They were claiming that `If you 
stay here then war will break out and we will be faced 
with difficulties and trouble. r1136 
While it was less of a welcome than the guerrilla 
chief might have hoped for, it was much warmer than the 
treatment he had received when departing his own village, 
just two kilometres away, the previous fall, when armed 
relatives tried to facilitate his capture. Massoud was 
back in the Pa'een. He was determined to make the most of 
the opportunity. 
For a number of days the guerrillas remained holed up 
in the dwelling just off the main road, rising early each 
morning to recite Koranic verses, dispatching a few 
messengers and spies, and discussing plans, but remaining 
hidden and out of touch with the local population. 
Fearful of detection and not knowing what to do next, 
their spirits began to sink. 
36Aziz interview, 12 October 1994, p. 10. 
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Then one day Sa'duddin came to visit them. Seeing 
the dejected looks on the guerrillas' faces as they sat 
around the house, he suggested that they go to Bazarak 
"and tell the people whatever you have . f/37 Massoud seized 
the moment to talk through his differences with Sa'duddin. 
Within days, the two men had developed a routine as they 
travelled from village to village promoting their cause. 
Sa'duddin would introduce Massoud, speaking of his 
accomplishments. Vigorously gesticulating as was his 
habit, the khan would denounce the Communist regime and, 
holding his lips in an expressive downturned position, 
inquire of the villagers if, as good Muslims, they could 
afford not to oppose the non-believers. 38 
Massoud, in a quiet, reverent mode, would then recite 
chapters of the Koran and speak about the virtues and 
history of their people and the aims of his movement. 
Following the khan's passionate words, the serenity of the 
amir's presentation seems to have had a pleasing, almost 
hypnotic, effect on the audiences. When he was finished, 
Massoud simply asked the people if they would join the 
movement. 39 Of the ten or fifteen presentations they made 
in the first couple of weeks to small groups of 
Sa'duddin's kinsmen up and down the Parande valley, 
37Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 11. 
38 Bashi Sa'duddin Khan interview, 18 June 1994. 
39Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 11. 
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virtually all listeners pledged support . 
40 "At that time 
[Sa'duddin] made a good initiative and he joined us to the 
people, " Massoud later acknowledged. "Otherwise we were 
an exiled group. "41 
In each village, after recruiting men, Sa'duddin and 
Massoud assigned a financial representative to collect 
taxes in wheat and livestock to be delivered to the 
front's local headquarters. The system worked quite well 
and soon they had covered all of the Khan's villages 
between Bazarak and Andarab. The guerrillas soon moved 
into a house owned by Sa'duddin in a safer location, four 
or five kilometres north of Bazarak. In this way, the 
khan both alleviated the risk of harbouring the rebels in 
Abdullah Jan's house, just several hundred metres above 
the town, and, as their host, took direct responsibility 
for their movement, much as Fazel Ahmad had done in Paryan 
earlier that autumn. 42 
Having canvassed all of Sa'duddin's territory, 
Massoud decided to cross the Panjsher River and start 
working in the opposite valley known as Manjahor. As in 
Parandi, he initially had trouble making headway and 
Sa'duddin, being an outsider, was of no help. Eventually, 
through the help of a local supporter, Massoud got a start 
90Bashi Sa'duddin Khan interview, 18 June 1994. Parande is a valley 
running due north of Bazarak that connects it to Andarab. 
Traditionally, it has been ruled by the khan of Bazarak. 
41Ahmad Shah Massoud interview, 5 April 1995, p. 11. 
42 Ibid., p. 11. 
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and began his political activities on the northeast bank 
of the Panjsher. Shortly afterward, the khan of Manjahor, 
Bashi Amir, and his son Azim joined the movement. 43 
This success was quickly overshadowed on December 10, 
1979, when twenty-one Mujahedin were killed on the bridge 
in Bazarak in a nighttime government attack. Two rebels 
were captured alive and executed two days later by 
government supporters in the Dashtak vicinity. 44 
Moscow Acts 
Earlier that same day, the Soviet defence minister, 
Dimitri Ustinov, had summoned his chief of staff, General 
Nikolai Ogarkov, and informed him that the Politburo had 
decided to deploy at least seventy-five thousand troops to 
Afghanistan. According to one account Ogarkov was 
"surprised and outraged" by such a decision, and said that 
seventy-five thousand would not stabilize the situation 
and that he was against the introduction of troops, 
calling it "reckless. " The defence minister cut him off 
harshly: "Are you going to teach the Politburo? Your only 
duty is to carry out the orders. " 
Accordingly, late in the day, Directive 321/12/00133 
was issued by the Soviet Defence Ministry providing for 
the formation of a new army in the Turestan Military 
District. So fearful was Ustinov about the authorization 
43 Ibid., p. 12; Aziz interview, 12 October 1995, p. 11. 
99Mansur, Diary of Jihad, p. 9. 
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being disclosed by even the highest levels of the Red 
Army, that he appears to have insisted on it being 
conveyed to his senior generals orally . 
45 
The Rebellion in Perspective 
What effect the Panjsher Rebellion - which had erupted in 
June of that year and almost immediately cut off Kabul's 
communist regime from the USSR - had on the Politburo's 
decision remains, in part, a subject for speculation. As 
was described in Chapter 5, it was this event, and the 
resulting spectre of a specific and ongoing strategic 
security threat to the Kabul regime, that set off a chain 
of events beginning in late June 1979. The Soviet 
deployment of special operations forces to Bagram Airbase 
and Prime Minister Hafisullah Amin's taking over the 
Ministry of Defence portfolio both appear to have been 
direct consequences of the Salang event. 
The deployment may have drawn Soviet personnel into 
engagements in the Panjsher such as the December 10 attack 
in Bazarak, and it certainly provided Moscow with direct 
reports of the ongoing insurgency in the northeast. At 
the same time, Amin's assumption of the defence post, for 
which the Panjsher Rebellion served as a critical pretext, 
effectively elevated him to the position of Commander-in- 
Chief, creating the power base from which he ordered the 
45Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, pp. 109-112. 
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assassination of President Taraki in mid-September 1979. 
Together these factors, directly triggered by Massoud's 
return to the country in May 1979, greatly alarmed the 




The Soviet decision to intervene has been widely 
linked directly to Amin's homicidal behaviour and the 
risks it posed for the USSR. Yet were it not for the 
presence of a specific domestic security threat, Amin's 
continued leadership may have been palatable for the 
Politburo. In and of itself, it did not pose a direct 
threat to Soviet hegemony in northern Afghanistan, whereas 
the Panjsher revolt did. 47 
The events of the subsequent three years show that 
once the Soviets became enmeshed in the foreign campaign, 
the Persian front and its defenders quickly became the 
principal threat to the Fortieth Army, as the Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan became known. Between April 1980 
and September 1982 the Red Army launched at least six 
major offensives into the strategic Panjsher Valley, none 
with lasting results. In January 1983, a KGB official 
46 The killing probably took place on 15 September 1979. See Arnold, 
Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, pp. 84-98, for the best analysis 
of the Soviet motivation to remove Amin. Also see Bradsher, 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, pp. 173-180. 
97 Arnold cites the importance of the cutting of the Salang Highway, 
which he describes as "Kabul's main land route north the USSR, " but 
he mistakenly identifies it as a September event; undoubtedly the 
two-month lag was a function of the scant reporting the event 
initially received, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism, p. 87. Also 
see Urban, War in Afghanistan, pp. 44,144-145, for further 
discussions on the strategic importance of the Salang route. 
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signed a cease-fire protocol directly with Commander 
Massoud. By that point the USSR's prospects of 
suppressing the Persian resistance in northeastern 
Afghanistan had effectively ended. One year later, peace 
talks began in Geneva, leading to the final Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989. 
The decision to invade Afghanistan and "remove H. 
Amin by the hands of KGB special agents" was made on 
December 8,1979, by "a narrow circle" of the Central 
Committee and was implemented two days later by the Soviet 
defence minister. 48 All this was in stark contrast to the 
Central Committee's response to the March 1979 killing of 
several dozen advisors in Herat on the Iranian border. At 
that time, after reasoned discussion within the Central 
Committee, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin phoned President 
Taraki to refuse politely to commit Soviet personnel, 
telling him, "I do not want to disappoint you, but it will 
not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the 
whole world will know about this. " 49 The basic question 
remains, what changed from March to December? 
The Soviets could dismiss the Herat event in March as 
essentially a terrorist attack on an isolated periphery - 
suppressible, in characteristic Soviet form, with more 
48Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, p. 109. 
49 Transcript of telephone conversation between Kosygin and Taraki, 
from "The Soviet Union and Afghanistan 1978-1989: Documents from 
the Russian and East German Archives, " in Cold War International 
History Project Electronic Bulletin, Issues 8-9 (Winter 1996/97), 
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington, D. C., 
p. 26. 
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terror. Similar excuses could be made regarding the 
Nuristani rebellion along the Pakistani border. However, 
as was shown in Chapter 5, the cutting of the Salang 
Highway, in contrast, was perceived as a strategic assault 
requiring a strategic response. Though declassified 
Soviet records do not directly point to the Salang event 
as the cause of the intervention, considering the reasoned 
and cautious comments made at the March 1979 Central 
Committee meeting in the wake of perhaps the gravest 
attacks on Soviet personnel since World War II, one can 
hardly imagine that just six months later the security 
incidents occurring in the Southern tribal belt, including 
Paktia, Nangahar and Kandahar Provinces, would be deemed 
sufficient grounds for intervention. 
As Ispahani points out, "The significant events that 
led to the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan - the legacy 
of the Great Game, the making of the Durand Line, the 
Afghan-Pakistani quarrel over the future `state' of 
Pashtunistan - were all caught up in the web of Central 
and South Asian Routes. '150 From the Soviet perspective, 
the roads connecting Kabul with the southern and eastern 
tribal belt towns were of secondary importance. Of 
primary importance were the routes connecting Kabul with 
the USSR, and political control of the historically 
tranquil northern territories surrounding them. 
50lspahani, Roads and Rivals, p. 84. 
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Arguments by Klass and others that the primary 
objective of the invasion was to secure warm water access 
seem equally improbable . 
51 By 1979 the leadership in 
Moscow seems to have become, through a decade and a half 
of active engagement with Washington, quite realistic 
about the limits of Soviet power beyond their own borders. 
Proceeding inductively, and recognizing that the 
USSR, since unwittingly gaining entry into Afghanistan in 
1955, had repeatedly cited a critical security interest in 
the northern part of the country relative to the presence 
of the fifty million Muslims on the far side of the Amu 
Darya River, and also that no other rebellions took place 
in northern Afghanistan in 1978 or 1979 posing a 
significant threat to the Kabul supply lines, one is led 
to conclude that one of the critical catalysts leading to 
the USSR's 1979 intervention was the nationalist Persi, zn 
rebels' closing of the Salang Highway in June-July 1979. 
Significant fault has been levelled at the Carter 
Administration for failing explicitly to challenge 
suspicious Soviet troop movements immediately prior to the 
invasion. Even Douglas Brinkley, a sympathetic biographer 
of Jimmy Carter's, has accused Carter of having 
"championed a post-cold-war foreign policy before the cold 
war was over. " As Brinkley concludes in The Unfinished 
Presidency, "The stupidity of the Soviet invasion of 
51See Klass (ed. ), The Great Game Revisited, pp. 1-30. 
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Afghanistan turned Carter into a hawk. "52 Prior to the 
actual event, Carter, a committed believer in detente, 
could not be persuaded that a Soviet offensive war was 
likely. 53 
Regional instability, highlighted by the toppling of 
the Bhutto and Pahlavi governments, of course was also a 
significant factor in the Soviet decision. 54 The 1977 
military takeover in Islamabad and Khomeini's 1979 
revolution in Tehran demonstrated the tremendous 
vulnerability of Moscow's underbelly. Were the Amin 
regime to fall, Soviet Central Asia would be encircled by 
a group of anti-Soviet Islamic governments stretching from 
Azerbaijan to Kashmir. That the Soviets effectively had 
been handed a special interest in Afghanistan by inept 
post-World War II U. S. diplomacy could only have 
heightened the Kremlin's desire to combat the Islamic and 
nationalist trends in that state following the Salang 
incident in the summer of 1979. Again, considering the 
52 Douglas Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency (New York: Viking, 
1998), pp. 20-23. 
53 See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar 
Straus & Giroux, 1983). 
54 Additionally, according to Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 
"The Kabul [KGB] residency reported, possibly inaccurately, that 
secret meetings had taken place at the end of September between 
representatives of Amin and the `extreme Muslim opposition, ' at 
which the possibility of expelling all Soviet officials, releasing 
all imprisoned Muslim rebels, and ending the civil war had been 
discussed. " Certain officers in the KGB had come to believe that 
the only way to prevent Afghanistan falling into the Islamic orbit 
was direct Soviet intervention, the first step of which "was to 
assemble a dependably pro-Soviet Afghan government-in-waiting to 
take power after the overthrow of Amin. " On 25 October 1979, a KGB 
officer, Alexander Petrov, met in Prague with Babrak Karmal, the 
leader of the Parcham faction, who was then serving as Afghan 
ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was 
Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New 
York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 397-398. 
274 
reasoned arguments made in March 1979 following the Herat 
event by veteran detentists such as Dmitry Ustinov and 
Yuri Andropov, their decision to champion intervention at 
the critical December 8 meeting, and the high risks 
associated with that course, seem to indicate a 
desperation caused by nothing less than a perceived 
security threat to the USSR itself. 55 
55Georgy M. Kornienko, The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant 
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye, 1994), pp. 193-195. Also see Andrew and 
Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, p. 269: "Gromyko's 
influence on the decision, however, was clearly inferior to that of 
Andropov and Ustinov. KGB special forces played a more impor+-. nt 
role in the invasion than any other previous conflict, and were 
charged with the assassination of the supposedly traitorous 
President Hafizullah Amin. " Though one senior KGB officer 
attributed this decision to a "Kremlin fantasy, " claiming that "a 
great breakthrough [in Afghanistan] would demonstrate [Soviet] 
effectiveness, showing the world that Communism was the ascendant 
political system, " these sentiments, while pointing the blame at 




On December 24,1979, the Soviet Union began its 
intervention in Afghanistan. As Samuel Huntington writes 
in his 1996 study The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World order, the ensuing ten-year war's 
"impact on the Islamic world was, in effect, comparable to 
the impact which the Japanese defeat of the Russians in 
1905 had on the Oriental world. "' As such, in conclusion 
it is worthwhile examining some of the specific factors 
that guided Ahmad Shah Massoud and his cadre towards their 
ultimate leadership of the critical 1979 Panjsher 
Rebellion, and to briefly review how those factors shaped 
the movement's success. The introduction noted that, to a 
large extent, credit for this rebellion belongs to a broad 
leadership group. However, as in other momentous geo- 
political events, in the Panjsher revolt it was the 
personal drive and inspiration of one leader, above all, 
that became emblematic of the entire endeavour. Having 
covered in detail in the body of this work the 
contributions of the nationalist cadre, this conclusion 
will focus on the commander of the Panjsher resistance. 
Egalitarian and highly traditional in his 
nationalistic outlook, Massoud was exactly the type of 
person destined to challenge effectively the might of the 
USSR. Much like certain celebrated figures of North 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking 
of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 247-247. 
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America's anti-colonial struggle, the key founder of the 
Persian resistance of the 1980s was able to accomplish 
dramatic political changes while not disrupting the 
general underpinnings of his society specifically because 
he was deeply aware of it. Schooled by nationalist 
leaders such as Faizani, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Mohammad 
Anwar, as described in Chapters 2 and 3, not to mention a 
handful of French educators at the elite Lycee Istiglal in 
Kabul, Massoud well understood by May 1979 that initiating 
an effective rebellion would require a full partnership 
with the Panjsher Valley's traditional leaders. His plan, 
upon returning from exile in Pakistan, was to win the 
support of the khans of the upper Panjsher with logical 
and precedented arguments similar to those used by Anwar 
in initiating the original Nuristani rebellion the 
previous summer. 
Massoud did not at first possess the strength to 
displace any of the chiefs and knew there would be risks 
in alienating any of them. He also knew that the movement 
would eventually become much stronger if he could 
incorporate broad segments of the populace into it. He 
was a member of one of the most distinguished clans in the 
Panjsher, with a father who had served as the valley's 
nominal commander as a young boy during World War I, a 
paternal grandfather who had personally served an earlier 
amir, and a maternal grandfather who was a respected 
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attorney from the principal Panjsheri town of Rukha. 
This, as much as any factor, provided him with useful 
contacts and access to men such as Haji Abdul Matin and 
Ahmad Jan, who were critical in sparking the rebellion. 2 
The militants' success from the first days, however, 
went far beyond Massoud's personal stature in the 
community. In particular, what stands out in so many of 
the published accounts of the early days are testimonies 
regarding his remarkable energy and drive. 
This factor is widely attributed, behaviourally and 
perhaps genetically, to Massoud's mother, a learned though 
not formally educated woman, who instilled in all of her 
children a sense of public spirit and enterprise. She had 
been "a strong character exerting a lot of influence on 
her children, " Massoud's older brother Yahya told an 
interviewer in 1982.3 She once rebuked her husband when he 
suggested buying one of Massoud's brothers a motorbike as 
a reward for a positive report card, saying, "Do your 
children ride horses? Can they use guns? Are they able 
to be in society with people? These are the 
characteristics that make a man. i4 
Dost Mohammad's wife had taught herself to read and 
it is interesting that Massoud, from a young age, used his 
2 This point was confirmed by Engineer Ayoub in an interview on 12 
December 2004. 
3 Sandy Gall, Behind Russian Lines (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1983), p. 79. 
4 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 109. 
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intellect to help tutor other children. Later, he would 
encourage his fighters, with an almost religious zeal, to 
teach themselves to read. As a teenager during the 1967 
Six-Day War, with coaching from his father, a formally 
trained military officer and by then a colonel, Massoud 
took it upon himself to lecture his classmates daily on 
the conflict's developments. This relentless 
determination, undoubtedly later strengthened by the 
horrors of the 1978 Communist coup and its aftermath, 
appears to have primarily derived from the influence of 
his publicly-spirited mother. 
Although she had died prematurely during the years 
Massoud was in exile in Pakistan, the presence of his 
younger brother, Ahmad Zia, at his side for much of the 
rebellion, and of his sister, Mrs. Mohammad Ghaus, who 
cared for him while he was recuperating from his wounds 
during the late summer of 1979, as well as the fact that 
much of the drama of the rebellion occurred within a short 
distance of his family's native village of Jangalak, could 
only have reinforced these values. 
Beyond connections and a deep desire and drive to 
serve the interests of a state Persian-Afghans had played 
such a central role in building, the third attribute 
commonly ascribed to Massoud and his militant colleagues, 
particularly Mustafa, was an uncanny understanding of 
historical figures and particularly ones involved in 
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recent revolutionary events. This factor, propelled by a 
personal appreciation of the central role played by 
Persians in the development of Afghanistan, enabled the 
young militants to envision the rebellion well in advance 
of its realization. By comparing the situation to events 
such as the Cuban Revolution and the French resistance 
during World War II, they convinced themselves, and many 
others, that they could see into the future. The 
realization that contemporary events could have a profound 
impact on the direction of cultures greatly heartened the 
militants, who often discussed the broad studies that they 
had conducted in Pakistan. These had included works by 
Mao; "Le livre de Mao, il est tres bon, " Massoud told a 
reporter in 1982, presumably in reference to a Persian 
copy of the Chinese leader's autobiography he had read. 
He also praised works by Che Guevara and Regis Debray, as 
well as a non-conventional warfare guide published by U. S. 
Special Forces. 5 Personal visits with foreigners who had 
participated in opposition struggles in places such as 
South Africa and Iran added to this historical analysis of 
contemporary liberation movements. 6 
Almost from the moment of Massoud's early political 
awakening during the Six-Day War, his quest for historical 
understanding became a means of realizing that he could, 
as a paradoxically enfranchised ethnic minority, have an 
5 Gall, Behind Russian Lines, p. 155. 
6 Es-Haq interview, 5 October 1994. 
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impact on his own country's path amid national 
deterioration caused by Soviet subversion. It was this 
third factor, an identification with historical events and 
an understanding of certain resistance leaders, which 
provided the factual basis to convince skeptics such as 
Bashi Sa'duddin, khan of Bazarak, that resistance, however 
modest initially, could over time have significant 
results. 
The next key characteristic was Massoud's belief in 
teamwork. He recognized in his mid-twenties the 
significance of what management expert Warren Bennis would 
later call the phenomenon of the Great Group. Bennis, 
whose early work on the subject as a young economics 
professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was 
spurred by a lecture given by Margaret Mead, concluded 
that "the usual way of looking at groups and leadership, 
as separate phenomena, was no longer adequate. "' He 
recognized that extraordinary results - such as the 1937 
production of Snow White, the first full-length animated 
film, or the Manhattan Project's completion of the atomic 
bomb in 1945 - were products less of individual leaders' 
actions than of the dynamic creativity of sophisticated 
teams. "The most exciting groups, " Bennis wrote in the 
book he eventually published on the subject in 1997, 
7 Warren Bennis, Organizing Genius: The Secrets of Creative 
Collaboration (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. xv. 
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"resulted from a mutually respectful marriage between an 
able leader and an assembly of extraordinary people. ,8 
Although Massoud was unaware of Bennis' argument, its 
thesis appears to have been central to the commander's 
planning when he returned to the Panjsher some eighteen 
years before the book's publication. From the outset, the 
young rebel leader was determined to recruit the most 
extraordinary and able people for the rebellion, 
regardless of their religious education or religious 
views. 
In his description of the development of the Afghan 
resistance organizations in 1978-79, Olivier Roy calls 
Jamiat, of which Massoud was one of two principal military 
commanders, the "dominant party, " attributing this to the 
fact that since the earliest days of the Herat and 
Panjsher Rebellions it "had renounced its quintessential 
[fundamentalist] character to absorb people who were not 
ideologically committed. i9 This pragmatism, though 
arguably a central feature of Afghan-Persian culture 
itself, was evident in the elaborate efforts Massoud made 
in recruiting the agnostic Ahmad Jan and his earlier 
service under the firmly atheist initiator of the 
Nuristani rebellion, Mohammad Anwar. In addition to 
8 Ibid., p. xvi. 
9 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 120. Ismail Khan, who 
played a role in the March 1979 Herat uprising and thereafter 
became the key commander of western Afghanistan until 1996, 
returned in 2001 and served as governor until the summer of 2004. 
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taking this pragmatic, or perhaps more accurately, 
nationalistic, view towards religious orthodoxy in the 
early days of the rebellion, Massoud simply looked for the 
best talent he could find. Consequently, in addition to 
prominent individuals such as Abdul Matin and Sa'duddin 
Khan, scores of Panjsheris of modest origins such as Abdul 
Aziz, previously an obscure but highly intelligent auto 
mechanic, quickly found themselves at the centre of a 
burgeoning movement and were treated with a level of 
respect similar to that bestowed on the recognized leaders 
and scions of the valley. 
The synthesis of individuals from diverse backgrounds 
was perhaps the late Mawlawi Faizani's most significant 
contribution to the key rebellion which would spawn the 
anti-Soviet nationalist movement of the 1980s. As Edwards 
writes, Faizani's "openness to people from various 
backgrounds" enabled the Muslim Youth for a time to "hold 
the loyalty of some Shi'a students. " 10 The inter-sectarian 
experience in Faizani's circle may have had a significant 
impact on Massoud. Though the Panjsher has only a small 
non-Tajik Hazara minority (almost entirely Sunni), 
throughout the rebellion, and later, the commander 
consistently made a significant effort to blunt clan 
loyalties and to put an end to terms such as "bad bloods, " 
which previously had been used to describe some of l-Jie 
loEdwards, Before Taliban, p. 230. 
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poorer clans. " In these ways, Massoud manifested many of 
the characteristics of leaders highlighted in Bennis' 
book, such as General Grove, the nominal "commander" of 
the Manhattan Project, whose approach to leadership was 
simply to recruit the most talented individuals he could, 
foster a meritorious working environment, and ensure that 
team members were supplied with the necessary resources to 
pursue their research and development. 
An inclination for team building alone, however, does 
not sufficiently explain the militants' success in the 
Panjsher. It seems that there was a fifth distinct 
component of Massoud's successful leadership of the 
rebellion, one which, in particular, points to the speed 
with which he was able to integrate into the culture of 
the upland khans. 
To use the words of historian James Collins, this 
factor could be described as a blend of "extreme personal 
humility with intense professional Will. f112 In a 2000 
study, Collins and a team of researchers combed the 
financial results over fifteen years for America's five 
hundred largest publicly-owned corporations before 
selecting eleven organizations whose values had 
outperformed market averages by 342 percent to 1,850 
percent. After completing exhaustive interviews of the 
"Said Aga interview, 5 June 1994. 
12 James Collins, Good to Great (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2001), p. 21.284 
chief executives at these, and eleven underperforming 
comparison companies, Collins' team came to an unexpected 
conclusion. The leaders in the higher-performing group 
were, in the researchers' words, "all cut from the same 
cloth. ff 13 Furthermore, the study showed, "the absence of 
[such] leadership showed up as a consistent pattern in the 
comparison companies. - 14 While the second facet of this 
condition - Massoud's intense belief in public service 
has already been mentioned, it is the former 
characteristic, his modesty, undoubtedly in part due to 
the stunning failure of the 1975 rebellion, that completes 
the pentagonal explanation of the success of the 1979 
movement. 
The leadership of the Panjsher Rebellion could well 
have served as a case study for the correlation between 
organizational success and managerial humility. The 
adjectives emanating from Collins' research - "quiet, 
humble, modest, reserved, shy, gracious, mild-mannered, 
self-effacing, understated"15 - could fairly be applied to 
key leaders like Haji Matin, Mustafa, Agha Gul, Aziz, 
Mohammad Pannar, Haji Zahir and Fazel Ahmad, who, partly 
as a result of their educated, mercantilist and 
13 The researchers identified eleven comparison companies that "were 
in the same industry as the good-to-great companies with the same 
opportunities and similar resources" over the same fifteen-year 
period when the outstanding results were achieved. " Collins, Good 
to Great, p. 8. The fifteen-year transition periods ranged from 
1964 to 1999. 
14 Collins, Good to Great, p. 22. 
15Ibid., p. 27. 
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militaristic Persian culture, comfortably subordinated 
themselves to Massoud and his lieutenants. It is here 
that Mountstuart Elphinstone's second definition of Tajik 
culture, from 1809, cited in Footnote 1 of this Thesis, 
can best be understood. ("They are excellent infantry, 
particularly among the hills. i16) This pattern of 
understatement and cohesion has often been described by 
commentators who observed the Panjsher resistance in the 
1980s. 
As Sandy Gall pointed out in his 1982 book, "Massoud 
was a good listener"; the author added that the guerrilla 
chief "talked about his position with almost clinical 
detachment. " 17 This perspective was undoubtedly encouraged 
in the rebellion's early days by his association with his 
older brother-in-law, Major Mohammad Ghaus, a career 
fighter pilot whom Massoud revered and who was personally 
driven to avenge the executions of several hundred of his 
brother officers that took place in the early days of 
Afghanistan's second Communist coup in 1978. 
It had been only through Massoud's family's 
connections and their diligence in winning the release of 
Ghaus that he had been spared a similar fate. Though 
Massoud was the nominal head of the group of militants 
that returned to the Panjsher in May 1979, it is clear 
16Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, reprint 1972), p. 409. 
17 Gall, Behind Russian Lines, p. 48. 
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from accounts that Ghaus, with his contacts in the 
capital, probably within Faizani's circle of officers, and 
his personal ties to Massoud, functioned as the architect 
of the campaign and bestowed a sense of decorum and 
competence that were fundamental to its early success. 
In addition, Massoud was strongly influenced by his 
experience with other seasoned and unassuming leaders such 
as Anwar in Nuristan, where he learned first-hand the 
critical importance of civil administration in waging 
guerrilla war. In contrast to the self-aggrandizing 
political rhetoric of the Pakistani-based political 
leaders, Massoud, by adopting the role of a field offi-er 
and serving at, or near, the front for most of the 
rebellion, styled himself as a hands-on practitioner 
rather than a visible figurehead of the movement that he 
would go on to play such a key role in building. 
While the commonly ascribed factors - his intense 
energy, his family's civic values and a sense of history - 
should not be underestimated, these three additional 
characteristics - his societal position, his rigorous 
inclination to build teams, and his modest persona - were 
also highly significant in the genesis of Afghanistan's 
Persian nationalist movement of the 1980s. 
As the events of the early 1990s demonstrate, the 
USSR's grasp on its Muslim and particularly its Baltic 
republics, by the late 1970s, was weak. Uzbekistan and 
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Tajikistan, on the Afghan border, were perceived to be 
vulnerable to events in northern Afghanistan, where 
hundreds of thousands of their citizens had fled after the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution. 18 While the dissolution of the 
USSR caught international observers off guard, few 
individuals living outside of the country were more 
enthusiastic about the potential demise of Moscow's grasp 
of Soviet Central Asia than the northern leaders of 
Afghanistan's Islamic Youth movement. Of this group, by 
December 1979, Ahmad Shah Massoud already stood out, as an 
individual, as a member of an ethnic group that had played 
a major role in the development of his nation over the 
previous one hundred fifty to two hundred years and, 
perhaps most significantly, as a representative of a 
hearty upland subset of that group that was willing to 
challenge the greatest threat posed to the country's 
independence in the twentieth century. 
This group's presence in the critical territory 
between the supply lines established by President Jimmy 
Carter's CIA following the assassination of the American 
envoy to Kabul in February 1979, and the primary overland 
route from the Soviet Union through the Hindu Kush to the 
Afghan capital, was to be a decisive factor in the 
ultimate outcome of the Soviet intervention. While today 
it is increasingly being recognized by popular authors 
18For a good account, see Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze. 
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such as Steve Coll, George Crile and others, as was cited 
in the introduction, that the Panjsher Valley was the 
place where the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended, 19 
it is no less important to appreciate the major role that 
the Panjsher played in that event's beginning. 
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